Political Equality: Levelling the Playing Field

One of the aims of this chapter is to determine what procedural justice requires for decisions. This means thinking about the normative ideals that ground fair procedures. Some people suggest that this is quite straightforward. For example, Ben Saunders suggests that procedural justice is about giving each actor an equal say in a decision (provided that each actor has a roughly equal stake in the decision (Saunders 2010)). Similarly, when discussing political equality, Sydney Verba argues that fairness means that each should have an equal say in a decision-making process (Verba 2003), and Thomas Christiano argues that fairness requires that each citizen has an equal vote in majority voting processes (Christiano 1996, p. 3).

But there’s obviously more to fair procedures than having an equal say in a decision-making process. If we only cared about equality then we could just as well make a decision through a lottery or coin toss. Instead, many suggest fair procedures are those that also include a commitment to justification and autonomy (Gould 1988; Dryzek 2000, 2010). People usually think that some epistemic value is also important. Therefore, before making any claims about what procedural justice requires, it’s necessary to say more about what actually grounds procedural justice.

If it’s necessary to think about the normative grounds for procedural justice then one way to start is by considering some of the arguments given for democracy. In what follows, I show that democracy provides a useful starting point for thinking about procedural justice. I then consider some of the most prominent arguments for democracy, including arguments based on autonomy, justification, and equality. Having done this, I then outline the values that ground procedural justice.

There are already a lot of arguments about the underlying values that ground democracy and many of these consider how decision-making processes can treat people fairly.² If some of these arguments overlap with those for procedural fairness, then this should prove a helpful starting point for thinking about what grounds procedural justice. There are several reasons for thinking that the arguments that ground democracy overlap with those for procedural justice.

Most accounts of democracy start from the premise that it is necessary to make collective decisions among people who disagree. Societies are typically very diverse, and it’s often necessary to make collective decisions among people who have conflicting views and opinions. Many accounts of democracy claim that democratic processes are those that are made collectively and that treat each actor fairly (Dahl 1956; Saunders 2010; Estlund 2008, p. 81). In this respect, these accounts share the same goals that fair procedures should achieve in the UNFCCC. In Chap. 3, I argued that procedural justice can help actors to reach a mutually acceptable outcome when there is reasonable disagreement. I argued that if there is significant initial disagreement between people then it’s unlikely that they will be able to reach a consensus through reasoned discussion. Given that many accounts of democracy start from the premise that there is significant disagreement in society, this provides a useful place for thinking about what grounds procedural justice.

But it’s not just that the UNFCCC needs procedures to enable those who disagree to make collective decisions; the UNFCCC needs procedures that each can perceive as sufficiently fair so that its outcomes are universally acceptable. In this respect, democratic procedures share a second motivation with procedural justice. For many democratic theorists, an important part of democratic decisions is that they bring about outcomes that everyone accepts and has a moral duty to comply with. Part of reaching an outcome that is morally binding is about developing a democratic process that sufficiently respects each actor so that each has a moral duty to comply with the outcome of that process. Given that our aim is to reach a procedure that each considers sufficiently fair so that its outcome is acceptable to all, arguments for democracy are likely to provide some ideas for the underlying values of procedural justice.

A further reason for looking at democracy is that some accounts of what grounds democracy appeal to the intrinsic value of procedures in reaching an outcome that all can accept as binding. That is, not only do these accounts of democracy share the ends that procedural justice should achieve, but they also do so by developing sufficiently fair procedures. Given that the UNFCCC needs procedures that are sufficiently fair that each decision-maker can accept the outcome, even if they disagree with the correctness of the outcome itself, democracy should provide one way of starting to think about what fair procedures should look like.

For these reasons, it is helpful to examine the normative grounds of democracy to gain an understanding of the value and nature of procedural justice. There are at least three prominent arguments for democracy that are worthwhile exploring as possible grounds for procedural justice: autonomy, equality, and justification.

Some argue that democracy is important on the basis of autonomy.³ People generally think that autonomy is a fundamentally important feature of our lives, and participating in decisions allows people to have some sort of input over important decisions the affect their lives. Many democratic decisions have profound impacts on people’s lives. By taking part in these decisions, people can act as authors of the rules that govern them. The important point is that people are able to maintain some degree of self-government, even in a society where it’s necessary to make decisions that restrict people’s autonomy in profound ways. In Chap. 4, I emphasised this point when I argued for the importance of participation in a decision-making process as a matter of autonomy. I argued that people have a right to representation in decision-making processes that coerce them, partly because coercion is damaging for autonomy and participation partially remedies this damage. This also fits with our thoughts about what’s important in a democratic process. People usually think that having some sort of input into or control over a decision is important. That is, it’s important that people actually vote in a decision, rather than just having their preferences collected and aggregated, even if they ultimately arrive at the same outcome.⁴

An alternative justification for democracy concerns equality. Egalitarian arguments often start by considering how people should address the problem of disagreement in society. Thomas Christiano advocates such an approach that focuses on giving each actor’s interests equal consideration (Christiano 2008). Christiano argues that each individual has a fundamental interest in being treated as an equal in society. For Christiano, democracy is desirable because it is the only way of achieving this end when there is significant disagreement about justice in society (Christiano 1990, 2008).⁵ Each individual’s interests are intertwined with fundamental features of society and there are inevitable conflicts between different people’s interests. Given this, one way of treating people’s interests equally is to give each person an equal say in democratic decisions. Democracy does this by giving each individual the equal ability to advance his or her concerns in decisions about the organisation of society. According to Christiano, this leads us to a democratic process with features such as equal voting power, equality of opportunity to run for office, and equal opportunities to participate in democratic decisions.

A further argument for democracy is based on the importance of justifiability. This is basis for some arguments for deliberative democracy.⁶ The idea behind deliberative democracy is that outcomes are legitimate to the extent that they are the result of free and reasoned deliberation among equal actors. The process of deliberation involves arriving at a consensus through the exchange of mutually acceptable reasons. Each decision-maker puts forward reasons that others can come to accept or, to put it another way, reasons that are justifiable to others. According to Gutmann and Thompson, when there is disagreement and reasonable pluralism, citizens owe each other justifications for the laws that they impose on one another as a basic moral ideal. In Gutmann and Thompson’s terms, this notion of ‘reciprocity’ allows us to arrive at an outcome in a way that treats each actor with sufficient respect so that each can accept the outcome as binding (Gutmann and Thompson 2000).⁷ The key point is that deliberative decisions produce legitimate outcomes, in the sense that these outcomes can be justified to others. Justification seems a promising ideal that democratic processes should aspire to. Because the aim of a deliberative process is to arrive at an outcome that each actor is willing to support, it shares some of our motives for designing a fair decision-making process.

There are of course many other reasons for thinking that democratic processes are important. In particular, some people claim that democracy is important for instrumental reasons, such as the desirable outcomes and externalities that it produces. But the arguments presented here represent the most prominent intrinsic arguments for democracy. They also seem to align with much of the thinking around what’s important for democracy in the negotiations of the UNFCCC. As I argued in Chap. 4, actors attribute a great deal of value to being able to participate in COP negotiations as independent agents. These are matched by claims around equality and justification. Given that ideals of democracy can provide one way of thinking about the ideals that ground procedural justice, these arguments can help us think about the normative ideals that ground procedural justice. This gives us a platform for thinking about what fair procedures look like. In what follows, I claim that fair procedures are those that respect these values, as well as some other normative values.

The UNFCCC needs procedures that are sufficiently fair so that its outcomes are universally acceptable. Christiano’s argument for equality provides one way of thinking about how we can achieve this goal. Christiano’s argument focuses on the need to respect interests when it is necessary to make decisions about the arrangement of society, and when people disagree about how this should be done. Given that it allows us to reach an agreement that treats each decision-maker fairly, this seems an appropriate way for thinking about fair procedures in the UNFCCC. But this isn’t the only thing that’s important here. As I suggested earlier, there is also something important about the fact that decision-makers actually play a role in reaching these decisions. This suggests that fair procedures should also pay some respect to autonomy in the UNFCCC. It isn’t enough that decision-makers’ interests are advanced equally in a decision; the decision-makers themselves must play some role in the way that this happens.

Further to equality and autonomy, fair procedures are those in which decision-makers justify decisions to one another. In order to see this, it’s worth recalling the argument from Chap. 3, where I suggested that fair procedures are those in which reasonable actors respect each other’s claims. In this respect, it is not enough that decision-makers put forward claims in a decision-making process; decision-makers should justify their claims to one another in terms of reasonableness. This means that fair procedures are those in which decision-makers justify their decisions to one another. Justification implies that decision-makers respect one another and offer reasons that others can accept as reasonable, even if they disagree with the correctness of those reasons. This is how arguments for deliberative democracy typically proceed. These arguments are based on the idea that decision-makers should deliberate with one another by providing reasons that each can endorse. In this sense, fair procedures are also those that respect justification through deliberation.

Although there may be some conflict between these values, on the whole, these ideals all point in the same direction when we’re thinking about fair procedures. These values suggest that it is necessary to give each actor equal respect and recognition in a decision-making process. They also suggest that decisions should be grounded in some notion of equality. Further, they all emphasise the agency of individuals, suggesting that decision-making processes should respect individuals as autonomous agents. Whilst there are different reasons for supporting fair procedures, for the most part, these all endorse the same approach to procedural justice.

This provides three intrinsic grounds for fair procedures. But these values aren’t just important for the fairness of decision-making procedures in the UNFCCC. Designing decision-making procedures that respect autonomy, equality and justification brings about other, instrumental benefits, and it’s worth briefly commenting on these.

For one thing, designing decision-making procedures that respect these values should also bring about decisions that accurately reflect the preferences and promote the interests of decision-makers. That is, decisions should also be more desirable on epistemic grounds. Some ways of making decisions, such as flipping a coin, fall down in this respect. But designing procedures that respect the values outlined above can bring about outcomes that have more epistemic value. For example, procedures that respect autonomy by giving people control over decisions are likely to lead to more accurate outcomes, since people are often best placed to know what their interests are. Alternatively, procedures in which people justify their decisions to one another are likely to be epistemically superior, because deliberation encourages people to learn about each other’s interests (Christiano 1996, p. 84). It is therefore important that decision-making procedures accurately reflect the interests and preferences of a group as much as possible.

In addition to the epistemic accuracy of a procedure, solidarity is also important for designing procedures in the UNFCCC. Following the discussion from Chap. 3, it is not enough that the procedures of the UNFCCC are fair; decision-makers must perceive these procedures as fair. This is so that it can gain the necessary support for coordinating action on a large scale. But this means that other factors are also important for assuring decision-makers that their interests are sufficiently taken into account in a decision-making process. In this respect, solidarity is also important, in the sense that it encourages decision-makers to see the process as fair and it instils institutional norms of cooperation and collective action.

But this isn’t all that’s important; fair procedures are also those that pay attention to some substantive values. In Chap. 2, I argued that there is reasonable disagreement about some of the ends that the UNFCCC should pursue. But this does not imply that there is complete disagreement on this issue. In fact, it is likely that there is a great deal that decision-makers will agree about on what it should achieve, including issues such as the need to avoid dangerous climate change, and the need to avoid outcomes that violate people’s basic human rights. The UNFCCC should certainly have procedures that avoid these sorts of ends, and the existence of reasonable disagreement doesn’t refute this approach. Whilst decision-makers may disagree on some issues, it is likely that they will agree on some substantive ends. In this respect, there are also some minimum substantive ends that procedures should achieve.

Now that I’ve introduced the grounds of procedural justice, it is possible to think about what fair procedures look like in the UNFCCC. The remainder of this chapter provides some initial ideas about what this means for decision-making in general by defining a notion of political equality for procedural justice. It then shows how this notion of political equality should be interpreted in the UNFCCC.

Many people think that political equality is an important part of fair procedures. That is, there is something intrinsically valuable about the fact that decision-makers are equal in some respect. These arguments also arise in the context of climate change negotiations, where many have commented on the unfair disparity of resources that different delegations have for influencing decisions. In this section, I use the normative arguments developed in section two to think about what fair procedures look like in the UNFCCC.

In doing so, I argue that there are two principles of political equality for climate change institutions. The first principle is that, (1) decision-makers should have equal status in a decision-making process. In this case, equal status concerns both (1.1) equal status by the decision-making authority, and (1.2) equal status by other decision-makers.

But in addition to this, political equality implies a second principle; (2) decision-makers should have the equal opportunity to influence decisions. There are two subsidiary principles for achieving the equal opportunity to influence decisions: (2.1) decision-makers should have sufficient resources to participate on equal terms and (2.2) the rules of a decision-making process should be such that decision-makers face a level playing field. In what follows, I draw on the earlier arguments of this chapter to show why these principles are necessary for procedural justice. I then show how these principles can be achieved in the UNFCCC by making some practical policy recommendations that can serve as a guide for thinking about its procedural reform.

An example that illustrates how the UNFCCC sometimes falls down on this issue concerns the language of negotiation documents. Sometimes, the documentation given to decision-makers is only provided in certain languages (UNfairplay 2011). Delegates whose native languages aren’t included in these documents may still be capable of participating in decisions effectively, if these delegates speak the languages that are represented, or employ translators. But this still represents a matter of procedural justice, even if people can participate on equal terms. The point is that some actors are treated unequally by the decision to publish documents in specific languages.

This means that decision-makers are treated alike, to the extent that they are equal in other important respects.⁸ This is similar to David Estlund’s notion of anonymity, where anonymity means that, to the extent that each actor is equal, they should be treated as if they are interchangeable (Estlund 2008, p. 73). Equal status means that the rules do not single out any particular individual (provided that they are equal in every other sense) (Cohen 1997, p. 74). For Knight and Johnson, this means that procedures shouldn’t discriminate between decision-makers (Knight and Johnson 1997, p. 288). There may be good reasons for treating actors differently if, for example, someone is unreasonable, or affected by a decision more than another actor.