From the Conservative King to the Reformist Monarch: The Stage of Enlightened Absolutism (Eighteenth Century)
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Legal History, Rey Juan Carlos University, Madrid, Spain
10.1.1 A Century of Transformation
10.1.3 Absolutism vs. Despotism
10.4.2 Frederick II’s Sonderweg
10.5.2 Portugal in the Pombal Era
“The sovereign is attached by indissoluble ties to the body of the state; hence it follows that he, by repercussion, is sensible of all the ills which afflict his subjects; and the people, in like manner, suffer from the misfortunes which affect their sovereign. There is but one general good, which is that of the state. […] the sovereign represents the state; he and his people form but one body, which can only be happy as far as united by concord. The prince is to the nation he governs what the head is to the man; it is his duty to see, think, and act for the whole community that he may procure it every advantage of which it is capable”.—Frederick II, King of Prussia. Essay on the Forms of Government and the Duties of Rulers. (1781).1
10.1 The Crisis of Classic Absolutism
As we know, absolute monarchy took hold in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries because it was a more effective system of government than feudal monarchy and, above all, because the unchallenged authority of the king was the best bulwark against chaos.
10.1.1 A Century of Transformation
The major economic changes (Industrial Revolution), which began to transform Europe in the eighteenth century, however, gave rise to the emergence of a new cultural framework which necessarily affected the European kingdoms’ political adaptations to the new times. The seventeenth century in Europe was an era of pivotal scientific breakthroughs thanks to thinkers such as Leibniz, Newton and Descartes. It is no wonder, then, that the latter’s best-known work received the title Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences (1637),2 one vividly reflecting the seventeenth and eighteenth century’s euphoric embrace of rationalism and the era’s growing conviction that men could improve their lives and achieve full happiness through scientific development. This was the proposition defended by the philosophes (friends of wisdom), and the men who embraced the Encyclopedia, the proponents of the movement known as the Enlightenment (Lumières in French, Aufklärung in German, Ilustración in Spanish and Illuminismo in Italian).3
10.1.2 The “Philosophes” and the Kings
It is only to be expected, therefore, that philosophers such as Voltaire, Diderot, D’Alembert, Montesquieu and Rousseau were highly critical of the established order, particularly the Church and, of course, absolute monarchy. The philosophes did not, in fact, object to the absoluteness of the monarch’s authority as much as they did to the way in which he wielded it. In line with their Enlightenment ideas, they believed that the king’s function was not only to maintain order but to bring progress to his people. The king, then, was no longer envisioned as an agent merely expected to defend an established order, in accordance with the old medieval idea of the “justice-dispensing king”. Rather, the era’s leading lights viewed monarchs as “reformist” agents who ought to free their kingdoms and peoples from obscurantism. In this sense it is significant that Voltaire was a strong advocate of “enlightened despotism” through which the souverains civilisateurs (Gorbatov 2006, 62) dedicated their governments’ actions to achieving the greatest level of well-being for their subjects.4
The philosophes proved able to convince and win over the ruling monarchs to their way of thought. In the Habsburg monarchy, after 1748, for instance, Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II, believed very firmly that expanded state power should be used to address all society’s ills. At the same time, this idea was ratified by most Austrian legal thinkers, who concluded that the dangers posed by feudal, decentralized justice were far more pernicious than those which could be expected from absolute monarchs, essentially because an enlightened despot, far from an arbitrary tyrant, exercised his power in the interest of the state, a sufficient guarantee that it would be exercised also in the interest of all his subjects (Bernard 1979, 3).
10.1.3 Absolutism vs. Despotism
Today the term “despot” is decidedly pejorative, but in the middle of the eighteenth century it was not saddled with this negative connotation.5 It is extremely telling that one as cultured and intelligent as Diderot imagined the ideal ruler, the “philosopher king”,6 to be “a despot”, and he best suited to govern wisely (Strugnell 1973, 93–98).7 In this sense, the case was quite similar to that of the term “tyrant”, which is today one of the worst epithets one can use to label a political leader, while in classical Greece it was simply a form of government which, in many cases, preceded and made possible the consolidation of democracy, as was the case, for example, in Athens under Peisistratus. After the French Revolution, however, the term “despot” came to acquire its negative connotation (Anderson 2000). Thus, in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, historians began to speak of “enlightened absolutism” as a more appropriate description of eighteenth-century political practice than “enlightened despotism” (Beales 2005, 55), a term they found misleading and pejorative (Szabo 1994, 5).
10.2 A New Legitimacy: From Christian to Secular Monarchs
A fundamental and defining aspect, in which Enlightenment monarchs differed from their predecessors, was that they did not justify their exercise of power on religious grounds.8 As these sovereigns did not base their authority upon any divine right to rule, in this sense they were not “Christian rulers”,9 a fact which allowed them to establish their independence from the papacy. Even during the era of absolutism, however, this also represented an objective, external limitation on the king’s power.10
The exception came in France, where the monarchy never accepted the main theories of enlightened absolutism (Outram 2007, 34). Louis XIV, for example, was profoundly Catholic, and though he supported Gallicanism, his Christian principles limited his actions as a ruler. His confessors, among them the famous Father Lachaise, constantly reminded him of his obligations as a Catholic monarch. Throughout France’s Ancien Regime, the monarchs continued to regularly summon the “General Assembly of the Clergy”, which had a permanent representative, the “general agent of the clergy”, at Versailles. Finally, once a week the king met with the “Council of Conscience”, to deal with all those matters in which the king could have problems of conscience arising from his role as a Christian monarch.11
In contrast, in the states in which the guiding principles were those of enlightened absolutism, the king was not considered to be chosen by God, nor to be his representative, nor to base his power on a Divine concession awarded him after the ceremony of anointing, coronation or consecration. Significant in this regard was that Joseph II of Austria refused to be crowned King of Hungary and Bohemia in accordance with a traditional liturgy; an enlightened king, in his view, did not rule by the grace of God (Agnew 2004, 92). Rather, his power was based on a new source of legitimacy: that provided by his education, which was, in turn, a consequence of his illustrious origins. As the king had been trained from childhood for his office, he was the one most apt to achieve those objectives of government which justified the existence of the state’s apparatus, including the monarchy itself. Thus, in principle, did the ruler stand above interests and prejudices, thanks to a preparation which enabled him to extract himself from pressure groups and exercise an arbitral role permitting him to resolve conflicts. In his Essay on Forms of Government, Frederick the Great wrote that a prince “is but a man, like the least of his subjects”, and that “if he be the first general, the first minister of the realm, it is not that he should remain the shadow of authority, but that he should fulfill the duties of such titles”, as “he is only the first servant of the state, who is obliged to act with probity and prudence and to remain as totally disinterested as if he were each moment liable to render an account of his administration to his fellow citizens” (Frederick II 1789, 29).
Upon shedding his sacred aura, the king was unshackled from religious fetters. Enlightenment principles no longer depended on a particular creed, or dogmas interpreted by an ecclesiastical apparatus, but only on the monarch’s personal conscience. In this sense, the power of the enlightened kings was more “absolute” because they were not subject to particular religious creeds. This explains in large measure why in a country like England, where the Church depended directly on the king, Parliament resorted to approving a Bill of Rights in 1689, to place objective limits on royal powers.12
The advent of the kings’ new secular legitimacy, divorced from the divine right theory which had prevailed during the Middle Ages, precipitated a manifest process of general secularization which further weakened the role which the Church had played hitherto, advancing the secularization of the state. In fact, the most illustrious representatives of enlightened absolutism endorsed secular policies and did not hesitate, for example, to abolish the Society of Jesus (The Jesuits) and expel it, a measure applied in Portugal in 1759, in France in 1764 and in Spain in 1767.13 The order would be ultimately abolished by Pope Clement XIV on July 21, 1773, in his bull Dominus ac Redemptor, which disbanded the Society of Jesus (Riccards 2012, 229). The principle of the separation between Church and State emerged, and processes were implemented to liquidate Church property (disentailment) to improve public finances.
Joseph II of Austria stands as a clear embodiment of a monarch illustrating the precepts of enlightened absolutism (Szabo 2011, 111–138). The emperor was a practicing Catholic, yet this did not prevent him from seeking to strip the monarchy of any vestige of religion. Politically, he sought to turn the Austrian Church into a national entity subject to the emperor (“Josephism”) (Dickson 1993, 89–114). To do this, he did not hesitate to undertake a whole series of radical reforms, suppressing processions and pilgrimages, and depriving monasteries and religious orders of their educational functions. Joseph II founded state schools (a policy which had already been adopted during his mother’s life), to counter the educational monopoly the Jesuits had held in Austria since the Thirty Years War (1618–1648), and secularized the universities (Outram 2007, 39). As of 1783, the government took over the education of the clergy itself, which came to be taught at state seminaries, with lessons consonant with the new Enlightenment ideas. Charity hospitals, another area which had until then been essentially ecclesiastical, was entrusted to the state. Joseph II even forbade church burials for public health reasons. The emperor also introduced civil marriage, and even divorce, breaking the exclusive authority which the Church had held hitherto over these matters. Finally, by virtue of the Patent of Tolerance (1781), he authorized the practice of religions other than Catholicism in the territories of the Austrian Empire (Vocelka 2000, 201–202).14
Frederick II of Prussia, meanwhile, broke sharply with divine right monarchy, creating a religiously neutral state, which permitted the practice of all religions without preference shown to any one of them.15 The king, himself, confirmed this principle by stating that in his kingdom everyone was saved in his own way as “each man believes that which appears to him to be the truth” and “the sovereign has no right to interfere in the belief of the subject” (Frederick II 1789, 28). In this regard, it is worthy of note that Frederick II’s religious tolerance prompted him to welcome the Jesuits into his kingdom at a time when they had been expelled from most Catholic states because of their submission to the papacy. However, Frederick II was, above all, extremely pragmatic. Although he considered himself to be a philosopher king, Frederick II of Prussia only put philosophical principles into practice when he considered them compatible with the interests of the Prussian state. The clearest evidence of this was the Edict on Religion he issued on July 9, 1788, which forbade evangelical ministers from teaching anything not contained in their official books, proclaimed the necessity of protecting the Christian religion against the “enlighteners” (Aufklärer), and placed educational establishments under the supervision of orthodox clergy.16
10.3 Enlightened Reformism or the New Spirit of Absolute Power
Enlightened absolutism was, in principle a variety of “classical absolutism” or Hochabsolutismus. Enlightened despots would continue to govern without requiring their subjects’ consent or seeking their engagement in public affairs. There was, however, a substantial difference between enlightened absolutism and its forerunner, as the former pursued a state which would no longer limit itself to functioning as a mere guarantor of order. Unlike classical absolutist monarchs, whose essential mission was to prevent chaos, enlightened sovereigns were expected to do everything possible to foster progress in their subjects’ interest.17 Thus, they made major efforts to do away with age-old prejudices, and construct a new society, according to Enlightenment ideals (Ingrao 1986).
10.3.1 The State: From Guardian of Order to Protector, Educator and Reformer
Enlightened absolutism represented public power’s complete embrace of eighteenth-century ideas. It was based on the principle then in vogue that the state rests upon a contract between the ruler and his people for the advancement of their general welfare and security, an objective which subjects could not (yet) achieve by themselves, as they lacked the knowledge necessary to advance in the right direction. The prince, in contrast, was fully qualified to do so, having been educated expressly from birth for this purpose. Thus, for Enlightenment monarchs, the state, while continuing to play its traditional role as a guardian of order, was also committed to protecting and educating its people18 to achieve the highest possible level of development and to promote the reforms needed to ensure social progress.19
The state took on an educational role, for example, in Austria, where Maria Theresa founded an academy, Vienna’s Theresianum, designed to train public servants for the Austrian state and to inculcate in them a spirit of public service.20 The general educational system was overhauled, with the creation of primary schools and the transformation of universities, which shifted from religious into state institutions. Maria Theresa’s son, Joseph II, took the same line, in 1774, promulgating his Allgemeine Schulordnung (General School Ordinance) which introduced into Austria the principle of compulsory education for children between 6 and 12 years of age (Melton 2002, 212–224). In the field of higher education universities lost their medieval status as independent entities—generally with ecclesiastical origins—and became public institutions, administrated by the state.
Frederick II of Prussia, meanwhile, in an effort to promote the welfare of his people, adopted a very ambitious educational policy, especially at the elementary school level through the General–Landschul–Reglement of 1763.21 When he acceded to the throne, primary education was in the hands of volunteers, who taught mainly during the winter months when they did not have to work the land. Frederick the Great brought stability and rigor to the system by creating public schools that contributed very effectively to raising Prussians’ educational level (MacDonogh 2001, 348–349). This educational ideal would be endorsed by Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), who introduced essential reforms of schools and universities during his brief period as head of the Prussian section for Education and Instruction in 1809–1810 (Philips 2011, 15). In 1810, he created the University that still bears his name in Berlin, and whose core philosophy was to give students broad, intellectual education rather than solely utilitarian training.
In Portugal, the expulsion of the Jesuits (1759), left the country virtually bereft of teachers at the secondary and university levels, which spurred the Marques de Pombal to support the development of a state-sponsored system of secondary education headed by a Director of Studies. He also transformed higher education through the creation of a “Junta for the Provision of Learning” and reformed the University of Coimbra. The Pombaline educational reform had the clear utilitarian purpose of providing a new learned class to staff the state and the Church (Maxwell 1994, 101–102).
In Spain, the exodus of the Jesuits (1767), spurred reformers to modify educational institutions, which hitherto had been some of the kingdom’s most reactionary forces. Enlightened figures such as Jovellanos and Cabarrús viewed education as a national problem, and believed that the transformation of schools, universities, and particularly colegios mayores 22 would transform the monarchy and the kingdom. Concerning higher education, they wanted universities to be better incorporated into society to satisfy its economic and cultural requirements, and reflect the greatest achievements of modern science and research. New, advanced schools were opened by the crown, with ministerial encouragement at the secondary level in Madrid and the main cities, and attempts were made to support affordable and even free primary education.23
The principle of the state’s educational role would extend into the nineteenth century in France, after the Revolution. Napoleon (1799–1815), despite establishing a new monarchy, in accordance with revolutionary principles, in 1806 implemented the “university” in France, understood as a state institution designed to educate citizens of the new French society, from primary school up to the university level.24 In addition, in the last third of the nineteenth century, Jules Ferry founded republican schools to foment public, secular and free education for the entire French population as a way of conveying republican principles and values (Harrigan 2001, 52–83). In this same sphere it is significant that the 1815 Constitution of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands expressly indicated the state’s role as an educator. In fact, throughout his reign King William I (1815–1840) supported the educational system in the Netherlands, from primary school to the university.25
10.3.2 The “Depatrimonialization” of the Monarchy and the Transformation of the State
An important consequence of the secularization of the monarchy was a resounding rejection of the traditional patrimonial concept of the royal institution. Since the time of the Romans, and even during the era of Visigoth Spain, a distinction had developed between the emperor or king’s personal patrimony (fiscus), and that belonging to the empire or kingdom. Subsequently, however, as a result of the expansion of feudalism there was a de facto privatization of European kingdoms, to the point where kings actually inherited and divided the realm among their descendants. In the Modern Age, even though the state was still identified and associated with the figure of the sovereign, his assets, or patrimony, gradually came to be considered as the property of the state.26
Under Enlightenment principles the monarch, then, became the administrator of the crown’s property, but did not actually own it, nor could he do with it whatever he deemed fit. This process, however, would not be complete until well into the nineteenth century.27
This “depatrimonialization” of the monarchy led to a professionalization of state administration, a field in which the enlightened monarchs undertook major reform efforts to enhance public administration and make it more efficient. In this area the work of Maria Theresa of Austria (1740–1780) is notable28; to ensure her kingdom’s unity she established a centralized administration while respecting the particularities of each of its territories to keep from stirring up resentment,29 as she did not inherit a country, but rather a princely house holding disputed sway over many lands and many peoples (Crankshaw 1970, 6). In this task she was ably assisted by Chancellor Haugwitz, the former administrator of Silesia, who in 1749 began to reorganize the State Chancellery, and by Gottfried van Swieten, who introduced reform in the areas of education and health. In 1753, Haugwitz would be replaced by Chancellor Kaunitz.30
Maria Theresa’s son, Joseph II, went even further, suspending the feudal assemblies of medieval origin in the empire’s different territories, deeming such meetings a waste of time and inefficient from a governmental point of view. Instead, the emperor divided his state into 13 districts, each organized, in turn, into “circles” (Kreise) headed by “captains”. The aim was to dissolve traditionally regional dynamics and standardize territorial administration. In pursuit of this objective, he also abolished what was left of municipal autonomy, with local authorities coming to be designated by the government.31
The key to these reforms was that enlightened monarchs entrusted royal administration to professional civil servants. Thus, for example, to impose his enlightened policies and implement his reforms, Joseph II employed a veritable army of officials. These were mainly lawyers, appointed directly by the emperor based on merit, to positions which they then occupied for life, allowing them to devote themselves fully to their tasks. In Austria, state offices were not purchasable, unlike in Spain or France, where the standard practice was the “sale of offices” through which monarchs obtained substantial revenues, a practice already examined in the previous chapter. The downside, however, was that these positions were transmitted from father to son, creating a hereditary caste of officials in which merit and capacity were not requisites. Neither did Austria employ a system of “patronage” (very close to Spain’s caciquismo in the late nineteenth century), one which had become firmly entrenched in England under the Tudor monarchy and consolidated under the Stuarts.32
This contingent of civil servants in the Austrian state proved extremely effective, especially in areas such as tax collection, which could be obtained directly and not through the unfair and inefficient system of ad-hoc tax-collectors, who operated for profit as commissioned agents of the state rather than permanent civil servants. The administration of the state improved markedly and royal reform was implemented more effectively.33
Concerning Prussia, though Frederick II harbored great admiration for his father’s administrative achievements, he did his best to improve the efficiency of the highest administrative body of his kingdom, the General Directory, through his order of May 20, 1748, which completely reorganized it. At the territorial level he also developed the War and Domains Chambers, the executive authorities in the provinces which provided precious information about the actual situation in different parts of the kingdom. He sought to streamline their functioning through the creation of Kammerdeputationen and the redistribution of the Kreise. Meanwhile, to form a body of excellent civil servants he decreed examinations and practical training for them. Finally, he did not rely entirely on a centralized approach to administration, but rather, in an effort to favor reconstruction,34 standardized the office of the Landrat throughout the Prussian provinces, against the wishes of his central administrators, who wished to get rid of the Provincial Estates and country deputies. Frederick continued to keep those institutions alive, as he saw in them a useful counterweight to his own bureaucracy (Hubatsch 1975, 151–168).
10.4 Enlightened Absolutism and the “Rule of Law”
When we think about absolute monarchs today, we have a tendency to envision them as dictators who did whatever they wished in their realms, with no respect at all for legality. Such a view is very far from reality, as Absolutism, in fact, did not preclude the rule of law (Bernard 1979, 1).
10.4.1 The Enlightened Monarchs and the Law
It is true that the absolute rulers stood, at least theoretically, above the law, which they could create unilaterally. They could not, however, do whatever they wanted about preexisting law, as they were bound to observe fixed and widely recognized rules concerning the manner in which they were expected to rule. To ignore these was not, strictly speaking, illegal, but it was certainly an affront to tradition. This is why the expansion of royal power that Enlightened reformism required was not necessarily incompatible with respect for the law.
In fact, the monarchs themselves did not hesitate to establish limits to prevent the sovereign from undertaking arbitrary actions. A clear example is that of Maria Theresa, who in 1749, as part of an overall reorganization of the Habsburg state administration, created a high court of appeal: the Oberste Justizstelle. This measure was intended not merely to centralize the appeals procedure in criminal cases, but also to establish the firm principle that judges appointed by the sovereign and serving for life would be independent from the general administration.35
Concerning the Prussian state, the expansion of absolutism was even clearer. Frederick II was able to consolidate his power from the beginning because Prussia was only a recently-created kingdom (founded in 1701), whose kings were not obligated by any agreements to consult any feudal assembly whatsoever about governmental affairs.36 This situation allowed Prussian kings to enjoy ample fiscal resources without having to negotiate with feudal representatives from throughout the realm.37 This was a uniquely favorable situation compared to what was generally the rule in Latin Christendom, where rulers had widely accepted that few taxes could be imposed without the consent of the assemblies of states.38 Moreover, the King of Prussia freely appointed and dismissed his ministers, who reported only to him while he, in turn, was answerable only to God (Johnson 1975). Despite all this, Frederick the Great was no arbitrary ruler. His efforts to improve the law accounted for the greater part of his administrative activity, and he firmly believed that the monarch’s primary function was not to create law, but to protect and support it (Hubatsch 1975, 211).
Frederick II exercised his autocratic power in accord with the political ideals of the Enlightenment (Aufklärung),39 which explains why he enjoyed a rare popularity, unequaled by any other European state of his time (Beck 1997, 34). Thanks to his Enlightenment-based education he believed that he was the agent most qualified to know what his people needed. In fact, in 1739, a year before his accession to the throne, the king himself authored a critique of Machiavelli’s work (Anti–Machiavel: Essay on the Criticism of Machiavelli) which was extensively revised by Voltaire, who the king welcomed on more than one occasion to his palace of Sans-Souci.40 Much later Frederick II would write his Essay on the Forms of Government and the Duties of Sovereigns, which he published in 1781 in French. In this work he argued that the prince is to society as the head is to the body, seeing, thinking and acting for the whole community to benefit it (Frederick II 1789, 15).
10.4.2 Frederick II’s Sonderweg
It is no wonder, then, that Frederick II made an important contribution to the European public legal tradition, developing in Germany an avant la lettre idea of the “rule of law”.41 Specifically, he supported the concept of the Rechtsstaat (state of law) as opposed to the Obrigkeitstaat (the authoritarian state) (Van Van Caenegem 2003, 136), as he maintained that the king served in a capacity of service to the state, rejecting the old patrimonial conception of the monarchy. In his aforementioned Essay on the Forms of Government, Frederick II held that citizens granted preeminence to one of their equals (their king) with an exclusive view to the services which they expected of him. Nevertheless, he believed in equality before the law42 and argued that princes, sovereigns and kings were not entrusted with the highest authority to bask in impunity, depravity and luxury.43 Rather, for Frederick II the monarch was subject to the law and obligated to respect it. Hence, from this point of view he was not an “absolute” monarch in the original sense of the term of someone who was above the law (legibus solutus).44 At the same time Frederick II rejected falling into the excesses of legislative dictatorship like the one that which the French Revolution would spawn, therefore advocating a “middle path” (Sonderweg) between autocratic monarchy and radical, Jacobin republicanism, holding that in no case should the assemblies’ power exceed that of the sovereign.45
This preeminence of what today we would call the Executive left a very strong mark on Prussia. Hence, after the Revolution of 1848, though Prussia became a constitutional regime (in 1850), it did not become a parliamentary one. The monarchical model of the state became more pronounced upon the proclamation of the II Reich in 1871. Thus, in cases of conflict with the legislature the monarch could rule via ordinance—something which Bismarck often, in fact, did when he headed up the Prussian Empire (1862–1890) according to the idea that Recht (law) had become a formal attribute of the state (Crosby 2008, 7). Prussia would not subscribe to a “parliamentary system” until as late as the Weimar Republic (1919–1933).
10.4.3 The Rationalization of the Legal System
Finally, the speed at which the rule of law spread was facilitated by the fact that enlightened monarchs sought to streamline and unify their realms’ legal systems. It is important to remember that in the eighteenth century monarchies ruled over patchworks of territories that possessed traditional laws and institutions that were usually left partly or wholly intact when they were incorporated into larger states. This explains why in a single kingdom there coexisted a great variety of different laws and jurisdictions, a phenomenon that was an eternal source of confusion and expense (Gagliardo 1968, 51). Enlightened monarchs did their best to unify and simplify the body of laws and judicial systems in their realms. To do so, they decided that old customs and books of authority had to be replaced by new law, freely conceived by modern man, based on reason and fee of obscurantism. The enlightened legal system was to be clear and certain, comprehensible to the people, whom it was meant to serve. The result was the first national Enlightenment-era codes, based on natural law and conceived of as a body of basic principles from which positive law ought to be directly derived, the best example being the Prussian Allgemeine Landrecht of 1794 (Van Caenegem 1994, 123–124).
10.5 The Expansion of Enlightened Absolutism in Eighteenth Century Europe: The Great Enlightenment Monarchs
Enlightened absolutism prevailed in many European monarchies. Although the prime examples of this new conception of the monarchy’s function arose in Austria and Prussia—and, therefore, in Italy, as the Peninsula was ceded to the Austrian empire by virtue of the Peace of Utrecht in 1713,46 its principles were also applied in Russia, Spain and Portugal.
10.5.1 The Austrian and the Prussian Models and Its Reception in Russia
Enlightened absolutism was not, however, just an abstract model, but rather one applied by specific monarchs who would become, a posteriori, the paradigms of Enlightenment-era kings. These would include the aforementioned Germanic monarchs Maria Theresa and Joseph II of Austria, Frederick II of Prussia, and Catherine II of Russia (who was also of German origin).47 Catherine II managed to establish a stable regime and serve as a worthy successor to Peter the Great (1682–1725). In addition to pursuing an ambitious foreign policy, essentially aimed at expanding Russia’s borders, mainly at the expense of Poland and Turkey, Catherine “the Great” was infused with French culture, regularly corresponding with the leading French philosophes (Whittaker 2003). This explains her religious tolerance, which led her to offer asylum in Russia to the Jesuits after the suppression of the order in 1773, and her tolerant stance towards Muslims (Fisher 1968, 542–539), one surely driven as well, by her desire to counter the influence of the Orthodox clergy, who she ended up bringing to heel by confiscating their property (de Madariaga 2002, 21–22). Domestically, Catherine II’s great push involved the colonization of southeastern Russia, a task she entrusted to Orlov and Potemkine, who went about seeing to the repopulation of a vast territory that remained virtually uninhabited, despite the fertility of its soil, to this end building roads, towns and cities, and encouraging its settlement by German peasants.48 In addition to all this she was a great reformer, through the Legislative Commission, convened in 1767 (Alexander 1989, 112–120) which, following the guidelines of the statement of legal principles known as Nakaz, (Butler and Tomsinov 2010), authored by Catherine herself,49 carried out major reforms of government, legal proceedings, courts and territorial organization, especially at the municipal level.50 When Catherine II died in 1796, even though most of the population still lived in destitution or slavery, Russia had significantly expanded its territory, the Russian upper classes were more cultured, the government more reliable, and its administration more effective.51
Enlightened absolutism triumphed also on the Iberian Peninsula, in the kingdoms of Portugal and Spain.
10.5.2 Portugal in the Pombal Era
In Portugal, the reign of Joseph I (1750–1777) is noteworthy, thanks to his powerful minister Sebastião José de Carvalho e Mello (1699–1782), better known by his title of Marquis of Pombal, granted to him by the king. Of humble origins, when he came to head the government, Pombal forcefully applied in Portugal the political philosophy of enlightened despotism which he had absorbed in London and Vienna. With energy, vigor and determination he set about reforming the Portuguese state and its economic and social life, though this would spark violent resistance by Portugal’s most privileged bodies, as their interests were in jeopardy. The growing opposition to his policies led Pombal to exercise a genuine dictatorship (Cheke 1969) and to employ repression as an instrument of government, including the death penalty, in what Maxwell (1994, 75) has defined as the paradox of Enlightenment and Despotism.52