Words Alone
Words Alone
Laurie L. Levenson
My brilliant colleague, Peter Tiersma, has written three compelling works regarding language and criminal law. His first, The Language of Perjury (Tiersma 1990), examined the dilemma of determining when a witness’s statements can be considered legally false. Poetically, Peter starts with the age-old question: “What is truth?” He focused on the challenges raised in the seminal case of Bronston v. United States,1 but today’s reader cannot help but think of the perjury accusations against President William J. Clinton during his impeachment hearings. The impeachment trials boiled down to determining what the word “is” meant when Clinton stated in his 1998 grand jury that “there’s nothing going on between” him and Monica Lewinsky at the time he was questioned. Tiersma’s genius was in giving us tools to make a determination that would be based upon something more than raw politics. While words might be “literally true,” the focus in perjury cases must be on how the witness intends the utterance to be understood. If perjury is a crime because it obstructs and misleads the decision maker, a person should be punished if he has the intent to cause such harm. This fundamental lesson continues to guide courts in the most high-profile of cases. In 2013 famed baseball giant Barry Bonds had his convictions for obstruction of justice affirmed because what he told the grand jury, although perhaps literally true, was still intended to mislead.2 Words have power and the intention of the speaker tells us whether that power is being used for good or wrong.
In 2005 Tiersma and his co-author, Lawrence M. Solan, continued this theme in their chapter on “Threats” in Speaking of Crime: The Language of Criminal Justice (Solan and Tiersma 2005