(…) to institute a Democratic State for the purpose of ensuring the exercise of social and individual rights, liberty, security, well being, development, equality and justice as supreme values of a fraternal, pluralist and unprejudiced society, based on social harmony and committed, in the internal and international spheres, to the peaceful solution of disputes (…)

Preamble of the Brazilian Constitution¹

We began the republican values’ investigation without a classical ode to the triad “Freedom, Equality, and Fraternity,” not for its minor importance (it summarizes vectors of the human spirit that we have not been able to accomplish yet and which remain as some of the greatest desires of enlightened humanity), but because they keep on developing, articulating, and materializing in multiple axiological topics, of which the Preamble of the Brazilian Constitution is one of the most eloquent examples.² With the advantage of articulating and balancing all the values, principles and rights that nowadays compete for a renewed idea of Republic.

Nowadays, it is necessary, of course, not to consider the values in abstract (even without naming them) but, on the other hand, to think them over and to practice them in comparison with other alternative values and with the respective anti-values.

In a very inspirational conference on the present and the past of the Republic, the historian António Reis asks: “What are, then, the republican values? How are they distinguished from the liberal values, the conservative values and the socialists’ values? Why the need to talk today of the republic values again, when Europe has lived the second half of the twentieth century immersed in the confrontation between a liberal-conservative ideology, the socialist-democratic ideology and the communist ideology?”³

And the conclusions that we come up with are fully satisfying. Whether it is about the values that keep on enunciating affirmatively, or whether it is about what concerns the enemies of those values.

The first axiological idea we have in this matter, although it is not in itself only a value, is the idea of Republic. Already in Rome, after a complex evolution, the Res Publica was seen with respect, veneration, even dedication. Because the public thing is a thing of everyone, it is above of the individualisms (and particularisms and egoisms).

Republican ethics are opposed in a way, to the kingdom’s mythification, which can as well, naturally, have mythical ethical elements.

Although republicanism is moderate and opting clearly for the public interest, it does not stop from being attentive to the needs and rights of the people. Being aware of the importance of the State, republicans are not friends of State hypertrophy: nor the minimal state, nor the monstrous state, but the optimal one. They are defenders of a State (better said, of the Republic, but that would be a detail for now) educator and communicator, fully democratic (with suffrage, representativeness, political pluralism, etc.), and Human Rights paladins.

Ultraliberalism (at least the ultraliberal or neoliberal canon, because there are many liberalisms), by the extreme emphasizing of the individual does not match the ethical republican’s ideals, which are not individualistic and more social than collective (but never collectivists). Although, surely, the class particularism of the socialisms (and they are equally plural) also does not instigate republican applause, which would stay in a position between the liberal and the socialist, or better. Being able to raise, whether in liberals as well as in socialists, that moderation and deliberation of contraries that balance freedom with equality, in a way that hopefully may one day lead to the bloom of the fraternity.

These ideals evidently have shades. Denis Collin, for example, finishes his book-manifest “Revive la République,” in a way which is not very divergent, but has other tones. He suggests an alternative:

(…) si nous voulons sauvegarder non seulement l’héritage du mouvement ouvrier, mais aussi le meilleur de notre passé républicain et le meilleur de la tradition libérale.⁴

Evidently, strictly speaking, neither the State, nor the democracy in its diverse manifestations, even Human Rights are not valued. They all seem to be inserted in the extent of a greater value, which is Freedom, but a more consequential and complete Freedom than the classical one.

Truthfully, the republican values (or, if we prefer, the republican superior values—since there might be others which are subordinate to them: sometimes called principles) are those from the well-known triad: Freedom, Equality, and Fraternity. As superior values, or secondary values, or—we believe that it’s even better—principles, arising from these values are secularism and citizenship.

The case of Justice is more complex: it is, without doubt, a superior value but not only republican, being sometimes put in the place of Fraternity (such as in the Spanish Constitution) for several reasons, but in general, sort of announcing it. As a species of transitory value (but not less important because of that), it’s not overcome in its full realization, the Fraternity. Justice is not only a value, but also a juridical principle.

Let us pay a little attention afterward to two “secondary” values, or principles more currently invoked. We believe that secularism is a specification of the two first values. Implying, right away, full religious freedom, positive, negative, and neutral, as well as neutrality and equality in the treatment of all. Another value of this kind is citizenship: It is especially an implementation of freedom, as well as political pluralism.

Politics is always, at least partly, opposition between friend and enemy (Freund/Feind). That is why certain authors (some surely less republican) invented it. And the Republic goes wrong if, wrapped in its idealism, it forgets the elementary truths of politics.

The Republic cannot be kept from bothering those that do not affiliate with their point of view, the ones that are or would be impaired materially or in immaterial privileges with their full realization, etc. For that (or because of that), there are people who do not like it, and people who fight against it. And nothing would be more natural. What we should never have is a Manichean attitude, according to which “who isn’t for us is against us.” The republican idea has already suffered, in some cases, from an exaggerated fervor that mistreated and even suppressed the enemies. It is not the case in any way nowadays, in which it has learned its lessons. So, by talking about “Republic enemies,” we are not even talking about concrete people. But about positions, perspectives and realities that counter it.

António Reis, in the aforementioned conference, enunciates not enemies, but dangers to the republican values. It is important to quote:

The education for citizenship is just as urgent as we know the dangers that threaten republican values. Without being exhaustive, we shall enumerate some of them:

1. The culture of the egotist individualism and of the values of the personal success, of easy money, in clear opposition to the communitarian feeling of ‘res publica’ and to the individual sense of honour and merit for work.

2. Corporatism, lobbyism and populism, in opposition to the culture of national and public interest.

3. Laxity, in opposition to the courageous democratic authority.

4. The devaluation of the culture of public service and of the role of the State, with the negative consequences that that diminishes the value of equality and justice.

5. The cultural homogenization of globalisation, with the threat to national cultural identity.

6. Xenophobia and racism, in opposition to the universal sense of Humanity.

7. The indifference or even contempt by politics and politicians, with the concurrent elevation of economics, in opposition to participative citizenship.

8. The pseudo democracy of opinion or television democracy, with privilege granted to spontaneous and individual opinion, through polls or statements, easily confused with the totality of the opinion, and which ignores the need for mediation of organized participation in institutions, harming the debate, personal reflection and the exercise of a critical spirit (…)”⁵

From these topics it is not hard to enunciate the necessary antidotes in summary, some of which could really be based on the respective roman values:

All these vectors need to be framed and promoted for an education for citizenship, for Human Rights, and in fact an extended legal education, not to make citizens obedient to the laws (no one obeys from only knowing), but above all to make them conscious of the rights and duties and of their close interconnection. Authors like Norberto Bobbio have already realized that the democracy could pay the price for not educating (sufficiently, properly).

Republican ideas do not agree with institutional and legal laxity, nor with neoliberal dismantlement of the State, instead they want a vigorous State (though flexible and naturally democratic, of rights and of culture), capable of assuming the fullness of its functions, all of its functions. And one of the essential tools of that renewal of the State (non statist, non totalitarian nor collectivist—obviously) is precisely the explanation of its importance for education. Without it, a passive mentality grows, for which the State, just like Sartre’s hell, “it’s the others,” in relation to who and to whom affinity and duties are not recognized. This mentality leads to parasitism that always calls for subsidies and handouts from the State, without giving anything in return. And it is this parasitism that set at risk—caricatured and made gigantic by the market theologians, betting on the dismantlement of the State and averse to all social policies—the social State.⁷

We end this question by considering what remedies could make the republican citizen flourish, instead of the skills of some and of the cadaveric rigidity of others. Here then, is a text for deep meditation:

(…) any general organization that limits the individual liberties immediately produces a moving reaction in which everyone is solidary. (…) The police, as representative of the general law, are considered the enemy, therefore reaction appears.

In the same way, the official, even when he wears the uniform and is forced to obey the law, has the similar difficulty in representing an impersonal role. (…) The minor official holds desperately to the law, without trying to understand its spirit. He doesn’t want to solve any case which is not current and passes it on to his hierarchical superior. He feels bad and uncomfortable, stuck in a straitjacket that stops him from being himself and from supporting his human instinct. (…) This tendency of overlapping the human sympathy to the general requirements of the law means that much of the time, social and public life revolves around the efforts and requests of friends. He is asked to help them pass exams in order to avoid military service, to get a job, to win a case, to pass through life’s difficulties (…).⁸

This was typical of Portuguese society in times of the dictatorship. The question is: Was it only in that society and only at that historical period?

We live and we will always live in the French Revolution, of the verb of its tribunes, of the thoughts of its philosophers, whose theses, principles, ideas and values will never perish and are constantly renewed, because they unswervingly conjugate two legitimacies, two sovereign wills: one of the People and one of the Nation.

That Revolution progressed like that until the present day, with the social State candied in the principles of freedom, equality and fraternity.

Paulo Bonavides, Do Estado Liberal ao Estado Social, 7th ed., 2nd print, São Paulo, Malheiros Editores, 2004, p. 36⁹

It is not convenient to make long considerations about values that are myths, and whose capacity of arousing action and of inspiring fables resides in subliminal appeal, in its immense capacity for acquiring new perceptions and of continuing to bear the same flag for diverse causes. Over the centuries, what Freedom, Equality, Justice, and Fraternity are has been discovered and aggregated into new understanding. At times, correcting others … here and there proscribing an abusive, local, and particular interpretation. Following a path of rationality, in scope and also attention to the rights of the minorities … It is an exciting walk that honors Humanity. In a short time (in few centuries, in some cases in a couple of them), the semantic evolution has been a witness of the spirit’s progress of humanity in discovering the deepest of its Humanity.

Therefore, it is important to recall the essential milestone that was the proclamation of Humanity’s emancipation, with the Enlightenment (that lately has had an interesting translation as “clarification”—which it is as well) that made Men begin to shake off (without doubt with not always good attempts) of the minority’s shackles.¹⁰ This theoretical proclamation was made, as we know, through Emanuel Kant, in his famous Was ist Aufklärung?, in 1783. There’s always some desire to read it out loud, as a proclamation of the emancipation that it is:

Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen. S e l b s t v e r s c h u l d e t ist diese Unmündigkeit, wenn die Ursache derselben nicht am Mangel des Verstandes, sondern der Entschließung und des Mutes liegt, sich seiner ohne Leitung eines andern zu bedienen. Sapere aude! Habe Mut, dich deines e i g e n e n Verstandes zu bedienen ! ist also der Wahlspruch der Aufklärung.¹¹

As we know, Republicanism owes a lot to the Enlightenment.¹² As does the French Revolution. Always, as we know, with the shadows that implementation places in the light of ideals. No doubt, Republicanism and Enlightenment are a mark without which Humanity would still live spectrally, with little hope of emancipation. If Was ist Aufklärung, by Kant, was the shout for emancipation, the French Revolution was the first triumphant political event with sufficient echos of change that it is yet to be achieved. The historian Paul Hazard paints a portrait of contrast:

Quel contraste! Quel brusque passage! La hiérarchie, la discipline, l’ordre que l’autorité se charge d’assurer, les dogmes qui règlent fermement la vie: voilà ce qu’aiment les hommes du dix-septième siécle. Les contraintes, l’autorité, les dogmes, voilà ce que détestent les hommes du dix-huitième siècle, leurs successeurs immédiats. Les premiers sont chrétiens, les autres antichrétiens; les premiers croient au droti divin, et les autres au droit naturel; les premiers vivent à l’aise dans une société qui se divise en classes inégales, les seconds ne rêvent qu’égalité.”¹³

Jean Starobinski explains in depth what happened in the French Revolution and the mixture of the lights of reason with sinister and dark impulses.¹⁴ Maybe a similar analysis would be useful to understand how the dreamed-of Republic has not yet been fully achieved to the present day. The text isn’t very long, and it would be worth reading it all. Let’s say with this synthesis, even though very incomplete, of the misfortune of the revolution: “By desiring to establish a kingdom of virtue, the revolutionary reason inevitably becomes suspicion’s kingdom, and soon that of horror.”¹⁵

But, if the achievements are imperfect, we should not think that it would be better not to dare. And it is by mistakes that we learn, as it is because of the dream that we keep on going.¹⁶

The Republic today is a lot more than the simple fact that the Head of the State (or the State’s vertex, though merely a symbol) has to be elected and is temporarily in that position. On the contrary, monarchy does not change: the King is king lifelong and the office is hereditary.¹⁷ Some old monarchies had an elective process, such as the Visigoth one. But that was long ago. A democratic mentality that does not give in to sentimentalist and traditionalist arguments without doubt chooses the first solution, the Republic. This happened, for example, in the referendum accomplished in Brazil (even though with all the criticisms that can be rightfully made to the referendums, which from the start was demagogy on the loose).¹⁸ In spite of how very democratic a monarchy can be, it has always an anti-democratic vice of basis (and irremediable within its logic): that of the nation’s supreme magistrate who is non-elected nor removable at the end of a relatively short amount of time.

Therefore, what is more the order of the day with republican thought, which once solved this question socially (without despising, naturally, the beliefs and monarchical activities of some, sometimes with a lot of activism, imagination, intelligence and rhetorical cleverness, but always elitists and minorities—and, in our modest opinion, without reason), is precisely the problem of values and virtues related to the republican hope. When we speak about the Republic, it is the hope and not the routine that we are talking about.

Paul Valéry clearly exaggerates when he puts the freedom question as follows:

Liberté: cést un de ces détestables mots qui ont plus de valeur que de sens; qui chantent plus qu’ils parlent; qui demandent plus qu’ils ne répondent; de ces mots qui ont fait tous les métiers, et desquels la mémoire est barbouillée de Théologie, de Métaphysique, de Morale et de Politique; mots très bons pour la controverse, la dialectique, Íéloquence; aussi propres aux analyses illusoires et aux subtilités infinies quáux fins de phrase qui déchaînent le tonnerre.¹⁹

However, it is true that freedom has had many meanings and has been used for too many and sometimes clashing ideals… or less than ideal.²⁰

In speaking of the value of republican liberty, we are not talking of course of pseudo-freedoms that are so exiguous in holders, or by absence of title are in fact nothing more than privileges or perks.

When we talk about freedom in a republican sense, we include rights and freedoms. And we are obviously talking about the liberty of the moderns, understood in the context of participatory democracy and even deliberative democracy,²¹ where the old citizenship (the core of freedom of the ancients) is present, anew, without losing the force of liberty of the moderns, mainly garantistic principle: and this has also been deepened today.

Indeed, the neo-republicanism and deliberative democracy often go hand in hand. As can be deduced from this synthesis of Ricardo Pinto Leite, considering neorepublicanism as the normative theory of democracy, the more we reinforce our idea of republican democracy tout court as ethics, values, and virtues:

The Neo-Republicanism is, then, a normative theory of democracy. There are several neo-republican approaches, some more liberal and others more communitarian in nature. It is possible, however, to identify at least three major common concerns, among others:

(a) The civic virtue (virtú/civic virtue), designating involvement in the community, the preference for public interest, the search for common good as opposed to corruption (the incapability for the free life, the emergence of private interests, the “factions”);

(b) The political participation that involves an extended process of discussion and deliberation where all can participate in independent and equal conditions (deliberative democracy) in which the argumentation in itself appeals to dialogical reason (audi alteram partem) and where conversational compromise gains a decisive importance;

(c) A certain model of citizenship and patriotism built around a civic conversation, the participation in the ‘polis’ with an emphasis in duty and responsibility.²²

And the author goes on in a distinctive dialog with the liberal model:

This model, mainly in its deliberative position, intends to be an alternative to other theories of democracy, especially in a liberal perspective which is based in the aggregation of interest groups and in politic negotiation. The liberal model, centred in individualism, in individual rights and in the democracy of parties, would not have avoided the contemporary democratic crisis: corruption, citizens’ withdrawal from political life, civic apathy, deficit in the legitimacy of political decisions.²³

But let us try a more philosophical framing of the issue. When we speak of human freedom, it is supposed that we have already solved some problems, not unimportant, such as the degree of freedom of action of individuals and their degree of constraint, endogenous or exogenous, genetic, constitutional, on the one hand, social on the other. And although much free will and responsibility has made the person omnipotent, this may also be a powerful alibi to many penalties and charges. The truth (a heavy word …) is that responsibility cannot easily be conceived without the idea that at least one other route could be traced by whom you invited to follow you. Never forgetting José Régio’s poem:

“Come this way” – tell me with some candy eye

Stretching my arms, and insurance

what good would that I hear

When I say, “come here!”

I look at them with eyes weary,

(There is, in my eyes, tiredness and ironies)

And cross my arms,

And never go by there … (…).²⁴

And this is the secret of a free person: knowing how to say ‘No’. And you can always say “No”, as in the poem of Manuel Alegre, whose final stanza is also a hope, no longer just personal (Régio, on the other hand, was criticized for his non interventionist attitude, but not Alegre, who even suffered exile and after that, in democratic times, ran for President of the Republic) but political:

Even in the saddest night

in time of servitude

there’s always someone who resists

there’s always someone who says no.²⁵

You may wonder about this approach to the value and nature of freedom, but the fact is that poets are those who best understand the values, and the most clear and deep expressions of those may be found in their poems, not in the dull and sad prose of boring academics. Certainly because poetry is a privileged way of communicating the most important things and expressing them. And values are some of the more important “things.”

The question of free will leads us to inner freedom in comparison with the physical one. Both are accurate. You know there are the cases of a Pyrrhic victory or the sweet lemon syndrome: for example, the prisoner who boasts of his “freedom” in jail. Let us not blame the prisoner. What a great thing for him and for everyone to feel free. He is free, but inwardly. With this kind of freedom, societies do not live. This freedom is a witness (the martyrs are witnesses) and is an accusation. However, this freedom to be fully realized needs to be transposed to the streets, to cities, and to the political order.

On the other hand, freedom can reign, at least formally, in the political order (in societies where theoretically, that is to say, constitutionally, the rule of law reigns) and yet people do not feel they are free. The reasons for this can be varied.

It may happen that freedom is too formal, just superstructural, and under the general freedom (electoral, media, etc.) the silent oppression of dictatorships germinates: micro-corporate, bureaucratic, local, etc.

Freedom needs to be cultivated, nurtured, and defended. Freedom is citizenship-based: for that, we need a solid background from childhood, or a powerful spirit that can overcome this lack of genius. And there is no such thing for many… Freedom is a learning process which begins in the family. And as today, so many confuse freedom with laxity, with parental absenteeism, with lack of education and also deficient firmness in education. Society forgets the need for participation, joint decision-making and dialog, composition, transactions, and compromise, but also “veto,” in cases of dignity and questions of honor.

There is no freedom if there is no consciousness of freedom. And also where there is no permanent consciousness inevitably there are those who hate freedom, and those who will be indifferent either to freedom or to oppression. Especially if they just swim in a sea of happiness, alienated from what other people suffer.

And as a result, not only is an acute vigilance needed against total subversion of the democratic order (which may also exist: look up the sad but eloquent examples of the Weimar Republic, Salvador Allende’s Chile in 1973, and many others, not far from us in time… just see what is going on in Hungary), but a patient pedagogy and diurnal tenacity.

First, by example, but also by the diffusion of ideas and debate. And it needs a lot of civic pedagogy, Republican pedagogy. Freedom, like health, often only can be appreciated when you lose it. Perhaps this would give reason to think of “suspending democracy” for a while, as some politicians already dare to say. A break in democracy would really be a huge boost to democratic and republican vocations. But of course we are not being serious: A suspension of democracy is always very bad. Some ingenuous observers and even learned people thought it would be a good idea in the past, but they regretted it deeply. A dictatorship (a suspension of democracy is always a dictatorship) is like a war: we know when it begins but we never know when it will end. All power wants to endure, and a dictatorship has more ways of enduring against the will of the People.

But without the shadow of ironies the issue of freedom cannot be taken as settled and resolved. At the frontiers of freedom, normal boundaries are always threatened from without and from within, and furthermore freedom always finds new expressions, and new challenges to be overcome.

Among the first rights of freedom were the freedom of religion and freedom of expression. Unfortunately, we must admit that neither of them are yet resolved.These two examples still have numerous problems: not only are there many countries where neither one is guaranteed, where people are persecuted, imprisoned and killed for defending them (or just because they express themselves), but also the set of interpretations and practices can subvert these major freedoms, even in countries that seem to enshrine them in their constitutions.

The proselytizing sects, the old privileges, prejudices of all stripes and from all walks entangle religious freedom to the point that there are many people in democratic countries who fear to express their ideas in this regard—whether belief, disbelief, or agnosticism. It depends on the small society where one moves. In some cases, we have to be one thing; in others, it is a sacrilege not to be another. In the work world there is sometimes a terrible fear of discrimination and, ultimately, one may lose his or her job because of hidden but real religious prejudices. This was for example the case in Greece, where some proselytizing religious officers harassed military personnel.²⁶

Freedom of speech, leaving aside the difficulty of access to the media by ordinary mortals, is no guarantee of any real exercise of that freedom. And many circumstances can lead to silence. Even for a journalist through not only political and economic pressures, among others, may be forced into silence. The legal system, conveniently manipulated by those who have money to hire perspicacious and persistent lawyers, can make the life of a free voice little less than hell.

With the slowness of assistance from the courts in virtually every country, a writer or a journalist whose nose, or more plausibly whose prose, displeases, can be soon silenced with processes. The poor and scarified people may win a claim, but actually, they are losing. Losing health, patience, and time, having too much trouble, and at having to pay the respective attorneys’ fees, if they are not representing themselves in court, which never seems psychologically advisable.

In short, there are new freedoms not yet dreamed of that await our intuition and our creativity. And there are old freedoms which are hard to preserve and to prevent unfairness under fallacious pretexts. Too many people with a grain of power in their hands do not care about anything but more and more power, and the alibis used to make other people’s life a hell are, of course, technocratic jargon: modernity, efficiency, changing times, etc. The good intentions of some are well-meaning, but for many the best alibi that our situation gives is to revanchist yesterday, just waiting for the moment to establish new prejudices, new rigid and illegitimate hierarchies, new retrograde policies.

Among the classic freedoms is the sacrosanct principle of the separation of powers, which no efficient complex system can justify ignoring. And to enforce it should be even deepened in a balanced and appropriate dissemination, even in the lower levels of the state. Where there is power and there is no separation of powers, free power is a wild beast: It will tend to increase its power and abuse. In a little-known text (originally in English), the always lucid Montesquieu says:

The love of power is natural. It is insatiable, almost constantly whetted, never cloyed by possession.²⁷

The tendency to want more power (and abuse it) is inevitable. So if we do not abuse but balance the powers (and that is a foundation of the Republic), the solution is to give rights to individuals, naturally, and special rights to citizens, special rights to employees, of course. But what are the rights that can be countered, equally, with enormous powers? They are other powers. So, power must be separated so that, by the celebrated mechanism of checks and balances, power confronts power. This is a lesson of Montesquieu, which should never fail to be present in the mind, and especially the heart, of today’s politicians, because everyone benefits, even them. Luck is so capricious that to have absolute power today is a safe guarantee that tomorrow the dictator will not have a quiet retirement. Now this is more and more real because the tyrant may be assassinated (that is a very old risk, and many decided to take it). But things have changed a little bit: he may also be judged and put behind bars by a democratic and objective impartial court of justice, national or international, in his/her country or in a third State. The case of Pinochet is a very interesting example. The International Criminal Court is the first step to preventing those undemocratic situations. The next would be the International Constitutional Court.²⁸

European Constitutions are full of freedoms (and rights and guarantees), at least in a traditional way. We believe that the future is imposing new demands, and new rights must be recognized. But we would be happy if the freedoms, rights, and political and social guarantees still present in the Constitutional texts of European countries, along with those in the European treaties, that are the European material Constitution, would be taken seriously,²⁹ which is less and less the case—especially for the social and propriety rights of common people.

But things may get better, and sometimes to make it better is the only way to survive. Take, for example, concerns on environmental and ecological matters. Just a few decades ago they were a marginal concern for political debate, very little assimilated by classical political forces. Today, there are ecological parties with some importance, and this is a front page concern. There is also an increasingly widespread awareness of this priority and vital global environmental rights.

Similarly, biological and gender questions, as well as IT and communication are profiled as main themes in the debate on rights for the future. This is not, however, the place to develop these issues either in balance or in prospective.

The problem of freedom has not been a special constitutional issue, nor in many cases, even a legal question. But problems arise from the application of value: by experience, administration, bureaucracy, de facto powers, and also other powers such as economic ones. Nowadays, an employer holds his or her employee almost in an ius vitae ac necis: because unemployment is now the general alternative to wage labor, and a matter of life or death, as seen in suicides among unemployed workers. Recently we have witnessed suicides of unemployed people evicted from their homes in Spain. We must admit that some old radicals were right: There is sometimes the freedom to starve. That is not freedom at all. When moderates have to give reason to some other positions, something is very “is rotten in the state of Denmark” (Hamlet, I, 4).

Another face of the debate is the criticism of monarchists against Republic. It is a rather minor question, but still Republics have to face it. Some monarchists say that in republican regimes there is no freedom, because many of them were established by a coup and never ratified by a popular referendum.

Although many support points can be put to referendums, exceptionally we would admit a referendum to end disputes definitely: if the monarchists solemnly undertook not to continue in their litany for, say, a hundred years at least … We are sure that such a consultation would be won overwhelmingly by the Republic, as happened in Brazilian referendum of 1993.