Political Virtues
© The Author(s) 2015
Paulo Ferreira da CunhaPolitical Ethics and European ConstitutionSpringerBriefs in Law10.1007/978-3-662-45600-2_22. Political Virtues
(1)
Faculty of Law, University of Porto, Porto, Portugal
(2)
School of Law, University Anhembi Morumbi (Laureate International Universities), São Paulo, Brazil
ce qui ne signifie pas que, dans une certaine république, on soit vertueux; mais qu’on devroit l’être. Cela ne prouve pas non plus que, dans une certaine monarchie, on ait de l’honneur: et que, dans un État despotique particulier, on ait de la crainte; mais qu’il faudroit en avoir: sans quoi le gouvernement sera imparfait.
Montesquieu—De l’Esprit des Lois, III, 11.
2.1 No Republic Without Virtue
Nowadays, political ethics may be called, republican ethics in what concerns either virtues or values. The Republic is, furthermore, an ethical government, not just a political regime. Without virtue the Republic misrepresents itself and perishes:
Lorsque cette vertu cesse, l’ambition entre dans les coeurs qui peuvent la recevoir, et l’avarice entre dans tous. Les désirs changent d’objets: ce qu’on aimait, on ne l’aime plus; on était libre avec les lois, on veut être libre contre ells. Chaque citoyen est comme un esclave échappé de la maison de son maître; ce qui était maxime, on l’appelle rigueur; ce qui était règle, on l’appelle gêne; ce qui y était attention, on l’appelle crainte. C’est la frugalité qui y est l’avarice, et non pas le désir d’avoir. Autrefois le bien des particuliers faisait le trésor public; mais pour lors le trésor public deviant le patrimoine des particuliers. La république est une dépouille; et sa force n’est plus que le pouvoir de quelques citoyens et la licence de tous.1
So, in this book we take political ethics and republican ethics as synonyms.
In ancient Greece, we originally had the σοϕια (wisdom, which would recede in prudency), the σωϕροσυνη (from which would temperance result), the strength, courage, or value (ανδρια), which would later be the Stronghold, then Justice (διακαιοσυνη), the most immutable of them all if we discount its own semantic evolution, which, in the Middle Ages led to identifying with the figure of Job or with the figure of the merciful, or the defensive king of widows and orphans’ (which has nothing to do with the Hellenic synonym, nor with the Roman meaning).2
2.2 Mythical Examples of Classical Virtues
Ancient Greece and Rome give us a considerable number of mythical and historical examples (also mythicized) of people who, one way or another, may be symbolic of classical virtues and of virtues in general.
Examples for Prudency: Fabius Maximus, Socrates and Numa Pompilius; for Justice, Camillus, Pittacus and Trajan; for Stronghold: Leonidas and Horatius Cocles; for Temperance: Scipio, Pericles, and Cincinnatus.
Marcus Furius Camillus (446–365 B.C) was one of those extraordinary Roman magistrates, called “dictators”—temporary and legally appointed magistrature, as was the custom then. Slandered, he preferred exile, but he would end up returning: faced with the Vae victis speech of Gaulish Breno, Rome’s marauder, Camillus opposed him with another maxim that would remain famous: Non auro, sed ferro, recuperando est patria. And through the iron he would release the homeland from the invaders.
Pittacus de Mytilene (who lived in the seventh century B.C.) was considered as one of the seven Greek wise men. He challenged an institution with some similarity to Roman “dictatorship”—one of the tyrants, which, initially, as we know, hadn’t any negative connotation, meaning only the lack of a normal title for exercising power. The wise Pittacus would depose the despotic governor of Mytilene, but instead of perpetuating himself in command, he retired after ruling for 10 years.
The Emperor Trajan (53–117) made himself distinguished in practically all domains, considered by some as the greatest Roman emperor. It is then natural that we consider him exemplary.
Leonidas died heroically in the Thermopile gorge (480 B.C.) accompanied by three hundred Spartans. History and legend tell of his bravery in his last fight against the Persians commanded by Xerxes.
The legend of Leonidas is similar to that of Publio Horatius Cocles’ (sixth century B.C.), according to which he would have defended the bridge that led to Rome alone, defending it from the Etruscans, headed by Porsena.3
Publius Cornelius, Scipio African (236–183 B.C.) is a very complex figure, perhaps praised for his temperance since he knew how to appreciate his enemy Hannibal Barca and for the magnanimous way that, in general, he treated defeated Carthage. He died in exile, leaving this self-written epitaph: Ingrata patria, non possidebis ossa mea.
Pericles (495–429 B.C.), considered the mythical father of Athenian democracy (which however was a gradual process, and was truthfully only partially democratic, as is well known4), distinguished himself in many fields. Maybe the reason for special praise of his temperance is explained by the fact that he never desired to abuse power, adopting a wise balance, of which his relations with Cimon, his political opponent, are an example.
To Pericles Thucydides attributed a mournful speech in honor of the Athens’ heroes killed in combat, which is an exquisite oratory play, but above all interests us as portrait of the Athenian Republic.
Cincinnatus was another Roman “dictator”, who took the nation from crisis to victory in only 16 days (471 B.C.), and after this deed returned to plowing his land as he did before.5
But there are many exemplary mythical actors beyond these.6 In fact, we see the correspondence between virtues and illustrious men to be sometimes a bit forced. Not everyone, certainly, but at least some.
We can look at examples of “excessive virtue” as a kind of vice by exaggeration. For example: that of Horatio, who killed his own sister because she cried for her fiancé, an enemy of the Republic that he had just killed. Or that of Marcio Portius Cato (234–139 B.C.) who confessed that he only held his wife when it thundered—but the situation, however, left him of good humor (he said).
On the other hand, the deeds of Regulus and Mucius Scaevola are no doubt heroic, but cannot be interpreted as a vicious exaggeration, only as extremely virtuous.
Marcus Atilius Regulus honored the word given to the Carthaginian enemies returning to Cartago for the greatest tortures and for death, after he himself had proposed not to give in to the Punic proposals7 in the Senate.
Gaius Mucius Scaevola is a mythical hero: surprised in his intent to kill the Etruscan leader Persena, he thrust his right hand into the flaming sacrificial brazier, showing not to have fear of death with which he had been threatened during the questioning. Astonished, the Etruscan released him.8
However, as Rousseau himself said, on preventing exaggeration:
Les anciens peoples ne sont plus un modèle pour les moderns; ils leur sont trop étrangers à tous égards. Vous surtout, Genevois, gardez votre place, et n’allez point aux objets élevés, qu’on vous présente pour vous cacher l’abîme qu’on creuse au-devant de vous. Vous n’êtes ni Romains ni Spartiates, vous n’êtes pas même Athéniens. Laissez là ces grands noms, qui ne vous vont point. Vous êtes des marchands, des artisans, des bourgeois, toujours occupies de leur interest privés, de leur travail, de leur traffic, de leur gain; des gens pour qui la liberté meme n’est qu’un moyen d’acquérir sans obstacle et de posséder en sûreté.9
Despite this, even Rousseau praised classical examples. Unfortunately, today classical culture has vanished from popular pursuit almost in its entirety, and the examples that we have given mean almost nothing to our youth. The republicans will have to search for ethics in the great sagas of contemporary literature: from The Chronicles of Narnia, to The Lord of the Rings and Harry Potter series.
But other sources, more explicitly political, may be proposed: like the excellent book of Fernando Pereira Marques, which echoes the thoughts of the philosopher and poet Antero de Quental, Esboço de um Programa para os Trabalhos das Novas Gerações. 10
2.3 Postmodern Virtues
The “traditional” or classical virtues should certainly be joined by some others, not specifically political, but that seem essential to our times. We will call these—for our convenience but without excessive conviction—postmodern virtues.11
The Italian thinker and essayist Italo Calvino summed up some of these with sharpness and insight, in his “Charles Eliot Norton Poetry Lectures,” which he sadly couldn’t finish.12
From Calvino’s English version, we shall also give them our interpretation, without implicating the author, who was merely an inspiration to our framework. Therefore, in our view, the following general virtues would be an essential support for republican virtues:
2.3.1 Lightness
The modern world is the light world,13 for good and bad. It must have lightness, to have adaptability, ductility, and mental and experiential malleability. Not, obviously, to allow the so-called co-workers (giving the impression nobody is now a permanent employee) to shift from function to function, from land to land, deprived of their rights. But, it stresses the need to be permanently evolving, and adapting to change. It seems that the world where people held the same job and had the same specialty their whole lives has come to an end, as much as we would like it to be otherwise. It is a sad truth. We may try to work to rebuild the Welfare State in order to adapt to this new situation, but for now this has led to rising unemployment.
2.3.2 Agility (Quickness)
We know how in current times change has accelerated. It is necessary not to be totally detached nor a frenetic follower of trends and news, but, no doubt the resourcefulness that we require today has something to do with speed. Speed of understanding change, speed of responding to new challenges. We also believe that, first, we should cultivate an agility of spirit, with sharpness of thought. Even though—we shouldn’t forget—with a “good use of slowness”14—as much as this is possible anyway.
2.3.3 Rigor (Precision)
We see, among our contemporaries, along with some growing “professionalism” (not always beneficial, because it tends toward exaggeration, to a lack of ductility and to a certain depersonalization), a lot of improvisation in ideas and acts. Precision, rigor, accuracy are essential. The amateur attitude among professionals needs to end. Of course, no offense to amateurs: there are some amateurs that do a lot of good. But amateurs are amateurs, and professionals are professionals.15 A different matter is the love for his or her work that a real professional should have. But this love doesn’t make him or her an amateur, on the contrary.
2.3.4 Exposure (Visibility)
In politics, as in many other fields, visibility has become increasingly indispensable. There is not (was there once in fact?) an omniscient entity that knows about people’s values and awards merit. It may seem somewhat vulgar and even shocking, but some marketing is necessary: personal, institutional, etc. Those are the rules of the game. And as long as it is played with seriousness and some discretion (even with some elegance) there won’t be an ethical mistake, or even a risk. This visibility is Protean: it goes from the need for some exposure and publicity, given the profusion of requites, from the very beginning until transparency, and institutional transparency, but trying to contradict today’s voyeuristic society.16
2.3.5 Pluralism (Diversity)
The monism, confinement, crystallization, avarice and myopia that value only one area of knowledge, or one unique idea has its days numbered. For good and for bad, the current world is already very diverse, fragmentary17 and plural18 even in Law, which was normally a friend of the monist solutions, like legal positivism. There is always a need to have multiplicity, variety, pluralism, and interdisciplinarity in our knowledge.
2.3.6 Consistency
Even as a symmetric pole to variety and fragmentation, coherence and consistency are necessary—which needs to be the mortar of everything, because the future will be very demanding of articulation if a totalitarian concentration of power doesn’t come and impose its boot on everything: and hopefully we still can avoid it, because we understand History and what happened before, after, and the reasons for such kinds of crisis.
2.3.7 “Un Coeur Intelligent”—“An Intelligent Heart”
Almost all these virtues refer to a very clear (affirmative, explicit) separation of the prejudice-paradigm from which the virtuous republican person is hard and fast, unable of adaptation, mentally heavy, slow, etc.—“conservative” even. To them we can add another from a poetic biblical passage, with a metaphor of the heart.19 It is King Solomon that speaks:
Give therefore thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy people, that I may discern between good and bad: for who is able to judge this thy great people?.20
About its relevance today Alain Finkielkraut comments:
Le roi Salomon suppliait l’Éternel de lui accorder un coeur intelligent. Au sortir d’un siècle ravagé par les méfaits conjoints de la bureaucratie, c’est-à-dire d’une intelligence purement fonctionnelle, et de l’idéologie, c’est-à-dire d’une sentimentalité binaire et souverainement indifférente à la singularité des destins individuels, cette prière pour être doué de perspicacité affective a gardé toute sa valeur.21
Effectively, the twentieth century had in its non-“discrete” ideologies22 (namely the fascists and the communists) terrible substitutive machines of critical thinking, and in the cadaveric hardness of the bureaucrats the source of one thousand incompetences and one thousand injustices. Without the affective intelligence (that refers to fraternity), we can’t go far. On the other hand, with an intelligent heart, we go where reason and the heart alone don’t allow.
2.4 The Virtue of Auctoritas
2.4.1 Consistency and Conviction
The first republican virtue demanded by today’s challenges is true love of the Republic, and true love of its values: Freedom, Equality, Fraternity, and the pathways to them, like Solidarity and Justice. You cannot perform any public office well when this is done for one’s own benefit, nor when the function is viewed with the cynicism of those who have no ideals, and none of these Republican ideals in particular. For example: at a certain moment, it was the lack of conviction, which dragged the lack of virtues, one of the main factors of corruption and fall of the Portuguese First Republic (1910–1926). It’s not just to deploy the Republic, or dream about it. You have to live it, give it permanent cheer with acts of coherent belief. Let us recall the eloquent Edgar Quinet:
(…) il ne suffit pas de dire devant le suffrage universel, au jour de l’élection : ‘République ! République !’ en pliant un genou. Nous demandons (…) des actes, des oeuvres conformes aux paroles.23
2.4.2 Public Service and Dedication
Without a sense of mission (not self-investiture in the category, but the practice of real and devoted service) there is no auctoritas that would validate any potestas. But this myth of service cannot be confused with the rather different spirit of pseudo-mission of “providential men,” which is a mythification. Republicans have always distrusted “providential men.” This was the case of Ana de Castro Osório, in her mainly historical, but also civic (among other things) precious little book of elementary instruction:
We do not need a saviour, we need many, who want to work and work to raise the Homeland.24
What it is about, and what is required for the Republic, is the spirit of service, statesmanship,25 not just of one, but of many. José Adelino Maltez26 judiciously quotes some passages from Alberto Morais António de Carvalho27 on precisely the opposite of this republican spirit. We allow ourselves to glean:
Employee with a small salary, living in luxury, if not inherited, stole. The positions of the state, in the hands of probity, give advantage, and honour: in the hands of corruption, give the benefit without honour. The probity of public employee cannot live, either in luxury, or in misery. Writers, ordinarily are like whores; they prostitute themselves to whoever pays them. If the honour of representing the nation by deputation was barren of jobs and distinctions, there would be fewer who have the ambition to represent. Despots never miss mandarins who are vile executors of their decrees. Any seaman is deemed qualified to steer the rudder of the ship of state, so she often suffers breakdowns. A wise government should create men for jobs not jobs for men. There are honours without honour, just as there is honour without honours.
2.4.3 Detachment from Public Places
It seems incredible to see politicians, throughout the world, clinging like limpets to power. Trying (and succeeding) to change the rules of the electoral game (usually through referendums, is always dangerous, a pasture of populism; some other times by subtle juridical interpretations). Willing to eternize themselves in high places: if not here, so, it could be there… None of this is good for their respective republics and says everything about their republican spirit. The positions are to be left on time, or whenever necessary, according either to dignity or to opportunity, or both. Whoever is in office will only be truly free, and therefore truly competent, when he or she is capable of leaving his place without problems, head on without sorrow—even in protest, even to be a candidate again… There are such cases of dignity and honesty. Some retreat just to campaign again at the next election. We have to carefully analyze the context, the reasons, and the ulterior steps of each case.
If there is an authoritarian mentality and avid hunger for power, even far beyond the time (or the expiration date), the Republican mindset should be beyond the availability, without turning away from facing the responsibilities, but with a full and complete detachment from power.
2.4.4 Public Private Thrift and Liberality
Public money should burn your fingers; it should be something only to handle with the greatest care, and not so often and so freely. Public money should be managed rigorously and sparingly, and never from the perspective of the patrimonial state.28
However, the “rule” in private management (and in personal finance management) is not to be greedy, and it is even commendable to contribute to the public good. One should not do charity nor allegiance at the expense of the state (this should make strict social justice—and specially the “social state,” which is one of the great achievements of Europe and its “social European model”), but only from his or her pocket. It looks good for a public official or officer to be privately liberal. Not in politics, of course, but in the classic sense of liberality…
2.4.5 Simplicity, Frugality, and Personal Restraint
Freedom should not be confused with personal hands-open. Only some Atticism allows you to have the spirit and be free in the world of seduction and deception that is so closely linked with Power. The fewer possessions, honors, pleasures, or political need to live through power, the more people are free to leave office, and not to be constrained by vassals’ bounds.
2.4.6 Constancy, Smart Adaptability, and Consistency
If on one hand it should rather break than bend in matters of principle, the fact is that there are situations where you have to bend, not break. Especially when it is realized that a change of context has to force a change in attitude. But this may lead to any abuse and treason to principles. It is wise to know when to bend. But it is honorable to understand the moment when only a rupture may save both the face and the soul and the common good, the res publica. One has to have a strong sense of the political moment (in a kayros way) and never confuse self-interest with public interest. Again, it is a matter of principles, values, and personal virtues.
2.4.7 Legalism and Intelligent Criticism: Respect for Laws as Guarantors of Freedom
The Republicans today are not essentially legalistic or normative positivists, although we know that the philosophical essence of many republics in the nineteenth and in the beginning of the twentieth centuries were positivist. But Auguste Comte’s theories and the dura lex sed lex blind clerks are far way… At least we hope. The problem lies elsewhere. We should remember that legal certainty is the most elemental level of justice itself. While there may be unjust laws (and it depends on the degree of injustice: social injustice is terrible, but for a classic jurist it would be more tolerable, we have to recognize that, than concrete, flagrant injustice, in a case where we have only two or so people in conflict, a particular case sub judice 29) we always have to ask if their application cannot be a lesser evil.
Unfortunately, the world today is full of exceptions to enforcement of the law (and even exceptions to the enforcement of the constitutional law). Before you cry out against unjust laws (and there will always be some) we must ask ourselves about the faithful compliance (or otherwise) of applicable laws. Increasingly, new tyrants (and little tyrants at all levels) consider themselves above the law (many, although dealing with law everyday even don’t think about that…). Only the décor at the speech is different, and it is amazing how some people seem not to recognize aspects of tyranny in some situations nowadays.
Let us be wise and practical: it is always more possible to succeed because of arguing the law on one’s behalf (and the lower the source of law evocated, the better) than appealing to higher clouds of ethereal justice. This reveals, of course, the tendency of our times toward technicality. In a sense it is not an evil. Ideas that are too general may impair accuracy. And before the prevailing subjectivism some moderation is not objectively evil, especially when based on the law. Concrete law, specific law.
However, before the turpitude of a blatantly unjust law, some people may be tempted to let the world perish, but fight for justice. It is not advisable to destroy the world. But people should really fight for Justice, even contra legem. And in that case the situation is not easy… Sometimes, it is not simply a question of opinion articles, demonstrations, and so on. But sometimes even those may be heroic actions, when forbidden by terrorist powers, not in a democratic situation of fair play.