Forensics
(1)
Ernst & Young, Cologne, Germany
Simon Newcomb made a strange discovery in 1881. The mathematician noticed that the number one on used logarithmic tables was much dirtier and worn than for example the number seven. A quick explanation is required at this point for those people not familiar with logarithmic tables: Before calculators were invented, huge hand-written numerical tables were used to help solve complicated arithmetic problems.
Newcomb would never have believed at the time that his discovery would ultimately lead to business people going to jail a little over 100 years later. He simply gathered from his observation that certain numbers appeared to be used more frequently than others when the logarithmic tables were being used practically to solve arithmetic problems. This discovery was not too spectacular initially, nor was it particularly relevant for forensic audits of the future.
However, the physician Frank Benford picked up on Newcomb’s strange observation again at the end of the 1930s and used it to develop a law. This law used a simple formula to predict the relative frequency at which the numbers one to ten will occur in all those real-life commercial transactions such as orders, invoices, inventory sheets, bank account statements, etc. Benfords’s Law states, for example, that the number four will occur significantly more frequently than the number eight. What at first sounds like some sort of numerical witchcraft has actually been proven to be a sort of “quasi natural law” in numerous experiments and studies.1 It is not really possible for anybody to hide from this “law of numbers.”
And at the latest from this point onwards, Newcomb’s discovery of the varying degrees of dirt found on logarithmic tables also became of interest in the fight against modern white-collar crime. This is because if the frequency distribution of numbers in “natural” business transactions follows a law, fraudsters and those falsifying balance sheets in the world of business would need to be outstanding mathematical geniuses in order to precisely replicate these laws through their manipulations. And this is precisely how it works in reality: specialist forensic auditing companies now possess computer programs that analyze company data for deviations from the Benford distribution and report any corresponding divergence. From a statistical standpoint, the cause of these deviations can very often be traced back to random numbers manipulated “by hand,” which can then be precisely followed back to the source. These types of programs were used, for example, to expose the extremely “creative” accountancy at Enron and convict those behind these manipulations. The Ilmenau University of Technology was able to use these laws of numbers to prove that Greece fiddled its economic data in order to be accepted into the EU—even though it had already been proven (see Editorial of the Thüringer Allgemeine 2011).
This brief excursion into the analysis of numbers related to white-collar crime already shows how technologically advanced and scientifically sound modern forensic auditing has become today. Even if the detection of the fraudulent manipulation of balance sheets only represents a small proportion of the tasks under the scope of “forensics” that are presented in this chapter.
There are a wide variety of reasons to initiate an investigation for detecting white-collar crime—also called a “fraud investigation” in technical jargon. The wide range of offenses that fall under the heading of “deviant behavior” and the different types of white-collar crime were already discussed in Chap. 2. The objectives of an investigation commissioned during a forensic audit are thus, to a large extent, highly variable. Just like the various contexts and situations in which an investigator can find themselves once they have accepted their mandate.
It is necessary for investigators and clients to be aware in advance that fraud investigations of a certain magnitude are one of the toughest experiences that can be faced in the business world. Companies or organizations that commission investigations themselves, or become the subject of this type of investigation, are entering into an extremely exceptional situation. One that entails high levels of emotion and interpersonal tension. Those investigating cases of white-collar crime will inevitably be supported, praised, harassed, despised, deceived, or even threatened during the process. The fact is that only very few people in management positions have ever had to deal with this type of situation. However, the probability that they will be faced with this type of investigation in future is rising.
The term “fraud investigation” is used in this book to describe a purely reactionary measure for gaining knowledge. Therefore, all of these investigations are based on events that occurred in the past, which were either covered up or it is unclear who carried them out. In contrast to the range of different preventative measures, a fraud investigation describes the actual “detective work”—a reconstruction of the sequence of events in the past based on clues. This criminalistics knowledge forms the basis for implementing corresponding preventative measures and also for the remaining chapters of this book. An effective compliance management system always relies on the methodological knowledge gained from an investigation and simply utilizes it for a different purpose.
3.1 Commissioning a Special Investigation
The basic prerequisite for an investigation must always be a tangible initial suspicion or indication of misconduct. No investigation should be carried out without some tangible form of initial suspicion. A feeling of mistrust held by a member of the management board or supervisory board should not be considered sufficient to carry out a concrete investigation,2 which could have dire consequences for both the organization and individual employees.
But what form does this initial suspicion take? It could of course be something that arises in the company’s internal control systems, such as strange bookings at the end of the year, unusual contracts issued to suppliers, or irregularities in the invoicing and payment processes. Nevertheless, any suspicious circumstances that are identified by the company itself or that emerge as part of routine checks must be significant enough to justify the commissioning of an auditing firm or law firm. Experience has shown, however, that a problem lies in the fact that many of the most significant cases of white-collar crime only become so large and result in so much damage to the company because they have been allowed to develop despite the existence of internal control systems. Although well-functioning preventative systems already exist in a great deal of companies, the initial clues that lead to an investigation are often discovered by chance. A considerable proportion of offenses committed in the areas of white-collar crime and corruption are still detected today by accident (see Editorial of Süddeutsche Zeitung 2012). Or they are uncovered because the perpetrators or their accomplices or confidants lose their nerve under the pressure and simply pull the plug on the crime by slipping an anonymous letter under a door, making a full confession on the corporate intranet or—in some cases—even passing on information to the media.
It is particularly important to proceed with caution when suspicions are aroused due to anonymous tip-offs. The recipients of these tip-offs will not do themselves any favors if they immediately alert the whole organization and in doing so cause the entire legal department to prepare for battle. After all, it would not be the first time that a particularly ambitious employee attempted to rid themselves of an annoying competitor or simply wanted to cause unrest. It is thus important that every tip-off is carefully checked. Should the anonymous tip-off really supply tangible indications of a serious case of noncompliance, or even a criminal act, and the first ad hoc inquiries prove fruitful then it is certainly worthwhile pursuing the issue with a more in-depth investigation.
If details of fraudulent activity have already become known in the company—or they pop up as breaking news on your smartphone—then it is high time to take action. Time and again there are cases where details of suspicious activities at a company find their way into the press while those responsible at the company still do not even realize that they have a serious problem. They should have taken action before the police, public prosecutor’s office, or tax fraud investigation office make the decisions for them about whether and how an investigation will be carried out.
How and by whom will an investigation be commissioned? The classic scenario is that a call will be made to a service provider who has the relevant expertise—meaning an auditing firm with a department dedicated to fraud investigations or forensic services. The person making the call is usually—depending on what previous cases have been experienced in the company—a furious proprietor, nervous chairman of the board, discreet supervisory board member, or an agitated and stuttering corporate secretary. All will be frantically trying to explain that they require help—and as quickly as possible. The client actually issuing the formal request for an investigation can be from all levels of the company. In general, it is possible and permitted for anyone who has been issued with relevant decision-making powers to commission an investigation. Naturally, this is provided that there is a concrete suspicion or that something has already occurred. The precise nature of the suspicious circumstances are ultimately always decisive in each scenario: if the suspicions implicate the management board, the supervisory board must become involved to resolve the issue, while if the offenses have been committed within the individual business units, it is strictly speaking the responsibility of the management board to take action. The fact that half-heartedly delegating responsibility to compliance and auditing department personnel is not always considered sufficient by crime enforcement authorities when evaluating the liability of the management board has been demonstrated often enough in both recent and older cases. This can have serious consequences. Handling white-collar crime and corruption is the responsibility of top management—always. Depending on how acutely the investigation is needed, a meeting is usually quickly organized in which the current situation, aim of the investigation, and investigative process are discussed.
Another common scenario is for a call to be received from a law firm which has been commissioned to carry out an investigation into a case of fraud or corruption. Only very few law firms employ their own experts for investigating white-collar crime and, once they have received the appropriate mandate, they thus search for suitable partners to carry out the investigation.
It is also not always necessary for the investigation to be directly commissioned by the damaged company. It is equally possible for the authorities to commission an auditing firm themselves to carry out an investigation or to issue appropriate orders to a company to commission an auditing firm for this purpose. For example, if the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) has a bank in its sights and initiates a special investigation in accordance with Article 44 of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz), it is quite common that one of the big four auditing firms will become involved. This is because—just as with law firms—only very few government authorities have their own criminal and forensic experts capable of adequately investigating a suspicion of white-collar crime.
This is also true of public prosecutor’s offices and police authorities. Only a few public prosecutor’s offices in Germany have the required specialist expertise in the area of white-collar crime to be able to reliably carry out investigations into commercial enterprises. There are two factors that are usually missing: qualified personnel and the necessary time before the statute of limitations for these crimes expires. The public prosecutor’s office often finds itself in a dilemma. Their own investigators within the police authorities are not familiar enough with business administration in all its many facets to be able, for example, to comprehensively understand complex balance sheet fraud or they simply have too little experience in the area of white-collar crime. Efficiently securing the required evidence for prosecuting and convicting the perpetrators would only be possible with a great deal of time and manpower. The danger is that the statute of limitations on these crimes will expire before they have been properly investigated.
Why do the authorities not simply employ people with the necessary expertise? It sounds banal but wages in the police service or public prosecutor’s office cannot hope to keep pace with those paid by law firms and auditing firms. It is thus safe to assume—while taking into account certain exceptions already mentioned—that the expertise and experience required for comprehensively investigating and combating cases of white-collar crime is increasingly and almost exclusively found in the free market. The demand for forensic auditors/accountants is currently booming—EY Fraud Investigation and Dispute Services currently employs 160 consultants in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland alone. This figure reaches over 2,000 worldwide.
One solution to this dilemma that is being increasingly practiced even in Germany is the so-called “American model”—meaning that auditing firms are employed as investigators in cases of white-collar crime. This model will be briefly presented below.
3.1.1 The Trend in Public Prosecutor’s Offices: The American Model
As the name already suggests, this is a method that has made the transition from the USA to Germany and Europe, and it is likely that it will be applied more and more frequently in future by public prosecutor’s offices. There are some public prosecutor’s offices in Germany—most notably the prosecutors in Munich—who already use the American model. The model works in a similar way to the approach described above in the BaFin example, namely by involving professional and independent auditors as partners in the investigation. The Americans are highly pragmatic in this area and basically begin by offering the following options to those less than cooperative companies faced with accusations of fraud and corruption:
Option no. 1: “You can continue to stay silent while we confiscate your computers, search your business premises, and prosecute you using the full force of the law, not to mention the inevitable headlines that may appear in the press.”
The problem with this option for the public prosecutor’s office is that it can take years until all the information has been gathered, sentences passed, and fines paid—if it is at all possible to investigate these types of complex commercial crimes with the available resources to the extent required for the resulting evidence to enable a successful prosecution.
What companies dislike about this option is clear: The public commotion surrounding the company and the unsightly images of grouchy criminal investigators carrying cartons full of files out of the company headquarters.
Therefore, option no. 2 appears to be much more sensible for both parties: “We initiate criminal proceedings but offer you the opportunity to cooperate—and thus potentially benefit from a less severe punishment due to mitigating circumstances. In order for the case to be comprehensively investigated, you will commission an independent law firm and an auditing firm, which you will pay for but which will report to us.” The Americans call this type of deal “deferred prosecution.” A “deferred prosecution agreement” essentially means that the criminal investigators agree to waive part of the fines in exchange for the cooperation of the accused company—as long as the company fulfils certain requirements and cooperates during the investigation of the crimes. This is a process that was used, for example, in the investigation of Siemens by the US Department of Justice.
The benefits to the public prosecutor’s office are that they save resources during the actual investigation, the process can be completed more quickly, and fines flow back into their coffers. In the end it is not always exclusively about justice even for a public prosecutor’s office—they also need to balance their budgets and resolve the required number of cases.
What companies like about this option is that they are spared the “hassle” of dealing with the public prosecutor’s office and also a large part of the public criticism, while they can also portray themselves as the party investigating the offenses and, hence, as a reformed company.
However, there are other things that companies and their lawyers don’t like about this option. For example, there is the fact that nobody can guarantee that the investigation will run 100 % efficiently or that the public prosecutor’s office will not still initiate supplementary investigations. And depending on the extent of the crimes, the process can quickly become very expensive due to the large number of external parties bustling about the company. There is also the issue that the willingness among employees to cooperate with “third party” lawyers and auditors is generally less than when compared to representatives of the public prosecutor’s office—which can endanger the efficiency of the investigation.
The solution when this happens is to develop a high level of integration and efficient coordination between all parties involved in the investigation.
3.1.2 The Public Prosecutor’s Office and Companies: Divergent Interests in the Investigation of White-Collar Crime
Anybody entrusted with investigating white-collar crime and corruption in their own company, or anyone who is in a position of liability for misconduct, should be clear about the following: During an investigation, the public prosecutor’s office and the police do not have even remotely the same interests as those people in responsible positions at the company. In order to really exclude the risk of liability in the long term, those in responsible positions at companies such as members of the management board, supervisory board, and the head of the audit committee need to delve much deeper than a public prosecutor’s office would do.
The investigative process conducted by the police and the public prosecutor’s office has no other aim than to enforce the state’s right to administer punishment in order to maintain law and order. And this process is carried out almost always in accordance with the principle of procedural economy—which prescribes that criminal proceedings must be carried out and concluded as efficiently as possible. For example, the public prosecutor’s office will pass sentence as soon as sufficient proof has been found for a crime, the perpetrators have confessed, or corporate negligence could be established. This will preferably be in the form of fines in accordance with OWiG or by calling to account those persons in positions of responsibility who are deemed liable for the crimes. Once all of the charges have been processed, the case is generally considered closed as far as the public prosecutor’s office is concerned.
Yet in certain circumstances it may still be far from clear whether other similar cases have occurred at the company, what the real magnitude of the resulting damage is, or what features of the internal control system and compliance management systems failed. All of these questions are generally not fully answered by the public prosecutor’s office and the police due to the principle of procedural economy.
However, company bodies like the supervisory board, management board, or audit committee are obligated to prevent all damage to the company. In the immediate aftermath of a case where damage was caused to the company by white-collar crime, the issue must be completely investigated so that any findings can be used to implement a damage reduction strategy. This includes, for example, making attempts to recover misappropriated assets or holding people in positions of responsibility liable for the resulting damage under civil law. Sometimes this can even go as far as the supervisory board taking measures against the management board because they acted too passively or were actually aware of certain facts—facts that played no role in the investigation conducted by the public prosecutor’s office but were nevertheless important when evaluating the case from the standpoint of the company.
In addition to simply investigating the case, company bodies are now also legally obligated to take appropriate measures for the prevention of similar cases in the future. Therefore, an investigation into these types of crimes must go above and beyond looking into the actual offenses and questions of guilt, and also examine the causes of the crime. Was this an isolated case that could not have been prevented even with the best control systems? Did the control systems fail? Does a structural problem exist that facilitates white-collar crime? Or has the situation developed to such an extent that a subculture has developed within the company, which practices fraud and manipulation in an organized manner? The relevant parameters that investigators can tweak will be presented in more detail in the next chapter where the early prevention of white-collar crime using compliance management systems will be discussed.
Once an offense becomes known, a company cannot simply choose whether it is a matter for the police or for auditors and lawyers. In order to give themselves proper protection against liability risks, supervisory bodies need both—especially if the authorities are already actively involved in the case.
The American model already takes account of this development to a large extent by ensuring that the company, the criminal proceedings, and the actual investigation of the case are already much more strongly linked once the investigative process begins. In this sense, there is no competition between the police and the forensic audit investigating white-collar crime. Companies even benefit from this mutual cooperation, which incidentally is now much more socially acceptable than it was before the turn of the millennium.
3.1.3 The Crime Enforcement Authorities and Companies: An Increasing Level of Cooperation
The level of willingness in companies to directly include independent auditing firms or even crime enforcement authorities in the process of solving white-collar crime from the very beginning has increased, not least due to the strict manner in which managers are made liable in the economy and the corresponding judicature. It has become much more rare for a solution to be exclusively found internally (in line with the motto: We can deal with this ourselves). Strictly speaking, it is not compulsory for companies to notify the police when they become aware of “deviant behavior.” There are only a handful of crimes that require the police to be notified in Germany and white-collar crimes are not generally included in this list. As long as none of the sales representatives is preparing for a war of aggression3 against a neighboring state, the accounting department is not entangled in a case of extortion,4 and no one in your office is taking hostages, there is no need in the eyes of the law to report their misconduct to the authorities.5
Whether and when a company decides to include the investigative authorities is certainly dependent on the relevant conditions in each individual case. How strict is the regulatory pressure? What is the legal form of the business and the ownership structure? Those companies listed on the capital markets are required to behave differently than owner-managed companies or medium-sized enterprises. Does the company have previous history of this type of crime or was it perhaps recently involved in a legal process? It makes sense in many cases to cooperate as a matter of course with the authorities and to engage the services of audit firms to provide the company with protection from all sides. Experience has shown that when commissioning an investigation—whether it is carried out by the crime enforcement authorities, auditing firms, or both—the dangers of indecision are often underestimated. If a tangible initial suspicion materializes and there are convincing indications of misconduct, it is important to act without delay. An attitude of “I’ll deal with it later” is simply not acceptable, if only to serve the purpose of fulfilling your duties, ensuring your employer suffers no further damage, and to avoid being drawn into the line of fire yourself as far as liability is concerned. A significant proportion of white-collar crime and corruption-related offenses are impossible to properly resolve because they were not dealt with quickly or purposefully enough.
3.2 The Process of a Forensic Investigation
Especially newcomers to the profession of forensic auditing often imagine that fraud investigations are much more spectacular than they really are. Naturally, you can find yourself in thrilling situations as an auditor that are played out in dramatic circumstances. Almost every forensic auditor will have their own “war stories” with plenty of related anecdotes to tell.
Nevertheless, auditors working in the private sector should not make the mistake of believing they are a “detective” playing the star role in their own small corporate thriller. Ultimately, every forensic audit should be viewed as a consultancy service that is to be carried out in close consultation with the clients. This process must be carried out—in contrast to the assumptions made by many newcomers to the profession—in accordance with budget constraints and cannot afford to focus on anything other than the implementation of target-oriented measures.
Forensics is nothing more than a structured analysis with the sole aim of gaining knowledge. It is a professional trade that is offered on the market. Any evaluation of how this new knowledge may impact on the company only follows at the second stage. This second stage of the process is the task of a company commissioned for precisely this purpose, and which will often also seek legal advice along the way. Experience has demonstrated that those people who are truly guilty of these types of offenses are not always held to account for their actions—this is something that a forensic auditor investigating white-collar crime also needs to be able to handle.
Forensic auditors must be clear from the very beginning about their mandate and about how their actions could be restricted (Fig. 3.1).
Fig. 3.1
Steps to be followed at the beginning of a forensic investigation
3.2.1 Assessing the Current Situation and Tactical Considerations for the Investigation
The first and most important question that needs to be asked by every auditor when investigating white-collar crime is: What is the current situation? In precisely the same way as in other criminal investigations or during military operations, there needs to be an assessment of the current situation before further investigative steps can be carried out. As already described, the situation at the company in which the investigation is to be conducted can vary greatly. Therefore, there is no unique standardized process for assessing the situation in the case of white-collar crime. Individual elements and key questions can be taken from the principles used to assess the situation in a military setting (for example, according to Army Regulations 100/100 “Military Leadership”) and from the criminalistic processes followed for investigating capital crimes (Police Service Regulations 100 “Management and Deployment of Police Forces”).6 The elements of both can serve as a blueprint. An assessment of the current situation—in the context of white-collar crime—basically involves considering the following key aspects: Critically evaluating the mandate itself, visually inspecting and evaluating the environment under investigation, determining the level of information available, and lastly planning possible courses of action.
3.2.1.1 Understanding Your Own Mandate
Who initiated the investigation? Will it deal only with an investigation commissioned by the company bodies, or are crime enforcement authorities already involved? If so have they already formulated a clear request for information and only want to know how the investigative process will be organized?
When planning and designing the investigative methods, a different approach should be taken—and may prove more productive—depending on the reason for the initiation of the investigation. This is because the aim of the investigation could be very broadly defined or it could be very detailed and focused on individual events.
What conditions have been set for the investigative measures? Have the offenses come to an end or are they ongoing?
The investigative measures will be subject to a set of conditions that must be formulated for every commissioned investigation. Fundamental conditions include time constraints and the methodological framework for the investigation. The conditions governing your own actions can also be slightly more unusual; for example, if only a few people in the company are actually aware of the investigation, certain investigative methods will not be permitted or are not generally permitted due to data protection regulations or corporate principles. Or if it is known that offenses are still being carried out at the time of the investigation and you must deal discreetly with ongoing crimes.
What type of offenses needs to be investigated? What expertise is required to complete this task? How extensive and time consuming is the investigation likely to be?
Even urgent and unavoidable investigations still need to be organized, and a calculation made to evaluate the time and effort required. In order to evaluate a mandate, it is thus also necessary to consider the fee for the investigation, external costs, and the deployment of personnel, and to come to an agreement with the client in advance—making sure this is completed before the first file has even been opened.
3.2.1.2 Evaluating the Investigative Environment
What is the overall economic situation of the company? Is the company in a healthy state or is it in a state of crisis? What effect has this had on the “mood” within the company?
The current state of the company or organization can already provide clues about the roots of white-collar crime. Those who carry out investigations or commission these types of investigations would be well advised to also keep an eye on soft factors such as the corporate culture and the internal company mindset as a “battleground,” and to develop an awareness for them. It is also important not to lose sight of informal networks and to try and get a feeling for the political currents within the company in order to be able to anticipate the threat of conflict.
Who else is involved in the investigation—who can influence the investigation?
It is necessary to involve all of the parties actively and passively linked to the investigation in the process of designing the forensic investigation. This includes of course those people who actively commissioned the investigation as representatives of the company and could also include in-house councils, law firms, the works council, or supervisory board committees such as the audit committee. Naturally, it is also necessary to take into account external players such as the law enforcement authorities.
Does the company have a previous history of white-collar crime? How were cases of white-collar crime dealt with in the past?
Every assessment of a situation—whether military or criminalistic—requires a study of similar or previous cases that may play a role. In a similar way to every newly admitted patient in a hospital, every company will bring with it a “medical history” for the areas of noncompliance, corruption, and white-collar crime. Forensic auditors need to familiarize themselves with the details of this history should it be available.
3.2.1.3 Determining the Level of Available Information
What cases of white-collar crime are already known? What are the sources of evidence?
In order to assess the situation at the start, it is necessary to study and evaluate the actual reasons for commissioning an investigation: the initial suspicion described earlier or the already existing evidence. It is thus necessary to ascertain what facts there are that point to a case of damage in the company and the information about where this evidence originates.
How aware of these cases are people both inside and outside of the company? Who knows that an investigation is being carried out?
In order to determine the level of available information, it is also necessary to evaluate the current level of awareness about the case. The success of an investigation can be significantly influenced by avoiding the shock caused externally by an investigation and a case of white-collar crime becoming known or, conversely, by using public awareness to advance the investigative work.
3.2.1.4 Courses of Action
How can information be obtained and from what sources? What subsequent steps will be most appropriate? As part of the preparation phase before the investigation, the planning of possible courses of action follows on almost as a logical consequence to assessing the situation at the start and examining the overall aim. In general, there is no ideal way to investigate a case where the company has incurred damage. It is much more probable that there will be a range of different strategies for obtaining necessary information. Depending on how well and diligently the assessment of the situation is carried out, it may be possible to design, schedule, and then implement an appropriate mix of investigative methods.
After the assessment of the situation, inexperienced auditors or investigators are often overcome by a feeling of euphoria. However, it does not make sense for any of the parties involved to blindly plough ahead or set to work too enthusiastically. There are fundamental aspects that everyone needs to take into account when dealing with white-collar crime, especially at the beginning of an investigation.
3.2.2 Three Basic Rules at the Start of an Investigation
As I mentioned before, no two investigations are alike and hence there is no ideal way to investigate these crimes. It is thus necessary to be very careful when discussing concepts like “basic rules.” Nevertheless, working for over 20 years in the fields of criminal investigation and forensic auditing provides you with a wealth of experience that enables you to avoid making critical errors at the start of an investigation. The best methodology and the most competent team are worthless if beginner’s errors are made right at the very start.
Basic Rule No. 1: Protect the Information
“At this point in the investigation, we are not able to reveal any details about the ongoing proceedings.” This sentence is heard often at press conferences held by the police, especially for example, when special commissions are investigating capital crimes. This apparently meaningless phrase with which police spokesmen attempt to fob off journalists already embodies the fundamental task of all investigators—protecting the information.
In the example where an individual within a company has had the aforementioned anonymous letter containing alleged details of corruption slipped under their door, one thing is crucial. They must be extremely careful with whom they discuss this matter and also about how they discuss it. Should they immediately attempt to talk to the accused? Should they turn to a confidant within the company? Or do they even send the information on in e-mails, which can then be forwarded, printed out, and left forgotten on the photocopier?
It is not without reason that the investigative authorities shroud themselves in secrecy after a murder has been committed. It would be negligent or even plain stupid to reveal precisely what had happened to the public because this would only make all other investigative measures more difficult. Let us assume that there are multiple suspects who need to be questioned individually. If the precise course of events has already been printed in the newspapers, investigators lose the opportunity to compare statements or identify irregularities in the statements. For example, when suspects are forced to reveal information about the crime due to skilful interviewing techniques that he or she shouldn’t actually know—so-called “perpetrator knowledge.”
What is true for capital crimes can equally be applied to cases of corruption or white-collar crime. The skilful screening, protection, and utilization of information simplifies the investigative process and prevents, in particular, perpetrators becoming aware that they have been found out and covering up evidence of their crime.