Conclusion
Role
Description
Report
Scientists limited to reporting results and letting others make resource decisions, the ‘traditional paradigm’
Interpret
Scientists interpret scientific results so that others can use them. This is often expressed as a scientist’s contractual obligation to funding organisations that the results will be ‘translated’ for non-scientific users
Integrate
Scientists work closely with managers to integrate scientific results into resource policies and decisions
Advocate
Scientists recommend specific policies they prefer or believe flow from their scientific findings
Make final decision
In the face of highly technical and complicated issues scientists make resource decisions themselves
The negative view that scientific advocacy is bad rests on six arguments. First, scientific advocacy for MRs risks being ‘unscientific, simplistic or selective’ (Kaiser 2004, p. 637), undermining the principle of scepticism that lies at the heart of the scientific method (Robertson and Hull 2003), and damaging the reputation of scientists for objective research (Lackey 2007). Second, scientific advocacy for MRs can lead to the politicisation of MR science, whereby research into MRs is geared to highlight their benefits and play down their deficiencies (see Chap. 4). Third, as a result, scientific advocacy could devalue the peer-review process (Pielke 2007; Rice 2011). Fourth, scientific advocacy for MRs could diminish the credibility of MRs in the eyes of marine users. According to Gleason et al. (2013), a key reason why the California MR project succeeded was that scientists adopted a neutral role of advice-giving, not a value-laden role of advocacy. Fifth, scientific advocacy has been criticised for misleading the media and through them, the public. Scientists’ communication of MR research to the media and general public may contribute significantly to how the issue is framed and whether it generates a critical mass of public support in favour of MRs, causing government to act (Polacheck 2006). Inaccurate reporting and sensationalism from the media (Ladle et al. 2005), can result in over-simplistic solutions to a complex problem becoming part of popular discourse, which can be counter-productive, as Agardy et al. (2003, p. 363) warn: ‘When MPA advocates make sweeping statements about the benefits of MPAs, expectations are raised in user groups…Striving to meet these often unrealistically high expectations then puts unnecessary pressure on MPA managers, threatens the continued existence of these MPAs, and even endangers future MPA designations’. Sixth, scientific advocacy for MRs may divert research from more salient topics (such as the vulnerability of different marine species and habitats to different fishing methods) to less salient topics (such as connectivity criteria for MR networks).
The positive view of scientific advocacy for MRs asserts that the purpose of scientific research is to benefit society, and if the findings of that research are agreed by a substantial portion of the scientific community, scientists have a right—even a duty—to push for those findings to be implemented (Marris 2006; Scott et al. 2007; Polacheck 2006). Moreover, scientific advocacy for MRs gets the issue into the public domain, and encourages a wider debate, which enhances democratic decision-making. Such advocacy does not necessarily compromise objectivity, according to a marine scientist respondent:
The problem is that those who are against advocacy think that any scientist who speaks about something is suddenly abandoning their scientific objective and principles because they are speaking out. But actually no, you can promote your findings and say that look we have found in this particular area, this is what the science says more broadly about the outcomes of the implementation of protection, and therefore we can frame this as a solution to some of the problems that we know exist in the oceans and that is a perfectly legitimate use of science in my view…I don’t see it as lacking objectivity…if I was to suddenly start twisting the science around and saying well…ignoring all the contrary evidence, or being very much cherry-picking about the examples that I was using, that then goes from scientific and objective to simply being an advocate, that is unhelpful.
Indeed, for this marine scientist, the alternative to (legitimate) advocacy is not objective decision-making but ignorant decision-making:
I feel strongly that if experts don’t speak out on these things, who is going to decide on them and who is going to be able to judge the validity of the arguments? Well it’s going to be non-experts and if the expert voices don’t get across the information or the evidence…in a powerful or effective way we will make decisions that are based on less good evidence and on opinions. Although ultimately that may happen still, if the good science is out there, then the chances of bad deci sion- making will be reduced.
Moreover, those who defend scientific advocacy claim that it is a fact of life, over which scientists have little control. Pressure exerted by various social groups on scientists to fulfil advocacy roles put them in the uncomfortable position where advocacy is unavoidable (Steel et al. 2004; Gray and Campbell 2008). The important question, therefore, is not whether scientists should advocate, but how they should do so (Nelson and Vucetich 2009).
There are four ways of resolving this conflict between the negative and positive view of scientific advocacy of MRs. The first way is the bathwater solution of saying that criticism of advocacy should not undermine the value of MR science (we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater). As Laffoley (2012) puts it, ‘you can say that advocacy has gone ahead of science, but that doesn’t mean that there isn’t some very good science at the heart of the matter that proves the basic concept of no-take MRs, that they benefit biodiversity in multiple ways and that what you get as a result of MRs is much better than not having one’. The second way is the pluralist solution of saying that provided there are advocates on both sides, the public interest is not at risk. However, if one side commanded much greater resources than the other, questions of inequity could arise. The third way to resolve the conflict is the transparency solution of saying that scientific advocacy for MRs is acceptable provided a distinction is publicly maintained between science and advocacy. There may be a fine line between scientists seeking to impartially provide advice to policy-makers, and becoming issue advocates (Pielke 2007; Scott et al. 2007), but, according to FAO (2006, para 9.8), it is a line that must be kept visible: ‘the public deserves to be able to distinguish members of the discipline giving neutral advice of quality, from those advocating for their client, their sponsors or their own values. Advocates have a societal role to play but the danger is in the confusion of the scientific and advocacy roles’. Some scholars argue that if scientists make their underlying values explicit when they advocate policies, then their advocacy is more acceptable to their academic peers (Nelson and Vucetich 2009)—scientists are also citizens after all. However, the distinction between ‘objective facts’ and ‘subjective values’ is often not clear cut, because scientific information can be interpreted in different ways, depending on one’s underlying worldview (Hilborn 2007b). Indeed, scientists may not even be aware of the subjective values that underpin their ‘objective’ advice, and therefore unable to recognise when they have crossed the line between giving neutral advice and giving value-laden advice (see Chap. 6).
The fourth way to resolve the conflict is the safeguards solution of saying that provided there are safeguards in place to prevent outrageously misleading and egregious claims being made by scientists, advocacy is legitimate. One such safeguard is to draw on experiential knowledge from practitioners in the field, such as fishers’ ecological knowledge (FEK), to monitor factual claims made by pro-MR advocates. Another safeguard is to make use of social science. For example, social science research conducted alongside natural science on MRs would ensure that the socio-economic implications of designations of MRs in particular areas would be documented, dampening down a tendency by ecologist advocates of MRs to ignore such implications (Higgins et al. 2008; Rees et al. 2013; Christie 2011). Another safeguard against dubious or overblown scientific claims is to draw on conceptual analysis. For example, NPs invoke the concept of ‘ecological coherence’ to justify MR networks. But what does ‘ecological coherence’ mean? In 2012, OSPAR (2013, p. 32) admitted that ‘no specific definition for the term “ecological coherence” has yet been formally agreed upon internationally and only a few theoretical concepts and practical approaches have been developed for an assessment of the ecological coherence of a network of MPAs’. Moreover, on this view, ecological coherence is not an independent criterion, but an umbrella term encompassing other criteria, which are themselves conceptually contested. For example, ‘viability’: MPA advocates often claim that MPAs must be large to be viable, but Hiscock (2014, p. 47) challenged this assertion: ‘we know that many rare or threatened habitats and species occur in small areas (perhaps as small as a metre across) and persist there over decades and probably centuries. Whilst identifying tiny areas for conservation may be impractical from the point-of-view of management, the concept that MCZs need to be a prescribed minimum size to be “viable” was flawed’. Another controversial concept is ‘network’, which Hiscock (2014, p. 47) again deconstructed: ‘The word “network” has become entrenched in the language of policy advisors and policy makers but is meaningless for all but a few mobile species…Attempts to identify connectivity distances between MCZs become mired in meaningless heuristics’ (see also Sale et al. 2005).
A further safeguard is to draw on ethical theory to clarify the normative assumptions that lie behind some ‘objective’ scientific advice. A frequent criticism of science advocacy is that the scientific norms of ‘disinterestedness’ and ‘organised scepticism’ may have been violated during research on MRs (Merton 1973). The fact that much MR science has been funded by ENGOs and green trusts that are sympathetic to the MR cause raises serious questions about the objectivity of knowledge on MRs that is being produced. Indeed, normative issues lie at the heart of every natural resource management policy. As Mazur (1981, p. 41) asserted, ‘Many technical controversies are primarily disputes over political goals and only secondarily concerned with the veracity of scientific issues which are related to these goals’. Weible (2007, p. 111) reported on the process of establishing MRs in California that ‘the conflict over MPAs appears to be driven by normative preferences to establish MPAs’. Ethicists help to decide when a scientific advocate is reporting personal preferences rather than research findings.
7.3.3 Role of Stakeholders in the MR Debate
Given the above discussions on the negative and positive perceptions of the roles of politics and scientific advocacy in the MR debate, not surprisingly we find negative and positive perceptions of the role of stakeholders in the MR debate. On negative perceptions, stakeholder engagement creates potential problems for the SNCAs and the UK government who have to meet European targets, because the greater involvement of resource users in decision making could lead to the triumph of local parochial self-interests, and this could undermine strategic nature conservation objectives. Jones and Burgess (2005) persuasively argued that the European Court of Justice is unlikely to accept a government’s defence that EU targets were not fulfilled because they were not consistent with decisions that emerged from local participation processes.
Positive perceptions of stakeholders’ role in the MR debate include the claim that there should be a shift from the idea that ‘the science is right’ to the idea of ‘making sense together’. The idea that the science is right with its associated nostrum that science speaks truth to power, depends on the highest quality of evidence. But in practice, such evidence is rarely available, both because of the lack of time and resources required to collect the massive amount of data necessary, and because of the difficulty of predicting the reaction of human and animal behaviour to management interventions (Fulton et al. 2011). An alternative approach to this linear model which privileges the place of the scientist, is the deliberative model of developing understanding together, which involves wider civil society in the production of knowledge. Non-scientists can focus on where key information gaps lie (e.g. contributing traditional ecological knowledge (TEK)), and can collaborate with scientists (e.g. in fisheries-science partnerships) which will improve the knowledge base and increase the legitimacy of scientific information for policy (Sweeting et al. 2011).1 These recommendations draw on the concept of ‘post-normal science’, which acknowledges that in addition to systematic ‘scientific’ knowledge, there are other sources of potentially useful information for planning, including local knowledge and unpublished research that can fill critical gaps and allow decision-makers to make a more informed judgement than would be provided by a formal scientific assessment (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1991). In effect, this is a shift away from the deficit model of public understanding whereby scientists are ‘educators’ of the general public, to the engagement model whereby scientists debate, listen and learn with the public, collectively solving problems with them instead of imposing solutions on them (Jensen and Holliman 2009).2 Such a shift towards more deliberative models of policy making acknowledges the messiness, complexity, and conflictual nature of marine resource problems (Stern 2005), and recognises that it is impossible for any single group or agency to possess the full range of knowledge needed to solve them (Berkes 2009). Essentially, post-normal science is a model of decision-making that is pluralistic and encourages open communication between resource users, conservationists, managers and scientists. Reflecting the idea of communicative rationality (Habermas 1984), open communication between stakeholders increases mutual understanding and trust, and improves the chances of successful policy outcomes (Hoefnagel et al. 2006).