The earliest indicators that negative ethnicity would adversely affect the post-colonial Kenya were evident during the last days of the struggle for independence from the British. The problem of negative ethnicity is an impress of the colonial legacy, having been reinforced by the British ruling system. The British introduced a divide-and-rule system in Kenya as they also did in their other African colonies. This was a system that entailed a purposeful stratification of the colony’s population in a number of ways, including along ethnic lines, mostly for ease of ruling and exploitation.⁵

By 1950 Kenya was already divided by economic differentiation between the minority white population and the majority local population. This differentiation was evident in, among other aspects, the allocation of massive land to the white settler farmers, which land was alienated from the indigenous population.⁶ The Kikuyus were the most affected ethnic community. The land issue was one of the underlying reasons which triggered a long war of liberation, the Mau Mau movement, between 1952 and 1960.⁷ The earliest impact of the divide-and-rule policy manifested itself during this war. The majority of the members of the other big ethnic groups, mostly the Luo, the Luhya, the Kalenjin and the Coastal people, remained as bystanders, having refused to rally behind the Kikuyu leadership.⁸ Thus, Mau Mau was in some way considered as a Kikuyu affair, and was brutally suppressed by the colonial state in the late 1950s.

Apart from this armed struggle, ethnic interests continued to shape most events, even those which concerned or seemed to affect the collective interests of the Kenyan people as a whole. For instance, in the early days of negotiations for independence, specifically in the famous 1962/1963 Lancaster Conferences in London,⁹ ethnicity took precedence, and strongly shaped the demands of the Kenyan participants. The fear that “big tribes” would dominate the “small tribes” after independence was taken seriously by some of the participating members of the Kenyan delegation. There was an informal division among the Kenyan delegation which, to a great extent, was informed by tribal affiliation of the delegates. Two parties, namely, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) participated in the conference, apparently representing ethnic demands of their respective members.¹⁰ As the following section will show, the difference between these parties also entailed an ideological dimension which, in a way, had a link to the tribalistic dimension. This pertained to the structure of the constitution which should be adopted at independence. The said ideological dimension remained one of the key issues dominating Kenyan politics throughout, including during the 2007 elections and beyond.

In the early 1960s, after the British had shown interest in decolonization, party politics in Kenya took a new dimension, as they became dominated by two different themes. In 1961, the main issue was the release of Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu hero and first President of independent Kenya.¹¹ This was followed, between 1962 and 1963, by the argument or theme already alluded to above—the structure of the government to be adopted at independence. It is within the context of the second theme that the 1963 first general elections were dominated by two quasi-ideological arguments, namely centralism versus regionalism.

From the onset, the two political parties, KANU and KADU, wanted a constitutional structure which, as a matter of priority, would benefit the tribal interests of their members. This placed the expected independent Kenya in a latent problem of tribalism and nepotism. KANU strongly wanted an independence constitution based on centralism (unitary state), while KADU strived for regionalism or federalism. KANU’s centralism envisioned a constitutional structure with three main features: an administration of the country done by a central government in Nairobi; a state-driven economy; and a free competition for resources.¹² Apparently, this had a strategic reason: to ensure that its members, predominantly Kikuyu and Luo, would perform relatively better in this set-up. KADU, which claimed to protect the interests of the minority ethnic communities, was in the phobia of “domination” by the two big tribes in the structure proposed by KANU. For this reason it campaigned for majimbo ¹³ (Swahili word for regional governments) in which different federal “states”, apparently based on ethno-regional demarcations, would have the autonomy to decide their own affairs, more importantly the question of ownership of land and other resources found in their majimbo.¹⁴

It was in this context that during the independence negotiations at the Lancaster Conference, KADU’s delegation carried the slogan “regionalism or death”. In a meeting before departing for London, the party leaders had assured their members that they were prepared to negotiate for majimbo constitution at any cost, even if it meant bloodshed.¹⁵ The party secretary even told KADU members that the “Abaluhya, Kalenjin, Maasai and Coast people” would declare their independence if regionalism were not adopted at the Lancaster Conference.¹⁶ Eventually, the framework constitution agreed upon in London, and which was operational at independence, was based on majimbo system.¹⁷ This was the case despite the fact that there was a misconception about the framework actually adopted, each party claiming to have triumphed in having its ideology adopted.¹⁸

The Lancaster arrangement led to the first general elections in 1963. In these elections, more divisions were witnessed, whereby tribalism and the phobia of “big tribe domination” manifested themselves clearly. The so-called “small tribes” did not trust KANU’s candidate, who was also Kenya’s independence hero, Jomo Kenyatta. They accused him of having sided with a group of Kikuyu elites which was allegedly planning on how their tribe should receive awards commensurate with their suffering in the Mau Mau war of liberation. Leaders of the “KADU tribes”, specifically the Maasai, Abaluya and the Kalenjin, feared that without regionalism their land would be grabbed by the “KANU tribes”, for Kenyatta was nothing but allegedly a “Kikuyu tribalist”.¹⁹ As a result, the election campaigns assumed a tribal trend at all levels. In the areas inhabited by the “small tribes” the decision on who to vote for was not necessarily based on candidates’ leadership qualities, but rather on their ethnic affiliations.²⁰

Eventually, KANU won the majority seats in the elections, the fact which enabled it to form an autonomous internal government. Jomo Kenyatta became Kenya’s first Prime Minister.²¹ For a short period of time, Kenya became a Dominion State pending official declaration of independence. In this transitional arrangement, the British monarch remained the Head of State²² and the Prime Minister became the Head of Government. Independence was officially declared on 12 December 1963, and on 1 June 1964, Kenya became a Republic, Jomo Kenyatta being its first Executive President. Having won the elections, KANU was determined to use its overwhelming majority in Parliament to diffuse the majimbo system, as it claimed that such a system was “unnecessary and expensive, and that it constrained its (KANU’s) rightful power emanating from its electoral supremacy”.²³

As pointed out earlier, Kenya was a de jure multi-party state at independence, KADU being the official opposition party after the 1963 elections. However, after KANU’s victory in these elections, concentration shifted temporarily from the ideological differentiation of the two parties to the building of a new consensus, i.e. politics of nation–building. In this new focus, national stability and identity were heralded as the most important national priorities of the infant state.²⁴ KANU was successful in ensuring that a completely new argument emerged. The argument was that the new priorities of the infant nation could not be realized if the “confrontational electoral politics” envisaged by the Westminster-style democracy inherited from the departing colonialists was emphasized.²⁵ Apparently, the new “consensus”, the paramountcy of nationhood over party ideologies, was put to experiment when the first cabinet was formed. KANU’s “determination” to the consensus seemed to have been confirmed when Kenyatta created a “tribal ruling coalition” within the KANU government by bringing in members of the small or “KADU tribes”.²⁶ This, to some extent, eased the tension, overcame the fears of big tribe domination and, more importantly for KANU, appeared to render KADU’s “protective” ideology of regionalism completely redundant.²⁷

The tribal-regional balance achieved in the Kenyatta’s first cabinet, together with the new perception, namely that competitive party politics was detrimental to the development of the infant state, had a serious impact on the continued existence of KADU. First, KADU’s strong supporters of majimbo vanished from the scene, as the ideology seemed to lose its strength drastically. This paved the way for Kenyatta’s new ideology, harambee (working together).²⁸ Secondly, KADU was significantly weakened by defections, as most of its members started to cross the floor in the National Assembly to join KANU having been lured by promises of more funds from the government for the development of their communities.²⁹ Apparently, this was a tactic by KANU to have KADU dissolved.³⁰ Shortly thereafter KADU actually dissolved itself voluntarily in December 1964, thereby rendering Kenya a de facto single-party state.³¹ KADU’s key leaders, including Daniel Arap Moi (a Kalenjin), joined KANU, and were soon appointed to key ministerial positions in the KANU government.³²

The amalgamation of KADU into KANU did not save the purpose for which it was intended. Instead, it brought the old ideological differences into KANU, and even created more others from within it. The reason being that before the fusion of the two parties, already there were two groups of radicals and moderates within both KADU and KANU.³³ For instance, while on the one hand the radicals advocated for, among other things, a total shift from pure capitalist economic policies inherited from the departing colonialists to socialist policies similar to those that were later adopted in neighbouring Tanzania, the moderates, on the other hand, preferred to continue with the status quo. Thus, upon the fusion of the two parties, a number of other radicals and moderates such as Daniel Moi moved from KADU to KANU to add to the numbers. This consolidated the existing factional groups. As a result, KANU experienced an internal threat of stability. A deliberate campaign was launched to eliminate all the followers of the radical faction. It was achieved through rigged party elections, allegedly engineered by President Kenyatta and his moderate allies.³⁴ This was then followed by the demotion of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, a radical, from vice presidency at the party conference in Limuru. His seat was taken by Daniel Arap Moi, a moderate, who, later in January 1967, was named Vice President. This happened after the eliminated radicals—a group of 29 KANU MPs led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga—did party hopping; they crossed the floor and found a new party, the Kenya People’s Union (KPU), in 1966.³⁵ Thus, from 1966 Kenya resumed its de jure multiparty status.

KANU’s strategy had always been to remain the sole political party in the Kenya’s politics, even where Kenya was de jure a multiparty state. The formation of the KPU was viewed as a hindrance to the realization of this ambition. As a result, between 1966 and 1969 there was a serious suppression of political opposition. Firstly, immediately after the KPU’s formation, KANU engineered an ex post facto constitutional amendment which forced all KANU MPs who had “crossed the floor” to re-contest their seats. Only six of them were re-elected. Secondly, the KPU’s political activities were suppressed, including registration of new branches, which was refused or deliberately delayed. Thirdly, constitutional amendments and other draconian laws targeting the opposition were enacted. Such laws banned independent candidates and empowered the President to order preventive detentions.³⁶ The climax of this suppression was reached in 1969 when the KPU was banned and its leaders, including Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, were arrested and detained without trial.³⁷ Kenya became once again a de facto single party state.

The banning of the opposition parties was never lifted throughout the remaining tenure of Kenyatta, who remained president until 1978 when he died. The then Vice President Daniel Arap Moi, a Kalenjin, took over the presidency, despite the disapproval of the Kikuyus in KANU.³⁸ Having assumed power, Moi promised to follow the nyayo (footsteps) of the “old man” (Kenyatta).³⁹ The nyayo politics, for sure, saw to it that the dictatorial state originally crafted by the “old man” was perfected. Moi’s regime became relatively more tyrannical and self-centred compared to Kenyatta’s.⁴⁰ For example, notwithstanding the ban against opposition parties, it is said that the Kenyatta regime had a higher level of tolerance for freedom of expression, dissent, criticism and independence of the judiciary than the Moi regime.⁴¹ When Moi took over, ethnic tensions and mistrust grew stronger as attention was perceived to have shifted from the Kikuyus, who had relatively benefited under Kenyatta’s rule, to the people of Rift Valley (Moi’s home Province).⁴² In the early 1980s, Moi is said to have made deliberate efforts to minimize the control of the Kikuyu elite in both public parastatal boards and civil service by replacing some of them with his loyal appointees.⁴³ The Moi regime continued to show all signs of authoritarian tendencies and concentration of powers in the presidency.

Two landmark events dominated the political scenes in 1982. First, through a motion moved by the then Vice President Mwai Kibaki,⁴⁴ the existing Constitution was amended by inserting the infamous section 2A that officially converted Kenya to a single party state.⁴⁵ It should be recalled that since 1969, when the opposition party, Kenya Progressive Union (KPU) was banned, Kenya had only remained a de facto single party state. The leaders of the banned KPU had, therefore, been rendered politically impotent, because they were denied any chance to contest any seats, even those who joined KANU. Once again, led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, they tried to form and register a new political party, the Kenyan Socialist Alliance, in order to challenge KANU’s monopoly of political power. However, registration was refused, and immediately, the aforementioned constitutional amendment was promulgated to make Kenya a de jure mono-party state from 1982.⁴⁶

The second event that dominated the political scene was an attempted coup d’état in August 1982, which was allegedly staged by low-rank members of the Air Force. It is not very clear which politicians were behind this attempt, although it is alleged that some of the senior Kikuyu members in KANU, the army and the police force were responsible.⁴⁷ Subsequent to this event, Moi strived more to centralize power and perfect the repressive state. The operation of an “imperial presidency” became more evident than ever before. The separation between the three arms of state became blurred, as the Judiciary and Parliament are said to have been reduced to mere “appendages” of the all-powerful Executive.⁴⁸ The party (KANU) became the central focus of authority, while the Parliament assumed a subordinate status. Some voices of discontentment were still raised despite serious state intimidation. The clergy, for example, echoed their dissent from the pulpit, having seen that democracy was being trampled underfoot.⁴⁹

Those who opposed Moi had a huge price to pay. The state agents implemented preventive detentions without trial, forcible exiles, political assassinations and extra-judicial killings.⁵⁰ Raila Odinga⁵¹ was Kenya’s longest serving political prisoner in this regard.⁵² After the attempted coup, he was put under house arrest for 7 months, detained without trial for 6 years, and later, in 1988, tried for supporting an underground movement, the Kenyan Revolutionary Movement, which was demanding a reintroduction of multiparty system in Kenya.⁵³ The following paragraph, retrieved from a post-Moi government official report, summarizes how tyrannical the Moi State turned:

The Moi government pursued an open policy of using naked state violence to suppress and vanquish the political opposition and pro-democracy campaigners, among them civil society, opposition political parties, journalists, students, the clergy, and any and every real or imagined political dissident. Opposition political rallies and meetings of government critics were frequently broken up, and violently so. Police and security forces have killed scores of reformers throughout the last two decades.⁵⁴

In the 1990s, the Moi-KANU government, under the pretext of land clashes, allegedly instigated and, in some cases, directed an ignition and execution of inter-ethnic violence against the communities and zones which supported opposition against Moi.⁵⁵ In the Rift Valley and Coastal provinces, for instance, people from other provinces (tribes) were termed as “foreigners” or “land grabbers” and subsequently forced out of their land or, in some instances, killed instantly. This has even been equated to “attempted genocide by way of ethnic cleansing”.⁵⁶

In December 1991, with Moi still in power, Kenya resumed its roots as a de jure multiparty state, thereby responding to the mounting pressure from within the country as well as from the international community, especially the donors.⁵⁷ The Constitutional provision establishing the mono-party state was repealed, and a constitutional restriction of the presidential seat to a maximum of two five-year terms was introduced.⁵⁸ Interestingly, despite its past suppression, the call for the majimbo (federalism) ideology resurfaced alongside the domestic pressure for resumption of multipartysm.⁵⁹

The first two multiparty elections were conducted in 1992 and 1997, and in both elections KANU emerged victorious. The presidential term limit introduced with the resumption of multipartysm in 1991 was prospective in nature. Consequently, although the incumbent President Moi had already been in power since 1978, he was allowed, under this arrangement, to count his “first” term effectively subsequent to the date of the law establishing term limits. He thus contested as KANU’s candidate in both the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections. The mere presence of Moi’s name in the ballot paper diminished almost completely the chances for the opposition parties to win these two elections. The main reason for this pessimism was that, although the opposition was generally too weak and divided to triumph over KANU, Moi, being the head of state seeking re-election, had an added advantage: he had at his disposal all the loyal state agents and machinery which he could use—and which he allegedly used—to manipulate the whole process.⁶⁰ What else could one expect from a framework where the incumbent President was the discretionary appointing (and firing) authority of the officials charged with the task of managing the elections? As will be shown shortly, the opposition parties had to wait until 2002 for them to win against KANU. This time, however, Moi was no longer eligible to contest having exhausted his two-term limit.

Since its inception, the multiparty system in Kenya has exhibited a constant trend of mergers, alliance forging and pact signing among the parties. The immediately conceivable rationale for this practice could be the need for strength-building in the environment characterized by proliferation of political parties.⁶¹ These alliances have exhibited two characteristics. Firstly, in all cases, they have been ad hoc in nature, emerging only as temporary vehicles for political elites angling for post-election posts. They have hardly lasted after elections, even in the first case in which an opposition alliance won the presidential election in 2002. The composition of the alliances changes frequently due to “party hopping” i.e. the tendency of individual members to constantly change their party affiliations. This tendency has been described sarcastically as “political nomadism”,⁶² and one that makes most political parties in Kenya “indomitable lions”.⁶³ Secondly, ethno-regional interests have remained the common denominator in almost all the party alliances, specific focus being on power and access to state resources.⁶⁴

The following parts describe some of the major party alliances in which the aforementioned features manifest themselves clearly. One notable thing is that most alliances emerged towards the 2002 and 2007 elections.