Stockpile destruction

6     Stockpile destruction

Introduction

Destruction is the only way to ensure that stockpiled landmines are never used. A growing awareness of the importance of stockpile destruction is reflected in the emphasis placed within the two treaty regimes on states meeting their destruction deadlines. Stockpile destruction also offers an inherent attraction for political and advocacy purposes since it is easily measured (in comparison to activities such as mine risk education or victim assistance) and thus can provide a clearly demonstrable success story. However, it is necessary to unpack the meaning of ‘success’ within the regimes. This can be done through analysing potential tensions between a focus on mines destroyed as a quantitative (and highly visible) measure of effectiveness, and emphasis within the mine action community on socio-economic and humanitarian impact as key determinants of effective mine action.

If states parties fail to conduct stockpile destruction this would undermine regime credibility. With different memberships and rules, the regimes adopt contrasting methods in addressing the resource, political, and humanitarian dimensions of stockpile destruction. Common to both, is that fulfilling stockpile destruction obligations requires a combination of technical capacity and political will. Because of the costs of stockpile destruction and the national security implications of giving up landmines, the ability to identify and deal with defection is particularly significant. Interplay dynamics that result in effects beyond regime membership may also be important given that states with huge stockpiles of APMs are not members of the mine ban treaty, while a number of APII member states have deferred compliance with certain key provisions.

Disconnects between stakeholder clusters involved in design and implementation may be particularly important because of the central role played by states and commercial companies in stockpile destruction. Moreover, if stockpile destruction is addressed solely from the perspective of state actors and stockpiled landmines held and used by ANSAs are ignored, overall regime effectiveness will be undermined. Thus, while IHL in general, and the landmine regimes in particular, may display a state-centric bias, how the regimes interact with international and sub-state actors will be particularly significant for effectiveness in this area.

The mine ban treaty contains provisions dealing specifically with stockpile destruction, while this activity is a consequence of complying with a number of restrictions contained in APII. This chapter begins by critically analysing stockpile destruction implementation through the regimes. New insights into why defection occurs, are developed through relating obligations to technical and political obstacles to stockpile destruction. It then considers the effectiveness of measures to destroy stockpiled landmines through the two regimes under the themes of resources, political will and humanitarian impact. This chapter concludes by considering new insights drawn from an individual and comparative analysis of the role of APII and the mine ban treaty in this field.

It is a central tenet of regime theory that rules should reflect a clear understanding of the measures required to implement them. While APII and the mine ban treaty are very specific in relation to the weapons they address, the official definition of stockpile destruction set out within the IMAS, and applied by the mine action community, does not clarify what should be destroyed: APMs, AVMs or other weapons and ammunition.1 This reflects the reality that landmines are frequently stockpiled with other munitions that may themselves pose a hazard. Consequently, the destruction of landmines is not distinguished from other explosive ordnance. Conceptual ‘fuzziness’ also avoids narrow alignment with the definitions and objectives of a single regime framework.

The contexts within which the activity takes place suggest that a distinction should be made between three types of stockpile destruction: the disposal of competently stored state inventories; the eradication of arms caches found in post-conflict environments (as undertaken in Iraq following the US-led invasion); and, the destruction of weapons found and grouped for destruction as a result of humanitarian demining activities.

In the first category, the two landmine regimes have made a clear, measurable, and with the mine ban treaty, dramatic impact in reducing global landmine stockpiles. Landmine Monitor calculates that in the mid-1990s, 131 states possessed stockpiles of more than 260 million APMs. Estimates for 2010 suggest that thirty-five countries now stockpile about 160 million APMs.² Among mine ban treaty states parties, 151 of 156 states parties do not hold stockpiles. Together, this amounts to some forty-five million APMs destroyed since the treaty’s entry into force.³ APII obligations have also resulted in the significant destruction of non-compliant stocks. China, in November 2005, declared that it had destroyed some 500,000 non-APII compliant landmines. The US completed the destruction of over 3.3 million dumb (non-self destruct) landmines in June 1998, retaining only those needed for training and research as well as for use in the South Korean de- militarized zone.⁴ These figures demonstrate that both regimes have had a measurable impact in reducing global landmine levels.

In the latter two categories (post-conflict caches and weapons collected through humanitarian demining), destruction activities have always formed a part of mine action. It is therefore necessary to distinguish regime-specific effects. One important set of implementation issues relates to how far the provisions for stockpile destruction are consistent with demining field realities and requirements. Implementation also throws up politically sensitive questions on defection that relate to how stockpile destruction obligations are interpreted by regime members.

Article 4 of the mine ban treaty obliges members to ensure the destruction of all stockpiled APMs ‘it owns or possesses or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party’.5 The timetable for the destruction of stockpiled APMs is clear. Unlike Article 5, which sets a deadline of ten years for the clearance of mined areas but allows the possibility of extension periods, the stockpile destruction deadline is non-renewable. Similarly, although APII contains no specific provisions on the destruction of stockpiles, if a state party is unable or unwilling to make stocks compliant with provisions on detectability, self-destruction or self-neutralization, then destruction is the only feasible alternative. As Maslen notes, ‘since the Protocol prohibits the use or transfer of an unlawful weapon, it is likely, in practice, to destroy it’.⁶ A deferral period of nine years for these provisions therefore represents a de facto deadline for stockpile destruction (unless stocks are adapted for compliance).

Stockpile destruction continues to be a significant challenge for mine ban treaty regime implementation. Remaining stocks held by regime members represent the hard cases in terms of national capacity and political will. As of November 2011, these include Belarus, Greece, Iraq, Turkey and Ukraine. All bar Iraq are now formally in breach of their Article 4 destruction commitment. Outside of the mine ban treaty, the major holders of stockpiles – China (110 million), Russia (24.5 million) the US (10.4 million), Pakistan (six million) and India (4–5 million) – are APII members, and therefore must ensure compliance with its provisions.⁷ The relevance of APII is further emphasized by the fact that these landmine stockpilers are highly unlikely to sign up to an APM ban in the foreseeable future.

The 2004 Nairobi Action Plan, calls for two mutually reinforcing sets of actions geared towards achieving the treaty’s stockpile destruction objectives. First, states parties are requested to identify and report on all stockpiled APMs to establish the capacities necessary to meet their deadlines and to develop plans, identify priorities, problems and requirements for assistance in a timely manner. Second, states parties ‘in a position to do so’ are required to assist others in meeting stockpile destruction obligations.⁸ Recognizing the danger of losing track of whether landmines have been stockpiled, retained for training purposes or destroyed, Action 15 of the Nairobi Action Plan stipulates:

When previously unknown stockpiles are discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed, report such activities in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, take advantage of other informal means to share such information and destroy those mines as a matter of urgent priority.9

The disjointed relationship between these requirements and field realities is well illustrated by the experience of one mine-affected state. Angola, with work hampered because landmine caches are frequently found in heavily mined and difficult to access areas, has suggested that it may require an extension to its deadline for destruction of APM stockpiles. The terse statement in Landmine Monitor to the effect that ‘the Mine Ban Treaty does not allow extensions for stockpile destruction’,¹⁰ fails to acknowledge or address the implementation challenges that caused Angola to miss the deadline in the first place. Though in breach of its treaty obligations since January 2007, Angola is a heavily mine-affected state, which is in need of assistance. Ignoring this reality demonstrates a gap between the principle, and practice, of regime support.

Involuntary and voluntary defection

A state’s ability to meet their obligations is a key determinant of successful implementation. Given the cost and potential complexity of stockpile destruction, the danger of involuntary defection would seem to be significant for mine-affected states. This poses a dilemma, since many countries have neither the resources nor the technological base to develop appropriate destruction facilities. A state’s willingness to meet regime obligations is at least as important. The potential for voluntary defection therefore represents another important factor for regime effectiveness.

In a statement to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, the DRC declared that it had fulfilled its stockpile destruction commitment by destroying all stockpiled APMs ‘that it had been able to identify’.¹¹ The statement went on to acknowledge the likelihood of finding additional stockpiles in the future, in parts of the country under the control of ANSAs. The existence of such stocks has been confirmed through the small numbers of APMs handed over to the United Nations through its DDR programme.¹² For the ICBL, this statement creates an unsatisfactory doubt as to whether the DRC is compliant with its Article 4 obligation.¹³ However, the ambiguity is not the consequence of a lack of clarity, but rather a reflection of the inability of the government to exert oversight and control over the national territory.¹⁴ A December 2005 meeting on treaty implementation in the DRC, demonstrated a further dimension to the challenge by highlighting the absence of a coherent structure within the government to oversee the country’s treaty obligations.¹⁵ This situation was exacerbated by instability during a period of political transition in the build up to national elections.

Afghanistan declared in May 2006, that all ‘known’ stockpiles would be destroyed by its March 2007 deadline under the mine ban treaty. At the same meeting, Afghan representatives acknowledged the challenge of addressing ‘the need for local commanders and villagers to voluntarily give up their stockpiled caches or to disclose the locations of them’.16 If Afghanistan’s stockpile destruction deadline was missed by six months, the formal notification of the completion in October 2007 also retained the proviso that this relates to ‘known’ stockpiles.¹⁷ Subsequently, further small quantities of APMs have been recovered from caches, while there has also been reporting of minelaying by Taliban forces. In September 2009, US forces in Kandahar province attributed extremely high casualty rates to the Taliban’s use of victim-activated explosive devices.¹⁸

How far provisions provide latitude for differing interpretations and enable regime members to evade their obligations is an important consideration. This challenge has been exemplified in the mine ban treaty context by Turkmenistan, which inherited a large stockpile of APMs from the Soviet Union. Its first Article 7 report, submitted in October 2001, stated that 761,782 APMs remained from an initial stockpile of 1.7 million. Destruction was estimated to take eight years, and a deadline extension was requested.¹⁹ Interventions by the co-chairs of the Stockpile Destruction Standing Committee saw Turkmenistan clarify that it would meet its deadline and that only 250,000 APMs remained.²⁰ In subsequent reporting of its successful destruction programme, it was announced that some 70,000 APMs would be retained for training and testing as provided for under Article 3. This figure is well beyond the numbers understood by other states parties to be necessary for this purpose. The country was therefore criticized for breaching the spirit of the treaty. The Turkmen Embassy to NATO subsequently wrote to the European Commission, stating that in February 2004 some 60,000 further APMs would be destroyed.²¹ Then, in April 2005, all stocks including those originally reserved for training were reported destroyed. An addendum provided by Landmine Monitor points out that all the earlier figures were wildly inaccurate, since the authorities had confused the number of containers with the number of individual APMs. Rather than 70,000 APMs, the real figure at that point was 572,200!²²

Clarity, support from regime members, coherence and links between primary obligations and enabling provisions are important considerations for the implementation of regime rules.²³ Although formally joining the regime on 1 March 1999, Turkmenistan only attended an intersessional meeting for the first time in June 2004 and failed to attend subsequent meetings. Its first two Article 7 reports were incomplete and the third consisted of a four-sentence statement. The short space between signature of the treaty (3 December 1997) and ratification (19 January 1998) reinforces the hypothesis that provision for domestic implementation modalities represents an important indicator of commitment levels at the national level.

These cases allow the identification of missed opportunities, but also show the limitations of the regimes in preventing defection. Reporting by Afghanistan and the DRC highlights the practical difficulties certain members face in ascertaining the numbers and locations of APM stockpiles. Declarations by states are shown to be inadequate where ANSAs retain de facto control of parts of the national territory. It is untenable for the government to claim full compliance with its national stockpile destruction obligations when armed groups hold stockpiles, and in some cases have been accused of mine laying. Stockpile destruction challenges also demonstrate the potential for abuse as well as the lack of capacity, in some mine-affected states, to internalize and implement international obligations through domestic bureaucratic structures. This lack of depth to the central state – understood as the inability to effectively implement, manage and oversee commitments at the national level – renders meaningless a quantitative approach to implementation. Instead, cases of involuntary defection show the extent to which a lack of emphasis on national capacity building can undermine regime goals.