have summoned forth innovative measures which have given practical expression to the Charter’s concepts of how international peace and security might be maintained.
Certainly the inter-state use of force in the years since 1991 has not produced anything like the international response triggered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The conflicts which broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Cameroon and Nigeria, Israel and Lebanon, and Ethiopia and Somalia did not provoke the UN to identify an aggressor and to authorize action against it. The reaction of the Security Council to the outbreak of inter-state conflict since the end of the Cold War, just as during the Cold War, has generally been to avoid condemnation and the attribution of responsibility and rather to call for a ceasefire and the restoration of peace. It is in internal conflicts rather then interstate conflicts that the experience of Iraq seems to have had a more significant impact.
With regard to Iraq, Resolution 678 (1990) authorized member states to use ‘all necessary means’ to ensure Iraq immediately and unconditionally withdrew all its forces from Kuwait and to restore international peace and security in the area.5 There now seems to be general agreement that the original scheme of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, even after the end of the Cold War, is not workable, and that it should not be for the UN itself to conduct enforcement operations. Instead there is consensus that it is for the Security Council to authorize member states to take enforcement action, even if the precise legal basis for this in the Charter is not clear.
The Security Council has not again authorized member states to use force against an aggressor state in the same way as it did against Iraq. In most cases the host state has consented to the UN-authorized operation, or even requested it. The situations nearest to that of Iraq are those where the Security Council authorized the use of force against a group involved in an internal conflict when that group did not comply with its obligations under a UN-brokered or approved ceasefire. This was the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina where member states were authorized to enforce the no-fly zones over Bosnia and to protect the ‘safe havens’; these measures were in fact directed against the Bosnian Serbs.6
The 1994 operation in Haiti can be seen as an action against a state, or rather against a military junta that had illegally seized power. This may be seen as a new development in UN action: the authorization to use force to restore a democratically elected government. In response to a military coup in 1991 overthrowing the first democratically elected government in the history of Haiti, the Security Council condemned the coup and demanded the replacement of the constitutionally elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. After the Security Council agreed on the imposition of an oil and arms embargo in 1993, the junta and the ousted President concluded the Governors Island Agreement, requiring the return of the lawful President and the restoration of democracy. The agreement included provision for a peacekeeping force, UNMIH. However, when an advance party of UNMIH tried to land in Haiti they were rebuffed.
The Security Council decided that in the absence of the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, UNMIH could not be deployed. Accordingly in Resolution 940 (1994), (12–0–2, China, Brazil), acting under Chapter VII, it authorized member states to create a multinational force to ‘use all necessary means’ to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership and the prompt return of the legitimately elected President, the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that would permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement on the restoration of democratic government. It also authorized the revision and expansion of the mandate of UNMIH, which was to take over from the multinational force when it had established a secure and stable environment necessary to restore and maintain democracy in Haiti. As it turned out, the US-led multinational force was able to land and carry out its mandate peacefully; it was duly replaced by UNMIH in March 1995. However, the situation in Haiti remained precarious and the re-established democracy was not secure.7
From its first resolutions on Haiti the Security Council stressed that this was a unique and exceptional case. Certainly the willingness of the Security Council to find that the situation in Haiti created by the failure of the military authorities to fulfil their obligations under the Governors Island Agreement and to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions calling for the restoration of the democratically elected government constituted a threat to peace and security in the region went further in its discretion under Article 39 than any other such finding.8
Ten years later in 2004 the Security Council again voted to establish a multinational force to intervene in Haiti. This time it no longer stressed the unique and exceptional nature of the case, and this time it is difficult to portray the intervention as pro-democratic. The USA was no longer willing to support President Aristide whose left wing political views were not attractive to the Bush administration. After controversial legislative elections in 2000 returned Aristide to power, the main bilateral donors cut international assistance to the government of Haiti, the poorest state in the western hemisphere, and withdrew their support from President Aristide.9 The situation in Haiti deteriorated and violent disorder spread. In 2004 armed insurrection broke out; opposition forces seized control of half the territory.10 The regional organizations CARICOM and the OAS made proposals to seek a political solution by the creation of a new government. President Aristide agreed, but the opposition did not. The Security Council initially condemned the opposition for this rejection.11 CARICOM and the OAS accordingly went to the Security Council in February 2004, asking for the establishment of a peacekeeping force in Haiti. There was considerable support for this proposal.12
But three days later the Security Council chose to follow a different route.13 France, the former colonial power, and the USA put pressure on President Aristide to step down.14 He left the country and subsequently accused the USA of forcing him into exile. The USA denied this.15 In Resolution 1529 (2004) the Security Council unanimously (without public debate) determined that the situation in Haiti constituted a ‘threat to international peace and security and to stability in the Caribbean, especially through the potential outflow of people to other States in the subregion’. Acting under Chapter VII it authorized the immediate deployment of a Multinational Interim Force for a period of not more than three months, to contribute to a secure and stable environment and facilitate the provision of humanitarian need. It authorized member states participating in the force to take ‘all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate’. The USA, France, Canada and Chile provided the 3,400 strong US-led force.16 CARICOM subsequently expressed criticism of the path taken by the Security Council; it regretted that it had not chosen to establish a peacekeeping force.17 After three months the MIF was replaced by a UN stabilization force, MINUSTAH, which remains today.18 The situation in Haiti at the end of 2007 has improved, but is still not secure.19
In Rwanda and Albania the Security Council used Chapter VII to authorize force to further humanitarian ends, as it had earlier in Yugoslavia and Somalia.20 Thus in Rwanda the Security Council responded to the request from France for authorization under Chapter VII to establish a safe humanitarian zone; in Resolution 929 (1994), passed by 10–0–5, the Security Council stressed the strictly humanitarian character of the operation which was to be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion; determined that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constituted a threat to peace and security in the region; and acting under Chapter VII authorized member states to conduct a temporary operation under national command aimed at contributing in an impartial way to the security and protection of displaced persons at risk in Rwanda and to use ‘all necessary means’ to achieve its humanitarian objectives.21 In Albania the Security Council expressly affirmed the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Albania, and determined that the breakdown of law and order in Albania and the collapse of effective government constituted a threat to peace and security in the region. It therefore welcomed the offer by certain member states to establish a temporary and limited multinational protection force to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to help create a secure environment for the missions of international organizations in Albania. It authorized member states participating in the multinational protection force to conduct the operation in a neutral and impartial way. In contrast to the other operations, it did not use the phrase ‘use all necessary means’ (or ‘all necessary measures’); rather, it used Chapter VII only to authorize member states to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel of the multinational force.22 The Security Council also used this formula in the case of the Central African Republic; in Resolution 1125 (1997) it welcomed the establishment of MISAB, the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements, set up in January 1997 at the request of the Central African Republic and, acting under Chapter VII, authorized those states to ensure the security and freedom of movement of their personnel. In April 1998 this force was replaced by a UN force, MINURCA, when France withdrew its logistical and financial support from MISAB and it was unable to continue on its own.23 The situation remained unstable and after the termination of MINURCA in 2000 another regional force was established; this remained in the Central African Republic at the end of 2007. The stability of the Central African Republic was further threatened by the crisis in Darfur and in 2007 the Security Council agreed to establish a new EU military force in the Central African Republic and Chad. This was authorized to use all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate ‘to contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, to contribute to the protection of UN personnel’.24
In East Timor the authorization of force was more far-reaching. The breakdown of law and order and widespread killing after the consultation process led the Security Council to authorize a multinational force (INTERFET) led by Australia to intervene. Under Resolution 1264 (1999), passed under Chapter VII, the Security Council authorized the establishment of a multinational force under a unified command structure, pursuant to the request of the government of Indonesia, to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support the UN mission in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations; it authorized the states participating in the multinational force to take ‘all necessary measures’ to fulfil this mandate. This multinational force was to be deployed until replaced as soon as possible by a UN peacekeeping operation and six months later it handed over to UNTAET.25
The Secretary-General has recognized that this delegation of UN functions to member states is necessary, given the limited resources at the disposal of the UN and its inability to mount an enforcement action. In the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace he acknowledged that the Security Council did not then have the capacity to deploy, command, and control an enforcement action. Although it was desirable that in the long term the UN should be able to conduct such operations, it would be folly to undertake them at a time when the UN was hard pressed even to carry out its peacekeeping commitments. However, he spoke of the dangers to the UN if it seemed to be sidelined; its stature and credibility might be adversely affected. Operation Desert Storm had given rise to concern among states about the need to limit the discretion of member states authorized to use force and to a determination not to repeat what came to be seen as flaws in the mandate of the operations. Thus, at the time of the operation there was concern about the lack of UN control over the decision as to when to start the operation and over the conduct of the campaign, about the wide and unclear mandate and about the lack of a time limit on the coalition action.26 Yemen and Cuba voted against Resolution 678 (1990), partly on these grounds. Yemen said that the resolution was vague and not related to any specific article of Chapter VII. The Security Council would not have any control over the forces and command was not with the UN. Cuba argued that the text of Resolution 678 (1990) violated the Charter in that it authorized member states to use military force in total disregard of Charter procedures. China abstained because it sought a peaceful solution and had difficulty with accepting the resolution because the phrase ‘all necessary means’ permitted the use of military action.27 When the Security Council subsequently authorized member state operations it increasingly took care to ensure a greater degree of Security Council control. States which abstained on, or opposed, Security Council resolutions authorizing new member state forces did so, not because of doubt about the constitutionality of such operations, but because they had concerns about the particular operation. China most often expressed such concerns.28
After the operation against Iraq, only UNITAF in Somalia and the 1994–95 NATO operations during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia (and KFOR in Kosovo) were not time-limited, but even these UNITAF and NATO member state forces were subject to greater limits than Operation Desert Storm had been. Member states were required to act in close coordination with the Secretary-General; in the former Yugoslavia this was interpreted to require the consent of the Secretary-General to any use of force by NATO in order to guarantee coordination and to avoid danger to the UN peacekeeping forces on the ground. The member state operations in Rwanda, Haiti and Albania, and all subsequent operations except for KFOR,29 were subject to fixed time limits and all had to be renewed by the Security Council. Also in all these operations the states concerned were required to report to the Council on a regular basis on the implementation of the resolution.
There is also a danger that interested states operating under UN authorization would gain legitimacy to further their own interests. The early tradition of not using the forces of permanent members of the Security Council or of those states with geographical or historical interests in the state concerned has been further circumvented through this type of operation. Thus it was the USA that led the 1994 and 2004 operations in Haiti, France in Rwanda and the Central African Republic (1997), Italy in Albania, and Australia in East Timor. There was some suspicion of the motives of these states. In Rwanda Operation Turquoise was criticized for providing a safe haven for the perpetrators of genocide. These were, however, all temporary, limited forces operating with the consent of the host states even where this was not expressly indicated in the relevant resolutions. It is not clear that the use of the EU to lead an operation instead of a single member state will necessarily meet this concern as to ulterior motives. There were newspaper reports that the use of the EU in the DRC was interpreted by some as evidence of foreign state support for the incumbent President in the elections.30 And Chad seems to have regarded an EU force led by its former colonial power and current supporter, France, as more acceptable than a UN force.31
The three operations authorized in 2003 were also all limited, temporary operations. The first was in the Côte d’Ivoire, and was designed to help in the implementation of a political agreement between the different factions.32 A coup attempt in September 2002 led to fears for the stability not only of Côte d’Ivoire, but of the region. There were deep divisions between the government-controlled south and the rebel-controlled north of Côte d’Ivoire. ECOWAS forces were quickly sent and the French troops already in Côte d’Ivoire by agreement with the government were increased.33 Agreement between the different parties in Côte d’Ivoire was reached in January 2003 in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, but there was still considerable unrest and the states in the region called for Security Council authority to be given to the ECOWAS and French forces.34 Accordingly Resolution 1464 (2003), passed unanimously, welcomed the deployment of ECOWAS and the French forces with a view to contributing to a peaceful solution to the crisis and the implementation of the peace agreement. Under Chapter VII it authorized member states participating in the ECOWAS forces, together with the French forces supporting them, to take ‘the necessary steps to guarantee the security and freedom of movement of their personnel’ and to ensure the protection of civilians immediately threatened with physical violence within their zones of operation.35 This went further than the authority given to the member state forces in Albania and the CAR, but, like them, the member state force in Côte d’Ivoire was not actually established under Chapter VII.
This authorization continued until the establishment of a UN force, UNOCI, under Chapter VII in April 2004.36 The 4,000 French troops remaining in Côte d’Ivoire were then authorized by Resolution 1528 (2004) to use ‘all necessary means’ to support UNOCI in the performance of its mandate. This authorization was given for an initial period of 12 months and has been renewed many times up to the present. France was requested to report ‘periodically’ to the Security Council. France was not willing to put its troops under UN command and it stipulated the functions they were and were not (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) to carry out.37 It would continue to oversee compliance with the ceasefire between government and rebel forces and to act as a rapid reaction force.
There was some anti-French feeling in Côte d’Ivoire and suspicion that the French force was not truly neutral, but that France was putting pressure on the government for its own ends. Anti-French riots broke out in 2003 and 2004.38 However, the Security Council clearly supported the French intervention. The Secretary-General had made it clear in his report on the establishment of a UN force that without French assistance a much larger UN force would have been needed.39 When government forces attacked opposition forces in November 2004, and in the process harmed the French forces, in violation of the ceasefire, France responded by destroying the small Côte d’Ivoire air force.40 In Resolution 1572 (2004), passed unanimously, the Security Council condemned the attack by the government of Côte d’Ivoire; it confirmed that the French forces and UNOCI were authorized to use all necessary means to carry out their mandate under Resolution 1528 (2004) and expressed full support for the action taken by the French forces. It imposed an arms embargo on Côte d’Ivoire. Interestingly, the Security Council expressly referred not only to UNOCI, but also to the French forces, as ‘impartial forces’ in the preamble to Resolution 1721 (2006) and in some, but not all, subsequent resolutions; this phrase was apparently taken from the Secretary-General’s reports.41 UNOCI and the French forces remained in Côte d’Ivoire at the end of 2007.
The second member state force authorized in 2003 was the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in the DRC.42 This had a crucial military role in ending factional fighting, but only in one small area of the DRC. The IEMF’s role was to end the factional fighting in Bunia when MONUC, the UN peacekeeping force, had not been able to do so. Fighting had been going on in the resource-rich DRC since 1998 and many neighbouring states were involved in the conflict. After the Lusaka Peace Agreement in 1999 the Security Council had created a UN peacekeeping force, MONUC, but it faced serious difficulties in securing enough troops and delays in deployment because of the insecure situation.43 A further peace agreement in May 2003 did not end the fighting in the gold-rich Ituri province in the north-east of the country. The small and lightly armed UN peacekeeping force stationed in Bunia, the main town in the Ituri province, proved unable to cope with the extreme violence which broke out between opposing militias.44 In May the UN Secretary-General asked the Security Council to act; he expressed deep concern about the rapidly deteriorating situation in the region and requested the Security Council urgently to consider his proposal for the rapid deployment of a highly trained and well-equipped multinational force under the lead of a member state.45 The President of the DRC, the parties in Ituri and the governments of Rwanda and Uganda supported the Secretary-General’s request, and the Security Council in Resolution 1484 (2003) unanimously authorized under Chapter VII the deployment of a 1,500 strong Interim Force, authorized to take ‘all necessary measures’ to fulfil its mandate. The IEMF was led by the EU in its first military operation outside Europe, Operation Artemis. In contrast to those in Albania, Central African Republic and Côte d’Ivoire, the IEMF was established under Chapter VII, as befitted its more military role. It was to act in close coordination with MONUC, to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation required it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, UN personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town. It was expressly said to be deployed on a ‘strictly temporary’ basis to allow the Secretary-General to reinforce MONUC’s presence in Bunia. It was replaced by a 2,500 strong MONUC brigade with a robust mandate on 1st September 2003.46 Over the subsequent years MONUC was incrementally expanded to meet the challenging conditions until it was the largest, most expensive peacekeeping operation in the world.47
When presidential and parliamentary elections were finally held in 2006 the Security Council once again turned to the EU to provide military assistance to MONUC. In Resolution 1671 (2006), passed under Chapter VII, it established EUFOR-RDC on a strictly temporary basis, with a fixed-term mandate, authorizing it to take ‘all necessary measures’ to support MONUC during the elections in case the mission faced serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate. The government of the DRC supported the temporary deployment of an EU force. EUFOR-RDC was also to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, to ensure the security and free movement of its own personnel and to execute limited operations to extract individuals in danger. These tasks were to be taken upon a request by the Secretary-General, or in emergency cases, in close consultation with MONUC. The EU was to report regularly not only to the Security Council, but also to the government of the DRC on the implementation of this mandate. The EU reported that the deterrent effect of EUFOR-RDC was a significant factor in limiting the number of incidents. The 2,400 strong EU force was decisive in containing the potential spread of violence at a sensitive moment in the election process.48 The EU claimed that EUFOR-RDC had confirmed its position of neutrality in the eyes of the Congolese population and had reinforced its credibility.49 However, there were newspaper reports that the European presence confirmed that foreign governments were backing President Kabila, just as they had propped up President Mobutu in order to secure access to the mineral resources of the DRC.50 As in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, EU members were not willing to participate in the UN force, but preferred to operate under a separate Chapter VII authorization. The UK representative to the Security Council said, ‘Whereas the EU member states were less active in UN peacekeeping, they hoped to be able to build the capacity to rapidly deploy when necessary, thereby contributing strongly to international efforts when needed.’51
Third, the Security Council established a force in Liberia, also on the initiative of the Secretary-General; it again turned to ECOWAS.52 Here Security Council action was delayed, apparently for political reasons. The USA was unwilling to intervene in its former creation. Ever since President Charles Taylor was elected in 1997 after a prolonged civil war, other states had accused him of intervention in neighbouring states. Sanctions were imposed on Liberia by Resolution 1343 (2001) for its interference in the civil war in Sierra Leone. In June 2003 President Taylor was also indicted by the Sierra Leone Special Court for war crimes committed during the ten-year civil war.53 Armed opposition to him in Liberia had been increasing since 2002, and in 2003 opposition forces gained control of much of the country and advanced on the capital, Monrovia. On 4 June 2003 President Taylor agreed to stand down and this was welcomed by the Security Council.54 A ceasefire was then agreed between the warring parties, but soon broke down. The UN Secretary-General wrote to the Security Council, expressing deep concern at the flagrant violations of the ceasefire.55 The intense fighting around Monrovia had made it evident that international action was urgently needed to reverse Liberia’s drift towards total disintegration. The consequences of allowing the situation to spiral out of control were too terrible to contemplate, not only for Liberia but also for the states of the sub-region, particularly Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. He therefore requested the Security Council to take urgent action to authorize the deployment of a highly trained and well-equipped multinational force under the lead of a member state, to prevent a major humanitarian tragedy and to stabilize the situation in Liberia. He regretted that this was the second such initiative he had had to propose in recent months, but he was again compelled to do so by a grave humanitarian and security situation with massive potential for exacerbating regional instability. He later requested the USA, the former quasi-colonial power, to consider spearheading the deployment of the force.56
Despite this plea the Security Council delayed in order to obtain further reports on the situation; it did not send in a force to restore law and order until it was confident that President Taylor would actually depart.57 ECOWAS informed the Security Council that it was willing to deploy 1,500 troops to Liberia by mid-August to serve as the vanguard for the multinational force proposed by the Secretary-General. In July 2003 the Secretary-General repeated his deep concern at the dramatic deterioration of the situation on the ground and said it was absolutely essential to accelerate the deployment of the ECOWAS vanguard force, ECOMIL, followed by a full multinational force and then a UN peacekeeping operation.58 The Security Council at the start of August in Resolution 1497 (2003) finally authorized member states under Chapter VII to establish a Multinational Force to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, including establishing conditions for initial stages of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, to help establish security in the period after the departure of the current President, to secure the environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to prepare for the introduction of a longer term, 15,000 strong, UN stabilization force to replace the Multinational Force.59 It authorized member states in the Multinational Force to take ‘all necessary measures’ to carry out its mandate. The USA did not directly take part, but it provided a task force of over 2,000 marines off the coast of Liberia.60 Like the IEMF in the DRC, this force was actually established under Chapter VII because of the significant military role assigned to it. The deployment of the substantial French-led force was followed by a comprehensive peace agreement in August 2003 and the situation in Liberia improved.61
These forces authorized under Chapter VII by the Security Council reveal the pattern of European involvement in African conflict. As was shown in the previous chapter, developed states have generally been reluctant to contribute troops to UN peacekeeping, especially in Africa. They prefer to contribute to limited Chapter VII action when authorized by the UN. They may also provide direct assistance to the governments of their former colonies or to regional organizations. The EU has recently taken a much more active role in undertaking Chapter VII action in Africa.62 These operations have been created after a UN force has proved unable to act effectively because of limited resources, as in the DRC in 2003, and Côte d’Ivoire in 2006; or to prepare for a UN operation, as with the French-led multinational force in Liberia, and with the ECOWAS and French forces in Côte d’Ivoire in 2003. The Security Council has also turned to the member states of the AU to take action in Sudan and Somalia.63
In 2007 the Security Council authorized a new EU military force in Chad and the CAR to help to bring an end to the long-lasting regional instability. The governments in Chad and the CAR were both under threat from armed opposition forces, and since 2003 the conflict in neighbouring Darfur had further destabilized the region. The significant cross-border movement of rebels and refugees had a serious impact on security. Chadian rebels operate from Sudan, and Sudan in turn accuses the government of Chad of supporting the opposition forces in Darfur. The UN Panel of Experts reported in 2006 that, ‘The Sudan/Chadian border is no more than a line in the desert, the concept of a border being often ignored by nationals of both countries. Insurgents from the Sudan and Chad regularly cross the border unhindered. Since December 2005 there has been an increase in attacks on both Sudanese and Chadian villages along the common border . . . The ongoing crisis stems from tribal conflicts in the two countries and a power struggle in Chad . . . The territory of Sudan has been used as a staging ground to topple at least two Chadian presidents.’ 64 The Security Council expressed deep concern at the deteriorating relations between Chad and Sudan.65 It was also concerned that the deterioration of relations between Chad and Sudan might negatively affect the security and stability of the CAR. It called for the adoption of a sub-regional approach to stabilize the borders.66 The situation in the CAR was worsening, especially along the borders with Chad and Sudan. The government of the CAR accused Sudan of supporting the rebellion against it.67
The UN Secretary-General initially suggested the creation of a multidimensional UN force along the borders of Chad and the CAR with Sudan, but this was not acceptable to Chad.68 Chad later agreed to accept an EU military force; the UN would provide only civilian staff.69 Accordingly Resolution 1778 (2007), passed under Chapter VII, authorized the EU to deploy for one year and ‘to take all necessary measures’ in eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR to contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, to contribute to the protection of UN personnel. The EU was to liaise with the UN and with the governments of Chad and the CAR, and to report twice during the year to the Security Council.
Thus the 3,000-strong EU force was to have a more robust mandate than that of the AU peacekeeping force then operating under great pressure in Darfur until it could be replaced by a hybrid UN/AU force by the end of 2007.70 France was to lead the EU force; it already maintained a substantial military presence in its former colony, Chad (now a significant oil producer) in support of the government of President Déby. This may help to explain why the EU force, under French leadership, was more acceptable to the government of Chad than a UN force. France also maintains some forces in the CAR, another former colony, where it assisted the government to maintain power against rebel attacks in 2006–7.71