Reaching Agreement Through Fair Process

Before showing that climate change is a matter of urgency, it’s necessary to say something about what is required to meet the 2 °C target. Given that there is a general understanding that UNFCCC should limit global temperature changes to no more than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, it’s now possible to consider what this actually requires in terms of collective action. Climate change is caused by actions that produce greenhouse gas emissions through the burning of fossil fuels or changes in land use such as deforestation. Leaving aside the possibility of geoengineering, which is still unproven, maintaining global temperature changes within the 2 °C threshold will require reductions of emissions on a global scale. The question now becomes what level of emissions reduction is needed to meet the 2 °C target.

This question is addressed in two articles published in the journal Nature in 2009. In one article Meinshausen et al. argue that people should look at cumulative emissions to the year 2050 as an indicator of whether the world will stay within the 2 °C limit by 2100 (Meinshausen et al. 2009). Taking this approach, the authors provide emissions targets for achieving specific temperature increases by 2100. In a second article, Allen et al. argue that the impact of emissions should be considered over a much longer time period and provide emissions targets for limiting atmospheric warming until 2500 (Allen et al. 2009b). Both of these articles suggest that meeting the 2 °C limit requires limiting our total cumulative emissions from the industrial revolution to less than a trillion tonnes of carbon dioxide. Both studies suggest that meeting the target requires large cuts in global emissions. This means that there is a ‘carbon budget’ that cannot be exceeded if people are serious about remaining within the 2 °C temperature threshold. Other research supports the findings of these studies. For example, the IPCC also suggests that meeting this temperature target requires that global emissions be reduced by 50–85 % by 2050 relative to 1990 levels (Gupta et al. 2007, p. 775).

The problem is that the world is not on track towards meeting this end. Whilst the international community has made a number of pledges to reduce emissions, these are inadequate for what is required. In 2011, a report from the International Energy Agency (IEA) states that current emissions trends are consistent with a long-term temperature increase of more than 3.5°carbon (IEA 2011).⁹ As it is, the 2 °C target required for climate stabilisation is unlikely to be met.

But avoiding dangerous climate change is as much about the rate at which emissions are reduced as it is about the stringency with which this is done. There are several reasons why this is the case.¹⁰

Firstly, a lot has already been emitted. Since the industrial revolution, the world has emitted a cumulative total of around half a trillion tonnes of carbon dioxide (Allen et al. 2009a). This has pushed up global atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases to 400 ppm, which is the highest that they have been in at least the past three million years. The fact that so much has already been emitted has two important implications. One related to adaptation and one to mitigation.

On the one hand, climate change is already happening and will continue to get worse in the future.¹¹ It is well documented that the earth’s atmosphere is undergoing extreme changes and that the possibility of limiting these changes diminishes as the starting point for action is pushed further into the future (Gardiner 2011; Stocker 2013). The greenhouse gases that have been put into the atmosphere since the industrial revolution have already caused an increase in the global average surface temperature of around 1 °C (IPCC 2013). This has caused changes to the climate that are having severe impacts on human welfare globally.¹² This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the physical effects of climate change are time-lagged. Due to inertia within the atmospheric system, the full effects of emissions that are generated today are not translated into physical changes in the atmosphere until sometime in the future. This also means that those emissions that were generated in the past will continue to cause an increase in global temperatures regardless of the actions that people take from now on.¹³ Given that climate change is already happening and will continue to happen in the future, any attempt to mitigate the very worst effects of climate change must take place as soon as possible.

On the other hand, there is a further issue associated with the fact that the world has already emitted a lot, which is that the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases is already close to the threshold limit for avoiding dangerous climate change.¹⁴ Given the intensity with which people are currently burning fossil fuels, it is expected that this threshold will be reached within the next two decades (Oliver et al. 2012). This means that the opportunity to prevent severe climate change is rapidly diminishing. If people are serious about staying within the 2 °C limit then action on climate change needs to happen soon.

A second reason for urgency is that the stakes are high and the outcomes unknown. Climate science is characterised by high uncertainty. The atmosphere is extremely complex and the implications of changes in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are difficult to model. Despite our best efforts to make predictions about climate change there is still a great deal of uncertainty about what its full effects will be in the future. This is particularly important given that climate change may bring about consequences that are non-linear, irreversible, and potentially catastrophic in nature.¹⁵ The effects of emissions are non-linear because there are both tipping points and positive feedback loops within the earth’s climate. This means that any given amount of emissions may lead to far greater changes in the atmosphere than the same amount of emissions brought about in the past. Some of these tipping points may bring about changes that are wholly irreversible (Halsnæs et al. 2007, p. 127; Solomon et al. 2009; Frolicher and Joos 2010). Climate change is also potentially catastrophic. The atmospheric changes that come about from unabated emissions could lead to a situation in which larger parts of the planet become uninhabitable. Even if the likelihood of such outcomes arising is very small, there are still strong arguments for reducing emissions as quickly as possible (Weitzman 2009). When these three features of climate change are combined, it is difficult to argue against taking immediate action to mitigate global emissions.

A third reason is that the ability to implement necessary measures to avoid dangerous climate change diminishes with time. This is for at least two separate reasons. On the one hand, there is technical inertia in implementing emissions reductions. The total amount of emissions that can be reduced in a certain amount of time is finite (den Elzen et al. 2006, p. 7). Carbon emissions are fundamental to every aspect of global society and making the necessary changes to global energy infrastructure to bring about a reduction in emissions will take a long time. On the other hand, ‘political’ or ‘social’ inertia is also an issue here.¹⁶ Energy infrastructure operates on very long time-scales, meaning that any decisions that are made now are likely to have implications that last for a very long time. Power plants, fuel storage facilities, and electricity grids have operational lifetimes of several decades. As a result, some authors argue that decisions on energy policy run the risk of ‘lock-in’, whereby decisions taken today have long-term implications for carbon emissions (Unruh 2000; IEA 2011, p. 2). This problem is worsened by the large costs involved with the development of energy infrastructure. Any decisions that are made now will continue to have implications for the future because reversing these decisions is prohibitively costly. Achieving the large reductions necessary for climate stabilisation therefore requires action now because delaying action may lead us in a direction that can’t be changed.

A fourth reason for urgency is that postponing action now makes future emissions reductions very costly.¹⁷ This is partly due to the issues raised above. If a large proportion of the total carbon budget needed to stay within the 2 °C limit are ‘locked-in’ by existing energy infrastructure, then any additional infrastructure has to be entirely carbon free. This is likely to be much more costly than a mitigation policy that takes gradual steps towards reducing emissions, phasing out emissions intensive infrastructure over time rather than stopping all emissions abruptly.

But further to this, if action isn’t taken to reduce the growth of global emissions now then even more stringent measures have to be adopted later on. It’s not just the case that emissions aren’t being reduced at the moment; global emissions are actually increasing and are expected to continue to do so in the future. The IEA predicts that global energy demand is likely to grow by over a third between now and 2035. Most of this growth is expected to come from increased energy consumption in developing countries that are undergoing rapid economic development. As a result of this increase in energy demand, energy-related carbon emissions are predicted to rise from an estimated 31.2–37.0 Gt in the same period (IEA 2011). Postponing action on mitigation until some point in the future means that the rate at which emissions have to be reduced will be higher than if this reduction starts now. A number of recent studies have made a strong economic case in support of more immediate action on climate change now in order to avoid more costly action later (Stern 2014; Global Commission on the Economy and Climate 2014). Given that the cost of reducing emissions increases in line with the amount that has already been emitted, postponing mitigation until some point in the future will ultimately involve higher costs.

This argument is based on the idea that it is economically efficient to take action on mitigation now rather than later. But some authors dispute this view, arguing that, rather than taking costly action to immediately reduce our emissions now, it is more cost effective to invest in clean technology for the future and postpone mitigation until suitable alternatives for producing energy are developed (Lomborg 2001). This is because what matters for staying below a certain global temperature target is the total cumulative amount of emissions up to a certain point in time, rather than the rate at which they are reduced.¹⁸ Furthermore, the cost of mitigating emissions in the future can be discounted because technological developments and economic growth will means that those who are alive in the future are expected, on aggregate, to be better off than those who are alive today. Under this approach, the 2 °C target is still feasible if global emissions continue at their current levels, or even increase in the near future. Given that it is possible to develop clean ways of generating energy, the international community should invest in these technologies and reduce emissions in the future rather than taking costly mitigation measures now.

But this represents an extremely optimistic view of how things might play out. Whilst it is impossible to rule out the possibility of developing sufficient alternatives to emissions intensive energy production in the future, there are important reasons for thinking that this is unlikely. The world is already very close to exceeding the total amount of emissions needed to meet the 2 °C target. Given the physical inertia of the climate system and the problem of carbon lock-in, many think that global emissions need to peak in the immediate future if dangerous climate change is to be avoided. There simply isn’t enough time to develop clean technologies whilst avoiding mitigation.

Further to this, the argument for postponing mitigation is based on the assumption that it is possible to develop cheap and reliable ways of producing clean energy. Yet, whilst there has been some investment in clean energy in the past few years, this is yet to produce a way of generating low carbon energy that is cost comparable with fossil fuels.¹⁹ Clean energy technology is still extremely costly and suffers from technical problems such as intermittency. There is no guarantee that investment in clean energy will bring about the necessary advances in technology to maintain the current standard of living enjoyed by many people around the world. This doesn’t mean that investment in research and development for clean energy should stop. Developing clean energy may ultimately be crucial for helping people live decent lives without causing dangerous climate change. But it may take a long time for the price of clean energy to fall and it shouldn’t be taken for granted that these technologies will be developed in the near future. Continuing to produce emissions now in the hope that suitable alternative modes of energy production will come about in the future is therefore naïve. In fact, starting emissions reductions now rather than later delays the point at which certain temperature limits are reached.²⁰ This provides more time for developing clean energy technologies and building the necessary infrastructure for meeting energy needs in a low carbon world. If people are serious about developing clean technologies they should pursue mitigation policies now rather than later.

A third point that supports these two arguments is that the necessary technological advances in energy production may only come about once sufficient incentives are in place to develop them. One of the main problems with clean energy at the moment is that it is so expensive in comparison to fossil fuels. This makes it difficult to encourage people to develop and use these forms of energy production. One way of changing this situation is to provide sufficient incentives for people to move away from carbon intensive methods of energy production and towards low-carbon options. Mitigation policies can play an important role here. These policies increase the cost of using fossil fuels thereby encouraging people to use and develop clean energy technology. As these technologies are developed their costs will fall, in turn encouraging their use. Contrary to the objection that some make, developing cheaper clean energy partly depends on adopting policies to reduce emissions, whereas continuing to emit simply reinforces the dominance of fossil fuels in the global energy market. Whilst people should take efforts to develop clean energy technology, people should also be sceptical about the prospect of meeting the 2 °C target without taking emissions reductions soon.

In summary, there is a great deal of evidence suggesting that people should take immediate action to address climate change. These arguments relate to different aspects of climate change, yet they all point in the same direction: people cannot afford to delay taking action to mitigate our emissions and develop adaptation policies. Ordinarily, getting bogged down in procedural issues would mean losing out on the benefits of immediate collective action until some future point in time. With climate change things are very different. Prolonged inaction not only has severe consequences for the near future, it also makes it unlikely that catastrophic outcomes can be avoided in the long-term. This means that urgency should be given great importance here. The implications of this (which become clear in the next section) are that if reasonable disagreement prolongs action in the UNFCCC then this is a serious problem for meeting its overall goal and continued deliberation over intractable issues is not a viable option.

So far, I’ve argued that the ultimate goal of the UNFCCC is to avoid dangerous climate change and that achieving this goal requires action that is both urgent and stringent. Now, I turn to an important condition under which the UNFCCC must achieve this goal, namely: consensual agreement. Consensual agreement means that the UNFCCC must command the voluntary consent and endorsements of all its participants.

The reasoning for this is that, under current international law, states cannot be forced to enter international agreements.²¹ There are no sufficiently credible enforcement mechanisms for ensuring participation and compliance with multilateral treaties at this point in time.²² This is because there is no global sovereign power that can force a state to participate in international treaties. There are also international norms that prevent states from forcing each other to participate in treaties. Even if this were not the case, then it is generally thought that there are insufficient mechanisms for encouraging participation and compliance at the international level. Whilst it might be the case that climate change eventually becomes so severe that it is imperative to force states to comply with the obligations of a multilateral treaty on climate change, credible sanctions and other means of enforcing compliance are not available at this point in time. This is because most enforcement mechanisms harm the enforcing state as much as they harm the offending state.²³ States are also reluctant to punish others, fearing that they may face reciprocal action.²⁴ Threats to impose economic sanctions or trade restrictions on another state therefore suffer from a credibility problem.²⁵ Whilst there are some limited enforcement mechanisms for ensuring compliance once a state has entered a treaty, these are relatively weak. Despite several instances of noncompliance, those who have refused to cooperate with the commitments of the UNFCCC have not yet faced any sort of punishment. Canada failed to meet its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and walked away from the agreement unpunished whilst Japan, Russia and the US refused to sign up to a second commitment period without facing any penalties at all (Metz 2013).

The implication of this is that a necessary condition for cooperation on climate change is that actors comply with international institutions on a voluntary basis (Risse, M.A. 2004; Halsnæs et al. 2007, p. 127). Because the UNFCCC is a comprehensive agreement with universal membership of states on a global scale, the UNFCCC requires the cooperation of these actors at the global level. A further important point is that actors generally do not commit themselves to voluntary agreements unless they consider these agreements fair. This is often true for individuals, as well as at the international level.²⁶ That is, states are often unwilling to join an agreement if it thinks that the terms of the agreement are unfair, either to itself, or to other actors.²⁷ This means that a further condition of the UNFCCC is that all of its participants perceive it as fair. As I suggested in Chap. 2, this applies as much to the fairness of its procedures as it does to the fairness of its outcomes.

To summarise the argument thus far, the ultimate goal of the UNFCCC is to limit atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at a level that avoids dangerous climate change. This requires limiting global temperature increases to no more than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, which in turn requires urgent action. The fact that this requires urgent action carries additional importance that will become clear in the next section. Further to these points, the UNFCCC and its related institutions must gain the voluntary support of its participants. Since states are largely unwilling to support unfair institutions, it’s also necessary that the international community perceives the UNFCCC as a fair institution.

This is where the relevance of reasonable disagreement becomes clear. As I argued in Chap. 2, there is reasonable disagreement about some of the substantive ends that a climate change institution should pursue. This means that agreement over the substantive ends of the institution is going to be difficult, if not wholly impossible. In fact, given the deadlock that has persisted in the negotiations of the UNFCCC for two decades, it seems fair to presume that this is unlikely to arise anytime soon, if ever at all. If avoiding climate change is something that requires great urgency, then this is obviously a problem.

Given these facts, I now argue that the parties of the UNFCCC might be able to reach mutually agreeable terms of cooperation through a fair procedure. In doing so, I show that procedural values are fundamentally important to the design of the UNFCCC.