Concepts of Integration and Citizenship in the Netherlands
3 THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER gave an overview of Dutch integration policy up until the adoption of the Act on Integration Abroad. Since the early 1990s the objective of this policy has often been formulated in terms of citizenship. Yet both citizenship and integration are rather abstract concepts that lend themselves to differing interpretations.1 It is worthwhile, therefore, to analyse in more detail the meaning given to these concepts in Dutch integration and immigration policies. This analysis serves two aims. The first is to show how the Dutch understanding of integration and citizenship has developed over time. The second is to gain better insight into the objectives pursued by the Act on Integration Abroad. This chapter focuses on two distinct themes. One concerns the relationship between immigration and integration policy and the construction of integration as an exclusionary concept. Section II explains how the integration exam abroad, as a requirement for admission, is expected to contribute to better integration in the Netherlands. The second theme is the changing meaning of integration throughout different stages of Dutch integration policy. Section III traces developments in the definition of integration, and hence in the objectives of the integration policy, both before and after the introduction of the Act on Integration Abroad. At the end of each section, a limited normative assessment is provided of the Dutch integration objectives and of the integration exam abroad as an instrument to achieve them. The findings presented in this chapter are primarily based on parliamentary documents expressing the views of the Dutch government. Where useful, other sources, such as the reports of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), are used to illustrate specific developments. Before the proposal for the Act on Integration Abroad was submitted in 2003, considerations of integration policy already played a role in the formulation of Dutch immigration rules. Under the Ethnic Minorities policy (chapter 2, section III), a restrictive policy on immigration was seen as a condition for successful integration.2 This position was confirmed in a 2001 policy paper, where the Dutch government stated that the number of immigrants that could be admitted was limited by the capacity of Dutch society to absorb new arrivals. This capacity was said to be ‘dependent on many factors, including employment opportunities, social infrastructures, the availability of reception and housing, but also the mental preparedness of Dutch nationals to live together with new citizens’.3 The paper moreover highlighted the potentially negative economic and social consequences of immigration, especially with regard to immigrants who were ‘at a larger distance from Western culture’.4 This illustrates that both the scope and nature of immigration flows were considered relevant factors in determining the impact of immigration on the integration process. Initially, however, considerations of integration did not point unequivocally in the direction of a restrictive immigration policy. Specifically where family migration was concerned, it was also recognised that family reunification could have a positive effect on the well-being of migrants already living in the Netherlands.5 From this perspective, the right to family reunification was viewed as an element of a strong legal status and in turn as a prerequisite for successful integration.6 Nevertheless, family reunification and especially family formation were at the same time also perceived as both symptom and cause of a faltering integration process. The fact that some immigrants in the Netherlands chose to marry someone from their country of origin was seen as a sign that they were not oriented towards the Netherlands. Concerns were also raised about a lack of participation of family migrants in Dutch society and the effects of this on their children.7 These concerns eventually resulted in the introduction of new criteria for regulating family migration, including age and income requirements.8 Some years later these requirements were followed by the integration exam abroad, which is discussed below. The idea for the integration exam abroad was introduced in 2003 as part of the ‘New Style’ Integration policy (section V.D of chapter 2). Initially, the exam was presented primarily as an instrument for the inclusion of newcomers. It was argued that integration abroad would enable immigrants to be better prepared for their future life in the Netherlands and to experience a greater degree of autonomy immediately upon their arrival.9 Clearly, this argument was based on the assumption that those having to take the exam would eventually be admitted. In the government’s view, taking the integration exam abroad would allow the integration process to start earlier: before being admitted, immigrants would already be obliged to obtain basic knowledge of the Dutch language and society. It was anticipated that this early preparation would make their integration in the Netherlands both faster and more effective. This connection between integration abroad and further integration in the Netherlands is also reflected in the target group of the AIA. According to the government, ‘it would not be useful to impose the integration exam abroad on aliens who will not be subject to integration obligations in the Netherlands’.10 Consequently, the Act applies only to immigrants who will also be subject to compulsory integration after being admitted. The integration exam abroad – and the sanction of non-admission for those failing the exam – was thus originally seen as an incentive for those who would not prepare themselves for life in the Netherlands of their own accord.11 It may be recalled in this respect that one of the principal features of the ‘New Style’ Integration policy was a strong emphasis on individual responsibility (chapter 2, section V.B). Implicit in the view of the exam as an ‘incentive’, however, is that all applicants for admission can eventually pass and enter the Netherlands. Yet, as was pointed out by the Dutch Council of State, application of the AIA would also result in the exclusion of those immigrants who would not pass the exam.12 The explanatory memorandum to the AIA (memorie van toelichting) was subsequently revised so as to include reasons why failure to pass the exam should result in non-admission. In the above memorandum the government reinforced its earlier stance that immigration could cause problems in the field of integration (section II.A), claiming that the continuing immigration to the Netherlands resulted in a constant repetition of the integration process ‘at the macro level’ as all new immigrants had to start their integration from the beginning. This was deemed to have a negative influence on social cohesion in Dutch society, as well as on the resident population’s acceptance of new migrants.13 Additionally, it was feared that continual immigration and delayed integration would marginalise certain groups in the population and result in their having a reduced capacity for social participation, poor opportunities in the labour market and structural dependence on social security benefits. Such marginalisation could in turn increase the chances of immigrants turning away from society and becoming susceptible to anti-Western feelings or radical ideologies. Lastly, since many new immigrants were family migrants who would raise their children in the Netherlands, there were concerns that these problems would be transferred from one generation to the next.14 Against the background of these expected problems, the integration exam abroad was proposed as a selection criterion for distinguishing between those immigrants whose integration into Dutch society was likely to be successful and others who would likely prove unable to integrate successfully.15 Even as an immigration requirement, therefore, the exam still pursued an integration objective. However, whereas the earlier arguments in support of the AIA were based on the assumption that applicants for admission would eventually be included, the current argument assumes that unsuccessful immigrants will be excluded. In this reasoning, the integration of those already present in the Netherlands will improve because others, who could disturb this process, will be kept out. The lasting influence of this line of argumentation on Dutch immigration policy was illustrated several years after the AIA had been adopted. While recognising that immigration to the Netherlands is unavoidable and sometimes also desirable (notably in the case of labour migration), the government nevertheless asserted that the arrival of migrants whose convictions and behaviour differ from, and sometimes clash heavily with, the convictions and behaviour of resident Dutch citizens has led to social tensions and discussions. The everyday effect of cultural diversity, in combination with the arrival of low-educated migrants who are insufficiently equipped for life in the Dutch society, has exerted severe pressure on the quality of life particularly in the larger cities.16 The need for a selective immigration policy was subsequently reconfirmed, together with the intention to increase the level of the integration exam abroad.17 It was submitted in section II.A that both the scope and nature of family migration to the Netherlands gave rise to concerns with regard to integration. Contrary to what has been asserted by other authors, however, the legislative history of the AIA shows that the integration exam abroad was primarily intended to act as a selection mechanism rather than as a mere barrier to immigration.18 As explained above, the purpose of the exam is to select those immigrants for admission whose integration in the Netherlands is likely to be successful. Meanwhile, it was acknowledged that introducing the AIA would also have the effect of restricting immigration.19 However reducing the number of immigrants was not presented as a goal in itself. In the words of the Dutch government: From this statement it can be concluded that the integration exam abroad was regarded as a measure of qualitative rather than quantitative immigration control. While it was expected that the exam would result in a reduction of immigration to the Netherlands, this was not presented as a solution for integration-related problems or as one of the reasons for the enactment of the AIA. Nevertheless, to the extent that this effect remained within the limits set by international law, it was considered ‘preferable to the situation in which the integration process is hampered immediately after [the] arrival [of the immigrant]’.21 In other words, the fact that fewer immigrants would be admitted was considered acceptable in view of the importance of the integration objective.22 This being said, the observation that the integration exam abroad was intended to act as a selection mechanism raises the question of the selection criterion to be used. In this respect the Dutch legislator’s position appears to have developed since the AIA was adopted. Initially, it was suggested that the main criterion for selection would be the immigrant’s motivation or determination to successfully integrate. It was claimed that the level of the integration exam abroad would be ‘reasonably attainable for all those who make sufficient efforts’ and that no one would be a priori excluded from coming to the Netherlands.23 To pass the exam immigrants would be required to demonstrate their readiness to make substantial efforts to integrate in the Netherlands, whereas those not willing to do so would not be eligible for admission.24 By contrast, it was expressly stated that the purpose of the AIA was not to select immigrants on the basis of their education and that both highly skilled and less-educated immigrants would be able to pass the integration test.25 Yet, despite the wish to use immigrants’ willingness to integrate as the primary selection criterion, the integration exam abroad was formulated as an obligation of result.26 Instead of having to complete an integration programme or invest a certain number of hours to prepare for life in the Netherlands, immigrants are asked to pass an exam at a specified level. This means that those with little education or learning capacity will have to show more effort and determination than those who are highly educated or learn easily. Additionally, the level of persistence needed to pass the exam depends on other factors, such as the availability of learning materials and the candidate’s financial means. These differences were accepted on the grounds that the basic knowledge required to pass the integration exam abroad was minimally necessary for successful integration in the Netherlands.27 By setting this standard, however, the legislator agreed to a measure that would select immigrants not only on the basis of their motivation to integrate, but also on their ability.28 Even if the exam was set at such a low level that those without any formal education were able to pass, such people still had to make more effort than others and were probably more easily deterred from seeking admission at all. More recently, the government explicitly changed its earlier position and claimed that education was an important factor in determining immigrants’ chances of successful integration. Towards the end of 2009, several years after the AIA entered into force, it was asserted that ‘the long-term effects of the integration exam abroad are still limited and 25 per cent of family migrants who take the exam have not received more than primary education in their country of origin’.29 It was then concluded that the level of the exam had to be raised so as to ensure that immigrants who were admitted would be better prepared for their further integration in the Netherlands. A reading comprehension test was also introduced, on the grounds that the ability to read the Latin script also enhanced the prospects of successful integration.30 These changes, which took effect on 1 April 2011, show that a certain level of education or literacy has replaced the motivation to integrate as the primary criterion for selection under the AIA. The previous subsections describe how the notion of integration has been conceptualised in relation to the admission of immigrants to the Netherlands and demonstrate that the integration exam abroad, as a requirement for admission, has been supported largely by arguments of exclusion. For immigrants eventually admitted to the Netherlands, preparation for the exam can be seen as a first step in the integration process. However, the exam mainly functions as a requirement for admission on the assumption that the integration process in the Netherlands will benefit from a selective immigration policy. The exclusionary purpose and effects of the AIA led Groenendijk to conclude that the integration exam abroad aims to control immigration rather than facilitate integration.31 However, these objectives do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, as the above analysis shows, the aim of integration, as understood in the context of the AIA, includes facilitating a smooth integration process within the Netherlands that is not interrupted by the arrival of new immigrants whose prospects for integration are considered problematic.32 The aim of the integration exam abroad can thus be described as ‘integration through exclusion’. Arguably this is not merely a terminological issue. By recognising that certain immigrants are excluded in order to make integration easier for those who are already in the Netherlands, the interests of the receiving state are made visible. The question to be asked, then, is not if the aim of the AIA is to enable integration, but whether the Act constitutes a suitable measure to achieve this aim and whether the interests of the receiving state outweigh those of the individuals (immigrants and their family members) who are seeking admission. Regarding the latter question, different authors have argued that the acceptability of immigration conditions must be determined by balancing the competing interests (the interest of the state versus that of the individual), with an important consideration being the reasons for which admission is sought. Vermeulen has submitted that the case for admission is particularly strong in situations where a person seeks international protection – thus leaving little or no room for requirements in the field of integration. On the other hand, states have a greater amount of discretion in cases of labour migration or family reunification, to decide the terms under which admission may be granted. In the latter type of cases, such requirements may be imposed as are necessary to protect national interests, including the interest of social unity or integration.33 Lastly, it is argued that the legitimacy of integration requirements for the admission of immigrants is greater if it can be established that such requirements actually contribute to the realisation or preservation of social unity. In most cases it is obviously not possible to establish the effect of integration measures before they are adopted. However, the longer these measures have been in force, the more weight has to be given to evidence (positive or negative) of their effectiveness. Thus, when considering the legitimacy of the AIA, the results of the 2009 evaluation (and further evaluations) must be taken into account (see chapter 2, section VI.D). Chapter 2 explained that the issue of immigrant integration in the Netherlands was first comprehensively addressed in the Ethnic Minorities policy, which came into being in the 1980s. In terms of integration objectives, this policy primarily sought to improve the legal and socio-economic position of immigrants compared to Dutch residents and to further their political engagement by granting them voting rights at a local level and adopting lenient laws on citizenship.36 At the same time, although members of ethnic minority groups were expected to respect ‘basic Dutch norms and values’ and make efforts to learn Dutch, these aspects of the integration process received relatively little attention. As far as ethnic minorities’ cultural identities were concerned, the Dutch government rejected both forced assimilation and segregation as possible policy approaches. Instead it was claimed that minority groups had to be enabled to experience and develop their identity in relation to Dutch society, which in turn would be changed by these new cultural influences. The government saw it as its task to create the conditions for this interaction to take place.37 In the early 1990s the concept of ‘integration’ – and consequently of the objectives of the integration policy – was reconsidered (chapter 2, section IV.B). This reconsideration was inspired by continuing concerns about immigration and the position of migrant minorities, as well as the ongoing restructuring of the welfare state and a changing philosophy on the relationship between the state and its citizens.38 The reformulated integration policy emphasised that integration was not only a matter of rights, but also of duties, and that the objective of integration (thereafter referred to as ‘citizenship’) required active participation in the public domain. As the government put it, citizens were ‘free, autonomous and active human beings who have a responsibility for their own well-being as well as for the society in which they live’.39 Concern was expressed that the Ethnic Minorities policy had treated immigrants too much as ‘needy categories’, thus making them dependent on the state.40 By contrast, the notion of ‘citizenship’ entailed immigrants being expected to ‘become judicious and mature citizens able to cope in the competitive Dutch society’.41 The focus of integration policy in the 1990s was primarily on socio-economic integration,43 with immigrants’ participation in education and the labour market often seen as key factors for achieving the citizenship objective. It was in order to achieve such participation that immigrants were expected to learn Dutch and to acquire basic knowledge about the Netherlands.44 As discussed in the previous chapter, attaining educational, professional or social self-reliance was also the objective of the Newcomers Integration Act adopted in 1998 (chapter 2, section IV.D).45 In the meantime, cultural expressions by ethnic minorities or interactions between minorities and the majority population did not feature prominently in the newly formulated notion of citizenship, especially in the first few years after it was introduced. This absence may be explained by two factors. Firstly, the idea of government support for ethnic minority cultures had been criticised. In September 1991 Frits Bolkestein, a Member of Parliament for the liberal VVD party, called for a more ‘daring’ integration policy, in which cultural relativism made way for the dominance of certain liberal principles that Bolkestein claimed to be universal and fundamental to the Dutch legal order (notably the separation of church and state, freedom of speech, tolerance and non-discrimination). According to Bolkestein, these principles had to be defended against what he perceived as illiberal practices occurring particularly in Muslim cultures, including discrimination of homosexuals, forced marriages and calls for the death of the writer Salman Rushdie.46 Although these remarks spurred a great deal of protest Bolkestein’s central thesis – the prevalence of liberal values and principles over cultural relativism – was eventually generally accepted.47 During the ensuing ‘national integration debate’ (maatschappelijk debat integratie) the Dutch Home Affairs Minister (then responsible for integration policy) stated that certain values were non-negotiable within Dutch society.48 The revised Integration policy also stated that citizenship required respect for norms described as fundamental to the Dutch constitutional system, including the democratic legal order, freedom of expression, the individual right to self-determination, equality between the sexes and the separation of church and state.49 The above focus on respect for liberal principles can help explain why support for ethnic minority cultural expressions waned. In addition, the prevailing view was that socio-cultural integration would come about after, and as a result of, successful social-economic integration, which would be achieved primarily through labour participation and (language) education.50 The stated aim of the integration policy was primarily, therefore, to achieve results in these latter fields. As far as civic integration was concerned, Dutch history and information on national holidays were taught as part of the social orientation course, but only as ‘nice to know’ topics.51 It was also expressly stated that members of ethnic minority groups were not expected to give up their own (ethnic) identity as this was regarded as a matter of personal choice.52 Compared to the Ethnic Minorities policy, however, the revised Integration policy did increase the pressure on individual immigrants to ‘fit in’ and adapt to mainstream society.53 From 1998 onwards, elements of culture and ethnicity began to play a more significant role in the way integration was conceptualised in the Netherlands.54 Although active citizenship remained the core objective of integration policy and responsibility for achieving this objective continued to be placed on immigrants and the receiving society alike,55 the government also expressed an increased awareness of the role of cultural differences – including minority religions – in the integration process.56 Initially, it was proposed accommodating these differences in the Dutch constitutional order, while interaction between different ethnic and cultural groups was to be promoted.57 Gradually, however, the scope for cultural, ethnic and religious differences diminished as a more comprehensive concept of citizenship was formulated.58 In 2000, the publicist Paul Scheffer called for more commitment to the integration process and for a stronger ‘national consciousness’ that could serve as guidance for immigrants seeking to integrate. In the ensuing parliamentary debate his ideas were rejected by several (liberal or leftist) political parties (GroenLinks, D66 and SP), but defended by the Christian Democratic party (CDA).59 After the ‘Scheffer debate’, issues of socio-cultural integration, including processes of identity and interaction, continued to play an increasingly important role in integration policy. At this stage it was reaffirmed that immigrants needed scope to experience their own identities. The government also, however, presented a rather wide-ranging view on what integration entailed, declaring that ‘immigrants must learn the Dutch language, adopt Dutch values, norms and social codes, qualify for the labour market, internalise the legal order and – most importantly – eventually feel at home’.60 As the notion of citizenship thickened, minority groups’ affiliations with their own cultures or religions increasingly came to be seen as an obstacle to citizenship, particularly in the case of non-Western immigrants, who were considered to be ‘at a greater distance from Western culture’, and Muslims.61 This development was reinforced in the years to come by events such as the attack on the New York Twin Towers in 2001 and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Muslim extremist in 2004.62 In 2003, the Dutch government once again reformulated its position on integration under the heading of the ‘New Style’ Integration policy (chapter 2, section V.B). At this point the objective of the integration policy, which was then labelled as ‘shared citizenship’, was described as a series of duties and responsibilities. Rather than fostering or supporting affiliations to minority cultural identities, the government sought to promote unity and social cohesion by emphasising commonalities between citizens. To this end, it was asserted, citizens had to actively participate in Dutch society, speak Dutch and comply with the Dutch Constitution and ‘basic Dutch norms’.63 Although no exhaustive account of these norms was provided, they were said to include
Concepts of Integration and
Citizenship in the Netherlands
I. INTRODUCTION
II. INTEGRATION AS AN ADMISSION REQUIREMENT
A. Integration as a Ground for Exclusion before 2003
B. The Act on Integration Abroad: from Inclusion to Exclusion
i. Inclusion: Preparing for Life in the Netherlands
ii. Exclusion: the Threat of Continuing Immigration
iii. Selection: from Motivation to Education
C. The Legitimacy of Exclusion: a Balancing of Interests
III. THE INTEGRATION EXAM ABROAD
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CITIZENSHIP
A. Integration and Citizenship in the Netherlands before the Introduction of the Act on Integration Abroad35
B. The ‘New Style’ Integration Policy: from ‘Active’ to ‘Shared’ Citizenship